The same reluctance is shared by part of the US political establishment. The Wall Street Journal article below notes that "some U.S. officials" believe the Bush administration "has only limited understanding of the fallout from a potential regime change" and that it's "approach has largely been driven by what they describe as President Bush's hatred of Mr. Kim."
The right-wing proponents of tough sanctions seem not to have learned the lessons of Iraq, and argue that a policy aimed at regime change in North Korea (as well as Iran) would be quicker, less expensive, and more efficient than the policy of containment based on economic incentives and security guarantees favoured by the more astute defenders of US imperial interests and their anxious regional allies. ====================================== Asia Weighs Risk of Sanctions North Korea's Neighbors Fear Pressure May Breed Regional Chaos By GORDON FAIRCLOUGH in Shanghai, EVAN RAMSTAD in Seoul, SOUTH KOREA, and JAY SOLOMON in Washington Wall Street Journal October 11, 2006
As the United Nations Security Council mulls sanctions against North Korea, it must consider one question that could affect the stability of North Asia for years to come: Would the collapse of Kim Jong Il's government prove more dangerous than leaving him in charge of a nuclear-armed state?
The prospect of regime change in Pyongyang may cheer many in Washington who view Mr. Kim as running a militarist regime that has tortured and starved its own people and traded missiles to Pakistan, Iran, Syria and others. But turmoil in North Korea could damage the economies of China and South Korea, set off a refugee crisis and lead to military conflict.
How the U.S. and Asia assess these risks could influence the outcome of Security Council meetings to decide how to respond to Pyongyang's announcement Monday that it detonated a nuclear device. The Bush administration is seeking to isolate North Korea, choking off money flow to its elite and preventing it from trading in materials used in weapons systems. It remains to be seen how long the regime would survive under strict sanctions.
Yesterday, China's U.N. Ambassador Wang Guangya told reporters China is willing to back "some punitive actions" but said those actions "have to be appropriate."
Still, the U.S. push for comprehensive sanctions that could topple the Kim regime is likely to be resisted by China and South Korea. "China won't agree to very stern sanctions," said Tao Wenzhao, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. A collapse of the North Korean regime would cause "serious economic and social problems for China" and "be bad for stability in Northeast Asia," he said.
The Bush administration has never formally tied itself to a policy of regime change, but instead it continues to hold open the possibility of negotiating with North Korea to eradicate its weapons programs. At the same time, Washington has ratcheted up financial pressure on Pyongyang over the past two years. That has made it increasingly difficult for North Korea to access outside funds. The U.S. has also, along with Japan, largely stopped food-aid shipments to North Korea. Both countries provided large amounts of such aid to the country in the 1990s.
Many North Korean officials view U.S. policies as wholly focused on removing Kim Jong Il, say people who recently visited. "No doubt that's how they see it," said Selig Harrison, an American researcher who met with senior North Korean officials last month.
Some U.S. officials who have worked on North Korea policy in recent years argue Washington has only limited understanding of the fallout from a potential regime change. They say the Bush administration's approach has largely been driven by what they describe as President Bush's hatred of Mr. Kim, and not a comprehensive strategy.
"I'm sure at times there are people who look at the odds of collapse and there are all sorts of contingency plans," said David Straub, who headed the State Department's Office of Korean Affairs from 2002 to 2004. "But no one really knows if and when there'd be an institutional collapse."
In South Korea, the approach taken by President Roh Moo Hyun -- trying to engage the North with economic incentives -- has meant regime change was rarely discussed in public. In the wake of the claimed nuclear test, some opposition lawmakers are starting to raise the topic.
"The nuclear test changes the circumstance," said Chung Mun Hun, a legislator who belongs to the conservative Grand National Party.
One concern among Chinese and South Korean policy makers is who would take over if Mr. Kim were deposed.
"The alternatives could easily be worse," said Peter Beck, a Korea expert at the nonprofit International Crisis Group. "The most likely thing would be a military junta. That's the best-case scenario."
Another possibility is civil war, with factions within the army and other parts of the elite struggling for control. Such a scenario could prompt China, South Korea or other players to intervene, either to back favored successors or to attempt to quell violence.
U.S. military experts say they expect Chinese troops would move into North Korea to establish a buffer zone and prevent refugee flows across the border. The U.S. military's top priority would be securing North Korea's nuclear material and other suspected weapons of mass destruction.
South Korea's army would likely try to restore order and extend Seoul's U.S.-backed administration over the northern half of the Korean peninsula -- resulting in a possible struggle for influence with China, analysts said.
A collapse of the Kim regime would also likely spark economic dislocation. South Korean government planners predict more than two million North Koreans, out of a population of 23 million, would flee south across the demilitarized zone, overwhelming social services. The planners say financial markets would swoon and inflation would jump. Crisis-management costs alone could total $6.5 billion.
Marcus Noland, a Korea expert at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, estimates the cost of unifying North and South Korea would be about $600 billion over the first decade the two states merged.
Many Chinese fret over the costs of a potential refugee exodus to China's economy. "We worry it will damage China's golden opportunity for development," which needs "a nice stable environment," said Shen Shishun, a researcher at the Chinese Institute of International Studies.
Backers of fast change in North Korea's regime argue that supporting gradual transformation of the North will be far more expensive than a sudden break with the past. They say rebuilding the North Korean economy would be much more efficient with the old regime and its centrally planned economic system out of the way, and both North and South would derive a significant peace dividend by demobilizing their militaries.
Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS think tank in Honolulu, an arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said other countries have tolerated North Korea because the cost of ousting Mr. Kim and rebuilding the country has been perceived to be too high.
"But if the cost of not having regime change is having it as a demonstrated nuclear state, then maybe that cost is too high," he said. "It's got to be the Chinese and South Koreans who say enough is enough."