But the problem with this Eurocentric story is that it obscures the considerable role that Eastern agents have played both in progressive global history and in the rise of Europe, which in turn implies a promiscuous and globally interdependent relationship between East and West. Recently, a number of scholars have undertaken their own ‘voyages of rediscovery’ resulting in various non- Eurocentric explorations of the global-historical rise of the West (Abu-Lughod, 1989; Blaut, 1993; Frank, 1998; Goldstone, 2000; Pomeranz, 2000; Hobson, 2004). Despite all manner of differences, one of the common themes of the alternative post- 1997 departure is the inversion of the standard Eurocentric temporal-narrative. Now the main- stream of global history up to the 19th century appears as Eastern – especially East Asian – and, after a short Western interlude, seems to be Islam led the way in terms of two major indi- cators – extensive and intensive global power. Extensive power refers to the ability of a state or region to spread its economic tentacles outwards, whereas intensive power refers to a leading economy that provides high supply and demand for global trade. Islamic West Asia led the way in both after about 650. Around 1100 the baton of global intensive power was passed not to Italy but to China (during the Sung industrial miracle), where it remained down to the early 19th century. And around 1450 the leading edge of global exten- sive power passed not to the Iberians but to the Chinese. Nevertheless the distribution of global economic power was polycentric for Islamic West Asia and North Africa as well as India and later Japan maintained high levels of intensive and extensive global power. Paradoxically, the official 1434 Chinese ban on foreign trade came just before Chinese external trade escalated (Hobson, 2004: Chapter 3). China’s voracious demand for silver, owing to her hugely productive economy and large trade surplus with the rest of the world, ultimately sucked Europe directly into the Afro-Asian-led global economy. China’s demand for silver provided the main outlet for the plundered Spanish-American bullion, thereby enabling the Europeans to finance both their trade deficit with China (and other Asian
countries) as well as their, albeit modest, presence within the Indian Ocean trading system (Hobson, 2004: Chapter 7). And it enabled the Europeans to directly insert themselves into the global gold–silver arbitrage system that was centred upon China (Flynn and Giraldez, 1994; Frank, 1998). Eurocentrism assumes that the Europeans single-handedly made their own developmental history (and subsequently that of the world’s). But this obscures what I call Oriental globalization wherein advanced Eastern ‘resource portfolios’ diffused along the sinews of the global economy to be eventually assimilated by the Europeans, thereby fuelling the rise of the West throughout the 500–1800 period. So while the Italians led the way in Europe after about 1000, the financial insti- tutions upon which they relied were borrowed from West Asia. Moreover, without the many Islamic ideas that diffused across there might never have been a ‘European’ Renaissance (Goody, 2004; Hobson, 2004: Chapters 6 and 8). In Euro- centrism the Voyages of Discovery signify the emergence of proto-globalization at the hands of the Europeans. But they might better be labelled the Voyages of Rediscovery, given that the regions the Portuguese ‘discovered’ had long been in contact with each other and indirectly with Europe through Oriental globalization. Moreover, without the diffusion of Eastern resource port- folios, there might never have been any Voyages of Rediscovery. The critical features of the European ships that enabled oceanic sailing – the square hull and stern-post rudder, lateen sail and triple-mast system – were derived from Islamic and Chinese shipping. The critical navigational techniques and technologies – the astrolabe, solar and lunar calen- dars, astronomy, trigonometry and geometry – were derived mainly from Islamic West Asia. And when we note that the weapons deployed by the Iberians – gunpowder, gun and cannon – had been invented in China in 850, 1275 and 1288 respec- tively, then there is very little left for the Portuguese or Spanish to have sincerely claimed for their own. Last, but not least, British industri- alization was significantly fuelled by the imperial appropriationof Eastern resources – land, labour, bullion, raw materials and markets – and the assimilation of Chinese ideas and technologies necessarily reveals the peoples of the world as symbiotic, hybrid partners rather than opposing and separate entities. It points up the modalities of inter-human commonality, communication and connection rather than difference, deafness and disassociation. And in so doing it reveals the affiliations and immanent solidarity of civiliza- tions and of the world’s peoples. Ultimately, in recognizing this we take an initial step, if not one giant leap, towards a global dream that exorcises the global nightmare of cycles of war and civiliz- ing missions imposed upon a manufactured Eastern Other. A dream wherein the peoples of the Earth can finally sit down at the table of global humanity and communicate as equal partners after the darkinterlude of Western colonialism and neocolonialism. 10:25 am Page 410
_________________________________________________________________ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/