The larger point -- an incompatibility of materialism in science with Islam and Islamism -- is contradicted by facts of scientific education in predominantly Muslim nations, including one run by Islamists who have been far more radical than the Muslim Brotherhood but have expanded scientific education, including scientific education of women, much more than was possible under the secularist Shah. Some leftists appear to believe that acceptance of scientific materialism has something to do with political orientation, often entertaining a hope that scientific materialism helps people adopt historical materialism (aka Marxism), but scientific materialism, historical evidence shows, is compatible with just about any politics, from fascism to liberalism to Islamism to socialism.
Today, if anything, what worries the empire is probably Muslims and Islamists' embrace of science and technology, rather than their rejection of them. After all, those who reject science and technology can't master nuclear physics among other things.
On 4/12/07, Doug Henwood <dhenwood at panix.com> wrote:
>
> On Apr 12, 2007, at 9:29 AM, Yoshie Furuhashi wrote:
>
> > Maybe you are forgetting the true state of women in Japan and the USA,
> > both of which are in some ways more conservative than Iran when it
> > comes to women's rights and lives, even though both are _a lot_ richer
> > than it: more Iranian women study engineering and other traditionally
> > male-dominated disciplines than Japanese or American women do, e.g.,
> > "In the applied physics department of Azad University 70% of the
> > graduates are women -- a statistic which would make many universities
> > in the West proud" (Frances Harrison, "Women graduates challenge
> > Iran," 19 September 2006,
>
> That's all wonderful, but I was quoting from what purported to be an
> official document on the status of women in Islam published by the
> Muslim Brotherhood. What that has to do with the number of woman
> engineers in Iran I don't really know. You were touting the MB as a
> potential partner for anti-imperialists, weren't you?
It seems to me that you, as well as some other liberals and leftists here and in Egypt, are concerned what Egypt might be like, especially when it comes to women's rights, if the Muslim Brotherhood comes into power, on its own or in a coalition with liberals and/or leftists, through social revolution or parliamentary politics. So, I've described (as I have done previously) how things are for women, economy, etc. in two countries where Islamists came into power through two different ways: Iran, where radical Islamists came into power through social revolution, and Turkey, where mild Islamists developed a parliamentary party that won elections, so you can see Islamism at work in countries comparable to Egypt. (I would suggest that the politics of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, if it comes into power, is more likely to resemble that of the AKP of Turkey than Islamists of Iran.)
What you took earlier from the Ikhwan Web site is a view of one man based in Qatar, not a program of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
The program of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood -- whose approarch to women I'd characterize as paternalist or maternalist, emphasizing gender differences even while advocating gender equality, without being patriarchal rejectionist of all women's rights -- is here: "The Muslim Brotherhood's Program," 9 May 2006, <http://204.10.105.180/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=4447>.
That's not as progressive as the views of Egyptian socialists, but it's more progressive than views commonly held by many conservatives in Egypt (as well as many other countries in the South, including those that aren't predominantly Muslim).
What is interesting is not so much the Brotherhood itself -- which is far more conservative (in the sense of having only modest ambitions and using only moderate means), both for better and worse, than Khomeinists in Iran -- as the fact that young male and female Brotherhood activists in Egypt are seeking to work with socialists on equal terms, in the atmosphere where mutual criticism as well as exploration of common ideas is possible, even though the former far outnumber the latter. That is good, for socialists in Egypt won't be able to overcome the Mubarak regime on their own, nor will the Brothers. If there is to be a real change, though, a coalition has to be even broader than these two currents, and more people have to become politically active.
There are some signs of more political activities in Egypt in recent years: Joel Beinin, "Popular Social Movements and the Future of Egyptian Politics," Middle East Report Online, 10 March 2005, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031005.html>; Emad Mekay, "Workers' Revolt Pays Off," <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=35858>, 14 December 2006; Joel Beinin and Hossam el-Hamalawy, "Egyptian Textile Workers Confront the New Economic Order," 25 March 2007, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero032507.html>; and Hossam El-Hamalawy, "Comrades and Brothers," MER 242, Spring 2007 <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html>. But there are many reports of continuing quietude: Michael Slackman, "In Arab Hub, Poor Are Left to Their Fate," 1 March 2007, <http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/pipermail/lbo-talk/Week-of-Mon-20070226/004067.html>; Michael Slackman, "Levittown on the Nile: A Standoff Over Age-Old Ways," 23 March 2007, <http://www-tech.mit.edu/V127/N14/long4.html>; and Michael Slackman, "As Egypt Votes on Laws, Cynicism Rules the Street," 26 March 2007.
If a larger social movement for democracy develops in Egypt, though, the Brothers, especially younger ones, will be pushed further, and they may develop their Islam into a liberation theology of the sort that Sherif Hetata, husband of Nawal El Saadawi, suggests is possible depending on political circumstances. On the other hand, the Brotherhood, in part or in whole, may develop into an instrument of Washington. Everything depends on present and future political development that is interesting and important to watch, as Egypt is a key country for change in the predominantly Arab world.
<http://www.nawalsaadawi.net/articlessherif/06/fundamentalism.htm> Fundamentalism, Political Islam And Democracy Sherif Hetata Novelist and Medical Doctor/ Egypt
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
When Sadat came to power at the end of September 1970 he quickly emerged as a ruler who had different views and represented different interests to those of Nasser, and his supporters.
To implement his policies he had to overcome those who opposed him because they believed in national independence and an economy geared to satisfy the basic needs of people. Under the guise of a multi party system and a new liberalism, and after naming himself "al Raiss al Moumin" which means the "President Believer" he reverted to the old game of encouraging and supporting the Islamic political movement, to counterbalance and overcome the opposition composed of Nasserites, and different national progressive and left wing movements.
Once again the followers of the Islamic political movement started to surface, the young men bearded, the women wearing the veil. Their slogans "Allah is Great" or "Islam is the Solution" reappeared on the walls, on taxis and cars, posters and stickers, or were shouted out through hundreds of microphones. But once again when they grew strong they started to steal towards power. A favourable moment seemed the Camp David Peace Treaty unpopular with many people and to which they declared open opposition. But on the 5 September 1981 Sadat arrested 1536 members of the opposition the majority of whom belonged to the Muslim politico-religious movement. One month later militants of this movements assassinated him during a military parade held in commemoration of the "victory" against Israel in the war of 1973.
Released from jail by his successor "Moubarak" they resumed their activities, growing more powerful everyday. But to many of the young members the "Moslem Brotherhood" seemed to have grown old, lost its vigour, become too mild. The Iranian revolution had entered on the scene as a new factor. Events in the Sudan, in Algeria, in Afghanistan involvement with the CIA, all played their role.
Over the years the pattern of the movement had changed. It became characterized by a greater sophistication and complexity coupled with an increasing tendency to resort to violent methods. Violence has always been a part of the ideology and action of the movement but now it seemed to have split into violent and non-violent groups. On the one hand there were numerous extremist hard core groups, some of them quite small, mushrooming or growing like a grape vine, so that if one was destroyed it was replaced by others existing or newly born4 which all propagated, doctrinaire terrorist teachings. On the other the main bulk with a mass following remained the Muslim Brotherhood, an ostensibly more moderate mainstream no longer engaged in terrorist activities. Learning from past experience it was now making use of the multi-party system and elections equated by Western ruling circles to a democratic system, playing the electoral game to get into parliament or local government, to gain control of professional, cultural, trade union, and social organizations. It was also moving more and more into the media (newspapers, T.V., radio, publishing houses) continuing to work hard at setting up a network of health, educational and other services, using the thousands of mosques more effectively, infiltrating into the judiciary, banks and economic enterprises, making use of the considerable resources and high level connections at its disposal especially in the Gulf countries.
As a result of these developments, the roles were now nicely divided between the moderate "mainstream" movement and the small radical terrorist groups. While the terrorist groups threw the bombs at Presidents, ministers, high level civil and police authorities intimidated or assassinated intellectuals, killed tourists and disrupted the economy by creating an atmosphere of insecurity and showing that "democracy" was a failure, the mainstream movement could steal towards power step by step. It no longer needed a militia, or a military wing. Others probably supported by it in different ways, off-shoots of the big brotherhood could do the job for it while it presented a moderate face for all to see, and appeared as the savior of society from the fanatical Muslims, as the only force capable of putting an end to all the chaos and destruction. To these ends it used the language of religion, of God, of morality exposing the corruption of Arab governments, standing up as the opponent of Western encroachment on the norms, traditions, values, and interests of the people. It capitalized on the protest movement of people harassed by poverty, unemployment, and the heavy hand of governments who protected the rich and had failed to implement any policies that would make their situation easier, and who applying the policies of the World Bank and the International Money Fund were making the poor poorer and the rich richer.
But the time came when those in power had to intervene or else step down. It was Moubarak's turn to crack down first on the terrorist groups which were the immediate threat, then on the Muslim Brotherhood. So now the situation lives an uneasy equilibrium and future developments may depend on whether Western ruling circles will need an Islamic alternative. For the time being they have moved away from what seemed under consideration sometime ago, since the more secular systems in Egypt or Algeria are less unpredictable than the backward and narrow minded movements of political Islam. Nevertheless amongst these movements more modern, open minded and younger leaderships have developed slowly over the years and so one day they may be looked upon as an alternative if things go wrong under present regimes, or if they "lose face" as we say in our part of the world.
Within the Muslim Brotherhood this process of modernization has been accompanied by limited democratic changes in the mentality and attitudes of its protagonists who belong to new generations of the movement. However these changes remain extremely limited. In addition a small number of Islamic intellectuals and professionals have sought to introduce more liberal interpretations of Islam. Nevertheless these developments continue to be of a minor nature in the absence of democratic changes and an influential democratic movement within the society as a whole. This does not mean that the Islamic political movements cannot develop one or other form of liberation theology similar to some of the movements which have developed in the West, but all these trends will tend to affect only a minor sector of the political religious movement as long as the present balance of forces is maintained not only in our region but also in the rest of the world. Since all religions are political in nature and the direction in which they evolve depends very much on the socio-economic structures and trends within which they operate.
* On a separate note, in case some may not remember who Amir Taheri is:
On 4/12/07, John E. Norem <jnorem at cox.net> wrote:
> Thursday 12 April 2007
> Holocaust denier Garaudy: a pariah in the West, an idol in the Islamic
> world
> Roger Garaudy
> Book Review by Amir Taheri
> Source: Asharq al-Awsat
> <http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=8&id=8605>
<http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Amir_Taheri> and <http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Benador_Associates>. -- Yoshie