[lbo-talk] Dov Weisglass on the Palestinians: "We have to make them much thinner, but not enough to die'"

joanna 123hop at comcast.net
Fri Feb 17 11:06:32 PST 2006


This is absurd. It would not have mattered what the election results were. If not radical enough, that would mean Israel could pursue its unilateralist policy over a quiescent opponent. If too radical, then once again, there would be "no partner for peace."

Israel's expansionist and yes, genocidal, policies have been in place for a long time and will continue ....

Joanna

Bryan Atinsky wrote:


>
> Dov Weisglass, was Sharon's friend and top advisor, and apparently
> acts as Olmert's also, said something very interesting, published
> today in Ha'aretz, on Israel's intention in cutting funds to the PA.
>
> http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/683458.html
>
> "'It's like a meeting with a dietician. We have to make them much
> thinner, but not enough to die,' said the prime minister's adviser Dov
> Weissglas."
>
> also related is this: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/684030.html
>
> Sorry if sometimes I come across as "advertising-esque" (including the
> following) but so much of my energy writing on the Palestinian/Israeli
> conflict goes into my work editing "News from Within" and often I
> think that what is written there and by others at/for the AIC is
> pertinent to the discussion here...(and actually, it works both ways,
> because I sometimes find that things I write on LBO-talk become the
> seeds of the Letter from the Editors for the next issue.)
>
> Anyway, the latest Letter from the Editors touches I think acts as a
> good reply to the plans of Israel vis-a-vis the PA and Palestinian
> people.
>
> http://alternativenews.dyndns.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=385&Itemid=70&lang=ISO-8859-1
>
>
> Letter from the Editors
>
> On 25 January 2006, the Palestinian people voted in the first
> Palestinian Legislative Council elections in ten years. While many
> projected outcomes of a Hamas plurality, in the final tally, taking
> seventy-six seats out of a total of 132, Hamas won a surprising
> majority position in the legislature.
>
> Numerous Israeli and international politicians and media pundits have
> been arguing that this victory for Hamas in the elections was a
> deliberate Palestinian “vote against peace.” Yet, they exhibit no
> aspiration to understand the complicated social and political context
> of contemporary Palestine, the results of Israel’s longstanding
> unilateralist approach, the continuing expansion of the Israeli
> Occupation, or the very bases on which the Palestinians themselves
> made their voting decisions. Instead, a very simplistic equation—that
> a vote for Hamas is a vote for terror and against peace—is projected.
> These assertions do not stand up to the evidence, however.
>
> First, it’s important to highlight that, due to a two-tiered electoral
> system featuring multi-member districts and a national proportional
> list, the elections results do not reflect a strict proportion of
> votes cast for a particular party or candidates aligned with that
> party. The multi-member district system penalizes ticket-splitting and
> rewards parties with greater cohesion.(1) Thus, Hamas was able to win
> without receiving the majority of the Palestinian vote, a little more
> than 44.4 percent, in comparison to 41.4 percent going to Fatah.
> Moreover, the remaining 14 percent of the popular vote went largely to
> secular parties, made up of former Fatah members and leftist parties
> such as the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine. This
> means that over 55 percent of the Palestinian vote did not go to
> parties or independent candidates aligned with Hamas. And
> significantly, time after time—including in the run-up to the
> elections—opinion polls of the Palestinian public have revealed that a
> majority of Palestinians are actually willing and interested in a
> realistic negotiated settlement.
>
> Between 6-15 December 2005, a little over one month before the PLC
> elections, a joint Palestinian/Israeli opinion poll was conducted by
> the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah and
> the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at
> the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.2 Fifty-five percent of
> Palestinians polled stated that they would support an agreement on
> final borders, based on the 1967 lines, except for about three percent
> of the West Bank, which would be exchanged for an Israeli territory of
> equal size. Moreover, 64 percent of the Palestinians polled supported
> “a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the
> permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end
> of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side.”
>
> Yet, disregarding the implications of these polls, the current Israeli
> administration has taken the election results as a cue to continue its
> unilateralist approach with additional zeal, and begin to implement
> its designs to formalize control over large tracts of the OPT through
> annexation.
>
> Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has declared that the Israeli
> government will not enter into any negotiations with a Palestinian
> government that includes Hamas, so long as Hamas does not lay down its
> arms and accept the Israel’s “right to exist.” This, despite the fact
> that, according to the same December poll discussed above: “50 percent
> of the Israelis support […] negotiations with Hamas if this is called
> for in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians.”
> While this poll was conducted before the elections, it was well known
> in Israel at the time that there was a significant chance Hamas would
> either finish the elections in a close second to Fatah or gain a
> plurality of the Palestinian vote. This reveals a significant
> disconnect between the Israeli government’s hard-line stance and the
> more conciliatory or ambivalent Israeli population.
>
> Moreover, Acting PM Olmert stated on 7 February that Israel would make
> unilateral moves to determine ‘its final borders.’ In what can only be
> understood as an attempt to implement a plan originally spelled out as
> far back as 1967 by General Yigal Allon, Israel would annex
> significant portions of the OPT, leaving islands of Palestinian
> autonomy surrounded on all sides by Israeli control. Specifically,
> Olmert declared intentions to annex “the main settlement blocs and
> preserve united Jerusalem. [...] Ma’aleh Adumim, Gush Etzion and Ariel
> will be part of the state of Israel” (Aluf Benn and Mazal Mualem in
> Ha’aretz, 8 Feb). In addition, he vowed that Israel would retain
> control over the Jordan Valley, which would effectively cut the
> Occupied Palestinian Territories off from Jordan. Implementation of
> this plan would never be accepted by the Palestinian people and is a
> sure recipe for perpetual war. Moreover, this once again, reveals a
> strong disparity between the Israeli government and public over the
> willingness to make concessions. According to an opinion poll on the
> subject of Jerusalem, published in January 2006 by the Tazpit Research
> Institute for the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS), 63
> percent of Israelis polled stated that they would be willing to give
> up control over East Jerusalem or more, in exchange for a settlement
> with the Palestinians. In addition, Israeli opinion polls, including
> the joint poll mentioned above, have consistently shown that the
> Israeli public is willing to make concessions based on the 1967 borders.
>
> Potentially more devastating in the immediate future for the
> Palestinian population is the likelihood of a drastic cut in the flow
> of funds to both the PA and Palestinian civil institutions. Yet, while
> the US and Europe may have the freedom of stopping the flow of funds,
> this would not be so simple for the Israeli government to do. Israel
> can elect not to recognize Hamas and/or negotiate with it, but the
> victory of Hamas in the PLC elections does not give Israel the right
> to abdicate any of its legal responsibilities. By international law,
> Israel, as an occupying power, is legally responsible for the
> wellbeing of the population under its occupation. According to Article
> 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: “In the case of occupied territory,
> the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after
> the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power
> shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation. [...]” These
> obligations include the provision of education, food, medical supplies
> and health facilities, etc. (please see box on page 5 for specific
> obligations). The fact that up to the present, these basic services
> have been largely provided by the PA, local and international NGOs and
> civil society institutions, does not detract from the fact that, as
> the occupying power, Israel bears sole legal responsibility.
>
> If either the Israeli government or international
> governments/institutions sever funding for the Palestinians, and there
> is a subsequent breakdown in the PA and/ or civil Palestinian
> institutions leading to a humanitarian crisis, the result would be
> nothing other than a war crime committed by Israel. The Israeli
> government has only three options regarding adherence to their
> obligations. It must either make certain that the PA and civil society
> institutions continue to function and provide for the basic needs of
> the Palestinian population, or take over these responsibilities
> directly. The third option, one that would release Israel from its
> legal responsibility over the Palestinians, is the one which Israel
> has not shown any willingness to entertain. Namely, an immediate and
> total end to the Occupation, recognition of the Palestinian Right of
> Return, and respect for the civil, human, and national rights of the
> Palestinians.
>
> Notes:
> (1) For a discussion of the entire poll, see here:
> <http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p18ejoint.html>
> (2) Over a 100 Fatah candidates ran as independents, for instance, and
> there were several smaller lists which appealed to Fatah voters,
> further diluting Fatah’s chances for legislative seats.
>
>
> Some of the relevant articles from the Fourth Geneva Convention
> relating to an Occupying Power’s responsibilities for the provision of
> basic services to the people it occupies(1):
>
> Article 50
>
> “The Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and
> local authorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions
> devoted to the care and education of children. The Occupying Power
> shall take all necessary steps to facilitate the identification of
> children and the registration of their parentage. [...] Should the
> local institutions be inadequate for the purpose, the Occupying Power
> shall make arrangements for the maintenance and education, if possible
> by persons of their own nationality, language and religion, of
> children who are orphaned or separated from their parents as a result
> of the war and who cannot be adequately cared for by a near relative
> or friend. [...] The Occupying Power shall not hinder the application
> of any preferential measures in regard to food, medical care and
> protection against the effects of war, which may have been adopted
> prior to the occupation in favor of children under fifteen years,
> expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven years.”
>
> Article 55
> “To the fullest extent of the means available to it the Occupying
> Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the
> population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary
> foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the
> occupied territory are inadequate. The Occupying Power may not
> requisition foodstuffs, articles or medical supplies available in the
> occupied territory, except for use by the occupation forces and
> administration personnel, and then only if the requirements of the
> civilian population have been taken into account. Subject to the
> provisions of other international Conventions, the Occupying Power
> shall make arrangements to ensure that fair value is paid for any
> requisitioned goods.[...]”
>
> Article 56
> To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying
> Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation
> of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital
> establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied
> territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application
> of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the
> spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. Medical personnel of all
> categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties. [...]”
> In adopting measures of health and hygiene and in their
> implementation, the Occupying Power shall take into consideration the
> moral and ethical susceptibilities of the population of the occupied
> territory.
>
> Article 59
> “If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is
> inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief
> schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by
> all the means at its disposal. Such schemes, which may be undertaken
> either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as
> the International Committee of the Red Cross, shall consist, in
> particular, of the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical
> supplies and clothing. All Contracting Parties shall permit the free
> passage of these consignments and shall guarantee their protection.
> [...]”
>
> Article 60
> “Relief consignments shall in no way relieve the Occupying Power of
> any of its responsibilities under Articles 55, 56 and 59. The
> Occupying Power shall in no way whatsoever divert relief consignments
> from the purpose for which they are intended, except in cases of
> urgent necessity, in the interests of the population of the occupied
> territory and with the consent of the Protecting Power.”
>
>
> Notes:
> (1) For the entire Fourth Geneva Convention, look here:
> <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ menu3/b/92.htm>
>
>
>
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>



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