(The guy is well known in leftish policy circles, but I can't remember his name. He does education stuff usually.)
On 2/10/06, Wojtek Sokolowski <sokol at jhu.edu> wrote:
> Michael P:
>
> > Since the likelihood that a corporation will obey the law
> > depends on the likelihood of potential sanctions, only huge
> > judgments can deter business from cutting corners, even where
> > public safety is put at risk. Reducing the costs that
> > corporations face obviously increases their incentive to
> > ignore legal requirements. For example, Ford never faced
> > criminal charges in the Pinto case. Instead, those who
> > suffered injury or their loved ones could only sue the
> > company for damages in civil court.
>
> This is only one aspect of tort litigation, one that is least objectionable.
> I see nothing wrong with making corporations pay for "cutting corners."
> However, the above does not address my main objections to the current
> system. These are:
>
> 1. Litigations against government entities effectively "privatize" public
> resources i.e. transfer tax revenue that can be used for public purposes
> (e.g. schools, roads, etc.) into a private windfall. Compensation for
> actual losses is one thing but everything above it is windfall to the
> plaintiff, i.e. privatization of public resources.
>
> 2. Imposing added "transaction cost" for cutting corners on corporations -
> while justified - does not have to translate into private windfalls - it can
> be a sum paid to a public interest organization, as it is routinely
> practiced in Europe. Thus, if a plaintiff wins, he/she can win back actual
> losses (including time, lost earnings, actual legal cost etc.), but the
> "punitive damages" should go in their entirety to a public interest
> organization identified by the court; instead of ending up in the pockets of
> the defense attorneys and their clients.
>
> 3. Private litigation does not address the systemic problem of standard
> enforcement. In fact, corporations can afford the risk of individual
> litigation if they know that otherwise standards are not enforced. This is
> a casino style public policy enforcement is really a gamble on someone
> willing to file a suit, a gamble on legal manipulations, etc.
>
> 4. Using private litigation instead of public policy and taxation is a very
> ineffective way of recovering the cost of corporate malfeasance. In fact,
> the chances are that most of the cost of that malfeasance will never be
> recovered (cf. tobacco litigation). Passing an excise tax on products that
> are likely to produce public harm, and vigorous government enforcement of
> safety standards with hefty fees for violations are a much more effective
> way.
>
> Wojtek
>
>
>
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-- Jim Devine
Bust Big Brother Bush!