Defusing the nuclear Middle East
<http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=mj04ramberg>
Joanna replied:
Defusing the nuclear Middle East is a joke if the issue of Israel's several hundred nuclear bombs are not up for discussion.
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Agreed.
This article falls within a popular sub genre of American political essays - an earnestly written "seach for solutions" that fails, despite spraying words like water from a fire hose, to address the true heart of the issue in question. In fact, it's an elaborate deflection designed to argue for an even deeper Western commitment to Israel's ambitions.
The trouble starts here:
Hopes that Tehran had turned the corner were dashed in February, when the IAEA revealed more discrepancies in Iran's reporting. Despite the evidence that it was not complying with its obligations under the NPT--the IAEA's March statement "deplored" Iran's actions--the agency's board of governors gave the mullahs yet another chance to take "pro-active steps" toward resolving outstanding issues Critics were not mollified and suspect that Iran is simply buying time. Tehran's reluctance to reveal its activities in the first place, its resistance to "coming clean" once questions arose, and its insistence on keeping certain details of its nuclear program off limits cloud its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.
Some fear that the commencement of power generation at the Bushehr nuclear reactor is Iran's next step toward building nuclear weapons. Although Tehran will be obligated to return the spent fuel to Russia, should it begin domestic enrichment--which could provide fuel as well as weapons-grade material--the repatriation obligation would cease. And, should Tehran go forward with its proposed natural uranium reactor, it could extract plutonium from that plant.
[...]
Iran "could extract plutonium". Iran hasn't violated the terms of the NPT but there are "discrepancies in Iran's reporting." Although the actual details of the problem - as defined by the IAEA - do not amount to a true nuclear crisis Mr. Ramberg borrows (though in a, on the surface, calm and measured fashion) Washington's alarmist rhetoric about the impending doom that is Iran's alleged nuclear weapons ambitions.
But a closer examination of the IAEA report Mr. Ramberg cites reveals a document unburdened by American heavy breathing.
On April 29, 2006, Prof. Juan Cole wrote:
IAEA Finds no Proof of Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program
In its April 28 report, the International Atomic Energy Agency mentioned the UNSC mandate to Iran of last February:
• re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
• reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
• ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
• pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;
• implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations.
Despite not being fully in compliance with these demands, Iran maintains that it is in fact fulfilling its obligations under the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty.
The IAEA found no smoking gun.
Here is its conclusion, which others will not quote for you at such length:
33. All the nuclear material declared by Iran to the Agency is accounted for. Apart from the small quantities previously reported to the Board, the Agency has found no other undeclared nuclear material in Iran. However, gaps remain in the Agency’s knowledge with respect to the scope and content of Iran’s centrifuge programme. Because of this, and other gaps in the Agency’s knowledge, including the role of the military in Iran’s nuclear programme, the Agency is Unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
34. After more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern. '
This ambiguity is being twisted by the Bush administration to make it seem as though Iran has done something illegal. The report can be read to say that there is no evidence that Iran is doing anything illegal.
In fact, under the NPT, countries do have the right to do the sort of experiments Iran is doing. Most of the complaints are not about substance but about something else.
[...]
full -
<http://www.juancole.com/2006/04/iaea-finds-no-proof-of-iranian-nuclear.html>
So from the beginning, Mr. Rambert is on shaky ground, building his case for action upon an excited over-interpretation of the IAEA's assertions.
But wait, there's more.
Carrol mentioned that Israel isn't mentioned.
Actually, it is but in the usual way.
Mr. Rambert knows that any discussion of a nuclear free Middle East must include Isreal. But how?
Standard operating procedure is to emphasize Tel Aviv's security concerns while downplaying (or ignoring) those of its neighbors.
Rambert writes:
Nonproliferation enforcement clearly is the objective of military action, the third approach. Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak reactor marks the sole attack on the nuclear war-making potential of an adversary. Despite its success, the attack provided a cautionary note, as the results were short lived. Military action, like a vaccination, needs a booster shot or the support of some other means to eradicate threats. Saddam Hussein reconstituted his nuclear program, as inspections revealed following his defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. But for that conflict, Baghdad might have the bomb.
[...]
Rambert's statement seems quite ordinary, even antiseptic in its matter-of-fact analysis of Israeli actions (and of course, a good bit of Saddam is tossed in for good measure). Hiding in plain sight is the idea that Tel Aviv, unlike other regional governments, has the right to take preemptive action against the "nuclear war-making potential of an adversary". Aggression is defined as defense as long as its the right state pulling the trigger.
Even though Rambert accepts the idea of preemption as a strategy (again, so long as Israel in in the aggressor role) he acknowledges its "short lived" results, which for him are limited to weapons program neutralization - never mind civilian deaths.
A long lasting solution must be found. Rambert has a plan:
As the Middle East's sole nuclear weapon state, Israel would assume the largest sacrifice under the NWZ [Rambert's concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone]. Its nuclear program would be dismantled and it would
be expected to be a party to the zone and the NPT. The South African, Ukrainian, and Libyan experiences may provide a model for the disassembly of its program.
But why should Israel bear the burden of Iran's violation of the NPT? The sacrifice only makes sense if it is compensated appropriately. The challenge is to fashion a strategy to supplement the NWZ with compensation that will benefit all parties.
NATO membership would offer Israel a key. For the first time in the Jewish state's history, it would find itself under the strategic umbrella of a family of nations formally dedicated to its survival, an ambition that goes back to the founding of the state. This, in turn, would ease the way for Israel to make territorial concessions with the Palestinians and Syrians and end the state of war.
At first blush the merits of this proposal are obvious. The parties, however, would have to overcome significant hurdles. NATO must be convinced that a permanent out-of-theater responsibility in the volatile Middle East serves its interests, and Israel must learn to trust NATO members.
[...]
Again, Rambert asserts Iranian non-compliance with the NPT, though he fails to back this up with a clear statement to that effect by the IAEA, and uses this "threat" to insist upon a formal treaty
arrangement - NATO membership - that would officially sanction Western powers to target Middle Eastern nations with nuclear weapons and other violence on behalf of Israel.
This proposed 'solution', although sold as a bold new approach, is typical of writings by American foreign policy experts; the acceptance of the Bush aministration's sky is falling rhetoric, the elevation
of Israeli concerns above all others, it's all there.
.d.
--------- Folks, if you're like me, you're constantly running from Mexican bandits who're after that diamond you got hidden somewhere on your body.
Olly