http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2725713.ece
01 July 2007
Independent (UK)
Brown's Wars Part 2: Meltdown on the frontline in Basra
The only people venturing out are British troops, and three died on the
PM's first day. Will Miliband persuade his boss to pull them out?
By Raymond Whitaker
The blast that killed Private James Kerr and Private Scott Kennedy,
both 20, and Corporal Paul Joszko, 28, would have been heard across
half of Basra. It happened at 1am on Thursday in the deserted streets
of al-Antahiya, on the southern outskirts of the city.
The men would have known their mission was dangerous. They had left the
relative security of Basra air station - Britain's main base in Iraq,
which is spread across a wide expanse of desert bordering the city's
airport - to resupply the only British contingent still within the city
limits, at Basra Palace. There are only a few possible routes between
the two bases, as local insurgents well know, and most journeys are
undertaken by helicopter.
To minimise the risk of travelling by road, the convoy had gone to
Basra Palace in darkness, when ordinary residents of the city remain
indoors, behind high walls. The only people to venture out are British
troops - and those they are fighting. The soldiers had delivered their
supplies, and were on the way back when they left their Warrior
armoured vehicles to check their surroundings. At this point, it
appears, a hidden watcher triggered the bomb that killed the three men
and seriously wounded a fourth.
<snip>
In one of the most detailed independent reports on Basra since the
invasion, the authoritative International Crisis Group (ICG) last week
painted a devastating portrait of life in the city. It said Operation
Sinbad, Britain's attempt between September 2006 and March this year to
root out militias, restore security and kick-start economic
reconstruction, appeared at first to be a qualified success.
Criminality, political assassinations and sectarian killings receded
somewhat, and relative calm prevailed.
"Yet this reality was both superficial and fleeting," says the ICG
report. "By March-April 2007, renewed political tensions once more
threatened to destabilise the city, and relentless attacks on British
forces in effect had driven them off the streets into increasingly
secluded compounds. Basra's residents and militiamen view this not as
an orderly withdrawal, but rather as an ignominious defeat. Today the
city is controlled by militias."
The ICG blames Britain for "the most glaring failing of all": the
inability to establish a strong provincial administration capable of
enforcing its will. Instead of the political parties responsible for
the violence being confronted, they were treated as partners - an
object lesson, it says, of what the Americans should not do as they
carry out their security "surge" in Baghdad.
While others might disagree with the group's belief that British forces
could ever have achieved such a transformation in Basra, they probably
would not quarrel with its conclusion that "in Basra the British appear
to have given up on the idea of establishing a functioning state,
capable of equitably redistributing wealth and resources, establishing
respect for the rule of law and instituting a genuine and accountable
democracy". The report adds: "In any event, time is running out. Four
years after the fall of Saddam's regime, they are facing increasingly
frequent and bloody attacks, and it is hard to imagine them remaining
for long." Even if the coalition wanted to re-engage, says the ICG "it
already may well be too late".
That was clear the minute Mr Blair, for once going against American
wishes, announced early this year that British forces would be reduced
from just over 7,000 to their present 5,500. The bitter irony of last
week's attack is that the resupply convoy on which the three soldiers
died may well have been the last to Basra Palace, which is due to be
handed over to Iraqi forces any day now. That will leave the airport as
the only British base in Iraq.
Military sources believe another 500 troops may come home soon, but
that would be the last partial withdrawal: 5,000 is considered the
minimum to ensure that the remaining force can protect itself. But what
would be the point, many ask, of keeping them in one location, unable
to achieve much beyond acting as a magnet for insurgent attacks?
Critics argue that a precipitate British withdrawal would make the
violence in Basra even worse. The diminished British presence has
created worsening friction with American commanders, who are concerned
about the security of the supply route from Kuwait. If the British
left, they say, American troops would have to be sent south to fill the
void.
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