On Jun 10, 2006, at 10:25 AM, Chris Doss wrote:
> Heidegger would reject this interpretation totally,
> since for him "consciousness" is a derivative notion,
> as is the idea of beings being "outside" some supposed
> "inside." No one has ever experiencd a
> "consciousness." BTW in Heidegger's interpretation
> Aristotle is a fellow-thinker. There is no notion of
> "consciousness" in Aristotle, or in any other
> philosopher before around Descartes. There is the
> soul, but then, "the soul is in a way all things."
> Heidegger supposedly convinced Husserl after many
> years that Aristotle had been the first and greatest
> phenomenologist.
This looks to be a confusion of the idea of "consciousness" as a derivative notion from Descartes idea of mind as a "substance" in the senses I specified with "consciousness" as conceived within an ontology of internal relations (a conception groundable, according to Marx, Husserl and Whitehead, in "phenomenology" in Husserl's sense). The latter conception constitutes all "beings" as "inside" and human "consciousness" as direct awareness of this. As I pointed out, Marx's ideas of "self" and "world" sublate Aristotle (called by Marx "the greatest thinker of antiquity"). This sublation, however, involves rejection of the idea of entities that bear qualities without being themselves qualities. It's a rejection of both this and the Cartesian idea of a "substance" i.e. conceived in this way "being-in is not an attribute, it is not a accidental property of extension".
Ted