Washington proclaimed that the elections were a victory for the Iraqis and democracy, but it of course knew that they weren't. The Iraqis -- probably including those who are elected officials -- have by now understood that they weren't a victory for them or democracy either, by simply looking at the real world around them: Iraq has become more dangerous, and it has become even harder to make ends meet, since the elections.
Daily Attacks by Insurgents: May 2003 5 May 2004 53 May 2005 70 May 2006 90
Monthly Incidents of Sectarian Violence: May 2003 5 May 2004 10 May 2005 20 May 2006 250 SOURCE: Nina Kamp, Michael O'Hanlon, and Amy Unikewicz, "The State of Iraq: An Update," New York Times, 16 June 2006 <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/StateofIraq16Jun06.gif>
Note the more than tenfold increase in sectarian violence since the elections. IMHO, the elections did not help quell insurgency (which too has increased, albeit more slowly than sectarian violence), and they only helped to create the conditions for a dramatic rise in sectarian violence by institutionalizing and encouraging competition among sects for political power.
As for economy:
<blockquote>For Mehdi Dawood, Iraq's failures have leached into the cucumbers, a staple of every meal that now devours a fifth of his monthly pension.
And it is not just the vegetables. Fuel and electricity prices are up more than 270 percent from last year's, according to Iraqi government figures. Tea in some markets has quadrupled, egg prices have doubled, and all over the country the daily routine now includes a new question: What can be done without?
"Meat, I just don't buy it anymore," said Mr. Dawood, 66, holding half-filled bags at a market in Baghdad. "It's too expensive."
"We are all suffering," he said. "It's the government's fault. There is no security. There is no stability."
As if Iraqis did not have enough to worry about. Going to the market already requires courage — after repeated bombings there — and now life's most basic needs are becoming drastically more expensive.
Three months into the administration of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, the inflation rate has reached 70 percent a year, up from 32 percent last year. Wages are flat, banks are barely functioning and the consensus among many American and Iraqi officials is that inflation is most likely to accelerate.
. . . . . .
Mr. Maliki's office has responded with proposals to spur foreign investment and calls for public patience, even forgiveness. (Damien Cave, "Weary Iraqis Face New Foe: Rising Prices," <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/26/world/middleeast/26iraq.html>)</blockquote>
This government can provide neither security nor jobs nor bare essentials, therefore it cannot win the allegiance of a majority of Iraqis. It doesn't have the power of the purse, nor does it have loyal troops who answer only to its command. So, it can't do anything to force the departure of US and other foreign troops, which is what Iraqis are said to desire.
The only people who still think that the elections were a victory for the Iraqis must be some liberals and leftists in the West (if I may assume that Achcar, Cole, Chomsky, etc. have not changed their minds).
> Certain individual UIA leaders (generally the ones in
> tailored suits) are dependent on the Americans because when the US
> leaves, their gravy train is over. But the UIA is more than those
> individuals - it's a collection of mass parties with deep roots in every
> Shiite neighborhood, as well as guns, money, and fighters. The fortunes
> of the tailored-suited politicians may ebb and flow but the UIA is an
> immovable mass that will still be there after the US leaves, whenever
> that happens.
The United Iraqi Alliance is not a cohesive political party itself, and it is a fragile alliance: e.g., between the January and December 2005 elections, Moqtada al-Sadr's party chose to join the Alliance, and the Iraqi National Congress and Iraqi Hezbollah left it to form their own lists. It has no roots at all among Kurds and Sunnis, so, when the Americans leave, it will probably just dissolve, its constituents controlling their respective neighborhoods in predominantly Shi'i areas, with Sunni and Kurdish militias controlling theirs.
The Iraqi people urgently need a national liberation front that is made up of Shi'is, Sunnis, and Kurds, which the UIA isn't and which can't come about through elections, which tend to divide rather than unite. Only such a national liberation front that has legitimacy in the eyes of all major constituencies in Iraq can credibly offer amnesty to nationalist guerrillas and isolate and liquidate sectarian terrorists.
I hope that Tehran will come to understand that, rather than setting store by the UIA as you seem to.
> > Why did you think that Washington wouldn't be able to work with
> > Islamist parties? Precedents from Afghanistan to Bosnia tell us that
> > religion is hardly an obstacle when it comes to choosing allies and
> > proxies.
>
> In principle, there's nothing keeping the US from working with, or
> allying with, Islamists. To quote the Violent Femmes, they do it all the
> time. But in the case of Iraq, they did not want, under any
> circumstances, to be forced to work with these particular Islamists.
> SCIRI and Dawa are friends of Iran. US policy has always been based on
> preventing any one bloc from having preponderance in the Gulf. That's
> why we supported Saddam.
Yes, dual containment, the policy ended by the US invasion of Iraq. That Dawa and SCIRI are "friends" of Tehran, however, isn't a problem for Washington if it makes friends with Tehran itself: a grand bargain a la Nixon in China at best, or security guarantees and a package of economic incentives in return for Tehran's collaboration with Washington in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine. Almost all political factions in Iran, except the one headed by the President of Iran, would be very happy to take either, wouldn't they? Tel Aviv might not be happy, but, then, tell it to shut the fuck up.
Washington wouldn't do either, though, for it is still driven by a fantasy of remaking the Middle East, to the imagined benefit of itself and Tel Aviv.
> > Can this government do anything that Washington doesn't really like?
>
> The Iraqi government may occasionally be deterred from doing things
> Washington doesn't like. But the reverse it true, too. That's hugely
> important. Rumsfeld was reported to be very nervous about US support for
> Israel's attack on Hezbollah precisely because he feared a grassroots
> Iraqi rebellion.
But a grassroots Iraqi rebellion didn't happen, except a large pro-Hizballah demonstration led by Moktada al-Sadr, which is one of the reasons why his organization is the chief Shi'i target of Washington today.
> On the reconciliation plan: I'm not sure of this, but my sense is that
> the Bush admin. wasn't necessarily monolithically opposed to it. They
> got out-demogogued by the Dems. For obvious political reasons they could
> hardly come out swinging for a plan to amnesty people who killed Americans.
Washington kept whittling the reconciliation plan till no one who has ever taken up arms against anyone could be given amnesty, i.e., till the concept became empty. :-0
Not that the reconciliation plan offered by the present Iraqi government could solve anything (see above). -- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>
