> Workers have high expectations for the new system to help bring about
> impartial and prompt settlements of labor disputes. But problems remain
> in that there is the possibility that judges in tribunals will propose
> monetary settlements even though the corporate dismissal order is judged
> to be null.
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In fact, virtually all contemporary labour struggles in the advanced
capitalist countries - from the US to France to Japan - are defensive in
nature, a result of the flight of capital to cheap new labour pools in East
Europe, Asia, and elsewhere in the developing world. In essence, they are
reducible to the monetary settlements to be given to workers "downsized"
through layoffs and other forms of dismissal. In these circumstances, the
function of unions has become to a) try to delay and stretch out the
reduction in permanent, full time jobs - ideally through attrition as older
workers leave and are not replaced, and b) obtain the most generous
severance arrangements possible ( termination pay, education allowances, job
search and retirement counselling, recall rights, etc.) when workers are let
go. The state, as in the example quoted above, has increasingly stepped in
to regulate the process, through bankruptcy courts or industrial relations
boards and through legislation.
The US, with the strongest capitalists and weakest unions, is farthest advanced down this road, but the process of weakening union bargaining power and union density is also well underway in the other OECD countries.
The inspiring militancy of the French working class has to unfortunately be seen in this context. Young French and other West European workers are waging a much different kind of struggle than that waged by their parents in the 60s and their grandparents in the 30s for union rights, shorter hours, higher pay, and improved benefits in expanding domestic industries. But at least they are struggling to cushion the impact on themselves of this historic shift in the global labour market.