[lbo-talk] "Neither East Nor West": Iran and Soviet Foreign Policy (was Universal Asceticism and Social Levelling)

Yoshie Furuhashi critical.montages at gmail.com
Tue Jul 17 06:22:36 PDT 2007


On 7/16/07, Chris Doss <lookoverhere1 at yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> --- Yoshie Furuhashi <critical.montages at gmail.com>
> quoted:
>
> "the Soviets who created a puppet state in
> Azerbaijan"
>
> --
>
> Is the writer of these words a visitor from an
> alternate Earth in which Azerbaijan was not a part of
> the Russian Empire?
>
> God knows Azerbaijan was better off when it was part
> of the USSR. As in, you could be an Armenian there and
> not have to worry about being hacked to death with an
> axe a la Sumgait.
>
> To the best of my recollection, BTW, Iran supported
> Armenia vs. Azerbaijan in the war, because they felt
> an independent Azerbaijan would rile up nationalist
> feelings amoung Azerbaijanis in Iran. Actually
> Armenia's only open land border is with Iran.

Daryush Shayegan was referring to the Azerbaijan People's Government, a Soviet-backed state in northern Iran with Tabriz as its capital, which lasted from November 1945 to November 1946: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azerbaijan_People's_Government>. This is an example of the type of Soviet foreign policy that made the Tudeh party in particular and communism in general less popular in Iran than they might have been and that made a majority of Iranians, probably nearly across the ideological spectrum except pro-UK/US royalists and the pro-Soviet Tudeh party, incline toward the ideology of "Neither East nor West," the ideology that both Mossadeq and Khomeini upheld.

The Soviets, btw, could have made a fresh diplomatic start after the Islamic Revolution, taken Khomeini's advice regarding Afghanistan, and saved themselves a great deal of trouble.

We have, fortunately, a detailed account of the [28

December 1979] meeting [with Khomeini] by the

accomplished Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov

himself, published in the Moscow Monthly International

Affairs (April 1991). Entitled "Audience At Dawn", it

provides a brilliant insight into Soviet and Iranian

diplomacy. Vinogradov was accompanied by Minister-

Counsellor Yevgeny Ostrovenko and another aide,

Alexander Maryasov. Both spoke Farsi, "The Imam asked

me to thank the Soviet leadership on his behalf for finding

it necessary to inform him [of the Soviet rejection of the

the American request regarding Iran] in advance [as well

as of "the reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan"].

He said he saw it as a sign of friendship and confidence

and appreciated it...

"He remarked that every people had the right to decide

its affairs without interference from outside. He

understood that the Afghan authorities persecuted

clergymen and closed mosques. That was an anti-popular

practice, it was inadmissible, Islam was invisible, nor could

anybody ban it. If what he had heard was true, Soviet

people ought to bring their influence to bear on the Afghan

leadership. Afghanistan was a Muslim country, part of the

Muslim world, and so Iran could not be indifferent to what

went on there. If the leadership there was in the hands of

clever men they would not persecute Islam. The dispatch

of Soviet troops to a Muslim country was certainly a

disagreeable matter unusual for the Soviet Union, a country

which the Iranians respected, and naturally, Iran could not

approve of the action. But since the troops were being

moved in, he would like me to convey to Moscow his advice

that the troops would fulfil their task as speedily as possible

and pull out. Generally speaking, he continued after a brief

pause, he would like the Soviet leadership to treat Muslim

countries with consideration, otherwise Soviet policy toward

them would fail."

Vinogradov pleaded for restraint by the Iranian media.

"Khomeini's eyes flashed. 'May I ask you for two things?'

he asked instead of responding to my suggestion. 'One of

these days, the U.N. Security Council is going to discuss

sanctions against Iran over the U.S. Embassy staff taken

hostage. I cannot understand why the Americans refuse to

come to terms with us on releasing our assets in the United

States. Will the Soviet Union support the demand for

sanctions against Iran? We know that even if no sanctions

are voted, the Americans are going to blockade all of Iran's

Gulf ports. If that were done, could Iran use the Soviet Union

for transit to Europe?' I had no specific instructions on that

score but I could not really confine myself to telling

Khomeini that I would convey his request to Moscow." The

assurances were given instantly and carried out.

Iranian radio soon broadcast news of the meeting, sharpened

Khomeini's response but omitted his requests. He began

criticising Moscow three months later as Soviet troops dug in.

(A. G. Nooran, "Afghanistan Declassified," Frontline 19.12,

8-21 June 2002,

<http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1912/19120620.htm>)

It was a quixotic enterprise to try to run Afghanistan directly and unilaterally from Kabul by using Soviet troops anyway. Instead of that, the Soviets might have withdrawn troops after deposing Hafizullah Amin and worked with Khomeini on Afghanistan thereafter. That would have tempered Khomeini's policy toward Tudeh. -- Yoshie



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