> Dennis: That doesn't mean we can't have a conversation without
> stopping to contemplate how every word came to have its meaning But
> in the context of what we were talking about I thought my question
> was relevant because I asked why your use of "view" was not a problem
> while "reading" as used in contemporary theory was.
JM: For the same reason that your use of the word "contemplate" is not a problem. I know that you do not mean to refer to auguries and that we should move into the "templum", the religious space, above and below to follow the auguries, by looking at that sky. You do not mean sky watching for birds when you say contemplate. But if you used the word in a systematic way so that it became a religious term, then I would call you on it. The fact that I know the history of ancient Roman divination and you don't would of course not matter, because fairness of argument doesn't matter for an augur.
> Jerry wrote: >But for some reason Dennis, you claim that I can't use the word
> >"vision", as I do.... without implying all of the mishigosh about
> >"light", "gnosis" "spirit", and seeing "God."
>
>
> Dennis: Well, I would say that using the word as you do does imply all that
> mishigosh because that is how the meaning you assume we understand
> came about.
JM: Quite frankly I think that you are simply avoiding a conversation of any kind. I have not used the word "vision" in a systematically misleading way or to imply any alliance with a culture of the primacy of vision. Your supposed history of some sort of "theory" that imposes an equation vision = knowledge is bogus. The fact is you have not addressed anything I have said you have only asserted on your authority that I some how use the word vision in a systematically misleading way. What you are referring to is the debate over the cultural bias of the primacy of vision. If I have ever shown this bias show me where. Don't take a few quotes, here and there, show me how I have done it please.
> This comes down to what I think the value of capital T theory is. It
> helps us question assumptions and I think that's a good thing.
I am defending theory. But I believe your use of the word "theory" devalues it. You devalue it by insisting there are theories where there are none. I believe that theory is important. I have said so in many places.
I just don't believe in pretending that we have "certain" knowledge and good theoretical explanations where we have none. I don't believe in pretending that we have good explanatory models of history or the economy, when all of them we have had tried so far have not shown their worth. The pretense to knowledge is often a sign of a dangerous and elitist intellectual.
I use the word theory in a strict sense and have always said so. Astrology is not a "theory." There are good theories of thermodynamics. Psychoanalysis is a "theory" that has failed, time and time again. On the other hand there is a good theory of species change through time. We have no good theories of human behavior or, though Chris Doss would laugh, of bee behavior for that matter. For some reason, that I can speculate about, good theoretical explanations are very hard to come by, and are limited and deep when we do come by them. I have never claimed that theory was bad, or oppressive or illegitimate or what ever.
One thing about good theories is that they are almost like language, when we hook on to them they almost grow themselves and lead to places that bring surprising results. I don't know if you have read Stephen Jay Gould but I would put it this way for short if you have. I pretty much agree with him on the need for theory and what makes a very few theories good and most contenders for providing theoretical explanation bogus.
> This conversation has shifted from a focus on critical theory being
> characterized by bad writing and incomprehensibility to what it has
> contributed that's valuable.
For me the conversation has always been about intellectuals and their institutions and the way they use their institutions to mystify and reproduce ideology. The incomprehensibility of certain intellectuals, their refusal to talk to or engage with or side with the working classes, their insistence on their special and priestly knowledge, whether those intellectuals reside in legal institutions, business institutions, scientific institutions, or academic institutions is what is the "matter". And it is funny that is the "matter" you have never engaged no matter when I bring up. There is no particular reason why I should in principle look at the intellectual institutions perpetuated by intellectuals in the humanities with as much skepticism and, where appropriate scorn, as I look at institutions created by corporate lawyers. Granted corporate lawyers "do" more harm to wage earners than humanities intellectuals, but potentially intellectuals in the humanities could benefit wage earners more than corporate lawyers can possibly do so. They can do so by "choosing" to talk and ally themselves with the working classes. And it is the same with a higher level of analysis. There is no reason why I should in principle be less scathing in my critique of the obscurantism and elitism of educational institutions than I am of legal institutions.
But for some reason I am supposed to apply a double standard. If I critique the institutions of the legal system in the way I have the institutions of the humanities intellectuals, only a few lawyers treat my arguments with scorn and sophistry and pick at words like vision in the way you do. But if I attack the institutions of the nice humanist intellectuals and their priestly obfuscations, then watch out if you say, "my view" instead of "my way of understanding." Then this shows that you are sunk into some kind of
Jerry Monaco