> Marx's notion has the
> element of "real freedom" important from Rousseau,
> Kant and Hegel, where what makes intrinsically
> valuable activity is obedience to the law one gives to
> one;self (see the discussion of Smith in the
> Grundrisse), a less clean notion of intrinsic value
> than Weber's.
This part of the Grundrisse passage is describing ideal _instrumental_ activity in "the realm of necessity" not ideal end in itself activity in "the true realm of freedom". The latter gives the "law" to the former which is instrumental to it. Universally developed individuals freely associated in an ideal realm of necessity give this law to themselves.
The example of fully free end in itself activity to which Marx points in that part of the Grundrisse is "composing". To be fully good such activity requires "recognition" (as elaborated in "Comments on James Mill"), a relation only possible with those with the developed capabilities ('virtues" in Aristotle's sense) it requires. It's a relation of equality and mutuality (as in Eagleton's example of improvisation in a great jazz group). It requires the mutual and recognized "goodwill" that constitutes, for Aristotle, the essence of true "friendship".
As Marx elaborates them, both realms actualize rational thinking, willing and acting. This involves a conception of "rationality" different from Weber's.
Ted