Carrol Cox wrote:
> The point is not that Israel is weak but that its strength is grounded
> in, depends on, the overarching power of u.s. imperialism.
>
> And the point is not that the Zionist lobby is weak but that its power
> is grounded in the general ideological and cultural strength of the u.s.
> ruling class.
>
> Hence the lobby can have great influence (defeating Finley -- who
> incidentally probably was anti-semitic), but it would lose that
> influence were it not supported by the cultural and political power of
> the u.s. ruling class.
Massad's critique of M&W's paper misses the main points: that the policies the U.S. follows in the Middle East, whether or not determined by the influence of the Israel lobby, *contradict* the interest of the U.S. capitalists taken as a whole, that the cost of this influence has mounted and become impossibly onerous. These propositions have merit.
Carrol, in apparent agreement with Massad, seems to assume that the goals of Zionism and those of U.S. capitalists are in basic harmony. I doubt that. (Please note: I do not imply that the conflict between Zionism and U.S. capitalism approaches the level of a class antagonism. It's an intra-class affair, but largely consequential when the class struggle is dormant.)
The large size of the U.S. domestic economy, compared both to its international linkages and the world economy, makes it possible for this paradox to exist. The U.S. exercises a tremendous influence abroad and yet remains relatively isolated from the rest of the world!
True that the economic dependence on the rest of the world announces itself periodically (and painfully) as the prices of primary goods cycle. True that the weight of the linkages have grown gradually, most rapidly in the 1990's. But -- using as a standard other rich or rapidly growing countries -- the linkages are still modest relative to the size of the U.S. economy.
In this context, the hijacking of foreign policy by special interests is not unthinkable. Maybe I'm too influenced by fine distinctions made by Marx in Capital, but I see a fundamental difference between capitalist production proper and mere capitalist appropriation of rents. In a mature capitalist society, a society where capitalist production predominates, rentiers can temporarily amass great political power, dictate state policies, etc. -- if and to the extent these policies don't conflict with the interests of the capitalist producers proper. When they do conflict with the interest of the capitalist producers, a crisis will ensue. The crisis may remain unresolved for a long while -- it may take a long time for the affected capitalists to marshal political resources and take care of the problem -- but time *tends* to be on their side. And the reason is clear: value has to be produced before it can be effectively appropriated. The fire in the pants may come from the dissolving effects these policies may have on internal class rule, e.g. they may foster discontent among working people.
Massad suggests that even without Israel, U.S. policies in the Middle East would be imperialist (as they would be in the Caribbean, even without a Miami gusano lobby). That could very well be true, but that does *not* mean that abstracting from Israel (or, say, from the gusanos in Miami), the U.S. imperialist policy in the Middle East (or, say, in the Caribbean) would be a direct, faithful, unmediated expression of the interest of U.S. capitalists taken as a whole. These policies may be great for U.S. special interests, but still contrary to the interest of the U.S. capitalists in general. (For a historic analogy, think of the conflict between the Southern slavocracy and the industrial North.)
If we look at things this way, the role of the Israel (or the gusano) lobby matters because when the balance of power between different factions of the capitalist class is unstable, a small outside influence can be decisive -- and, as in the case of the Iraq war -- the consequences may compound quickly to everyone's surprise. In this case, the Israel lobby may be already contributing disproportionately to sabotaging the interest of U.S. capitalists taken as a whole.
I'd view the paper by M&W as a salvo fired by a wing in the academic establishment, one of the major sources of pro-status quo ideology in the country. The message is that U.S. capitalists, that until now have taken a relaxed, laissez-faire approach to those special interests (after all, in "normal" times, how some people conduct business abroad may have very little to do with my bottom line), may be -- or should be! -- increasingly worried about the consequences of leaving foreign policy in the hands of these special interests. That this salvo has been fired this late in the game attests to the tremendous power the parasites have accrued.
Julio