--- Jim Devine <jdevine03 at gmail.com> wrote:
> a economic journalist whose last name (I believe) is
> Rothenburg had a
> good proposal about law suits. Regular damages
> should be paid to the
> plaintiff (as happens now). But punitive damages
> should go into
> government revenues, The latter (1) plays the
> "governmental" role of
> punishing bad behavior without bringing in criminal
> law and (2)
> undermines the incentive to artificially expand
> punitive damages just
> so that the lawyer and (to a lesser extent) the
> plaintiff can get
> rich.
>
> (The guy is well known in leftish policy circles,
> but I can't remember
> his name. He does education stuff usually.)
>
> On 2/10/06, Wojtek Sokolowski <sokol at jhu.edu> wrote:
> > Michael P:
> >
> > > Since the likelihood that a corporation will
> obey the law
> > > depends on the likelihood of potential
> sanctions, only huge
> > > judgments can deter business from cutting
> corners, even where
> > > public safety is put at risk. Reducing the
> costs that
> > > corporations face obviously increases their
> incentive to
> > > ignore legal requirements. For example, Ford
> never faced
> > > criminal charges in the Pinto case. Instead,
> those who
> > > suffered injury or their loved ones could only
> sue the
> > > company for damages in civil court.
> >
> > This is only one aspect of tort litigation, one
> that is least objectionable.
> > I see nothing wrong with making corporations pay
> for "cutting corners."
> > However, the above does not address my main
> objections to the current
> > system. These are:
> >
> > 1. Litigations against government entities
> effectively "privatize" public
> > resources i.e. transfer tax revenue that can be
> used for public purposes
> > (e.g. schools, roads, etc.) into a private
> windfall. Compensation for
> > actual losses is one thing but everything above it
> is windfall to the
> > plaintiff, i.e. privatization of public resources.
> >
> > 2. Imposing added "transaction cost" for cutting
> corners on corporations -
> > while justified - does not have to translate into
> private windfalls - it can
> > be a sum paid to a public interest organization,
> as it is routinely
> > practiced in Europe. Thus, if a plaintiff wins,
> he/she can win back actual
> > losses (including time, lost earnings, actual
> legal cost etc.), but the
> > "punitive damages" should go in their entirety to
> a public interest
> > organization identified by the court; instead of
> ending up in the pockets of
> > the defense attorneys and their clients.
> >
> > 3. Private litigation does not address the
> systemic problem of standard
> > enforcement. In fact, corporations can afford the
> risk of individual
> > litigation if they know that otherwise standards
> are not enforced. This is
> > a casino style public policy enforcement is really
> a gamble on someone
> > willing to file a suit, a gamble on legal
> manipulations, etc.
> >
> > 4. Using private litigation instead of public
> policy and taxation is a very
> > ineffective way of recovering the cost of
> corporate malfeasance. In fact,
> > the chances are that most of the cost of that
> malfeasance will never be
> > recovered (cf. tobacco litigation). Passing an
> excise tax on products that
> > are likely to produce public harm, and vigorous
> government enforcement of
> > safety standards with hefty fees for violations
> are a much more effective
> > way.
> >
> > Wojtek
> >
> >
> >
> > ___________________________________
> >
>
http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/mailman/listinfo/lbo-talk
> >
>
>
> --
> Jim Devine
>
> Bust Big Brother Bush!
>
> ___________________________________
>
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>
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