http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/18/AR2007061801365.html
Tuesday, June 19, 2007; A17
Washington Post
'West Bank First': It Won't Work
By Robert Malley and Aaron David Miller
Having embraced one illusion -- that it could help isolate and defeat
Hamas -- the Bush administration is dangerously close to embracing
another: Gaza is dead, long live the West Bank. This approach appears
compelling. Flood the West Bank with money, boost Fatah security forces
and create a meaningful negotiating process. The Palestinian people,
drawn to a recovering West Bank and repelled by the nightmare of an
impoverished Gaza, will rally around the more pragmatic of the
Palestinians.
The theory is a few years late and several steps removed from reality.
If the United States wanted to help President Mahmoud Abbas, the time
to do so was in 2005, when he won office in a landslide, emerged as the
Palestinians' uncontested leader and was in a position to sell
difficult compromises to his people. Today, Abbas is challenged by far
more Palestinians and is far less capable of securing a consensus on
any important decision.
But the more fundamental problem with this theory is its lack of
grounding. It is premised on the notion that Fatah controls the West
Bank. Yet the West Bank is not Gaza in reverse. Unlike in Gaza,
Israel's West Bank presence is overwhelming and, unlike Hamas, Fatah
has ceased to exist as an ideologically or organizationally coherent
movement. Behind the brand name lie a multitude of offshoots, fiefdoms
and personal interests. Most attacks against Israel since the elections
were launched by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the unruly
Fatah-affiliated militias, notwithstanding Abbas's repeated calls for
them to stop. Given this, why would Israel agree to measurably loosen
security restrictions?
"West Bank first" also relies on the notion that Abbas -- or any other
Palestinian leader -- can afford to concentrate on the West Bank at
Gaza's expense. There is raw anger among Palestinians. But once the
dust settles, Abbas will want to be viewed as president of all
Palestinians, not of a geographic or political segment of them. For him
to accept funds that can be spent only on the West Bank, or
international dealings that exclude Gaza, would critically undercut his
position as a symbol of the Palestinian nation.
Finally, the theory assumes that Hamas has little influence in the West
Bank. Fatah may have more guns, but Hamas retains considerable
political support. More important, it takes only a few militants to
conduct attacks against Israel and few such attacks to provoke an
Israeli military reaction. If Hamas is convinced that there is an
effort to strangle its rule, it is likely to resume violence against
Israel -- either directly or through one of many militant groups, Fatah
offshoots included. There will be no shortage of militants angry at
Fatah leaders' dealings with Israel or hungry for cash. If such
violence occurs, hope for progress in the West Bank will come crashing
down.
Since Hamas's election in early 2006, the United States and its allies
have behaved as though isolating the Islamist movement could undo its
victory and that supporting Fatah politically and militarily would
hasten that outcome. The wreckage of that policy is clear. Yet, having
witnessed the consequences of those myths, they are hastening to adopt
others. Efforts to deepen the split between Hamas and Fatah or between
Gaza and the West Bank will compound the disaster, for there can be no
security, let alone a peace process, without minimal Palestinian unity
and consensus.
The United States and others should support Abbas and encourage
progress in the West Bank, but smartly. Sticks for Gaza coupled with
carrots for the West Bank will divide Palestinians, radicalize Gazans,
provoke violence by those who are left out and discredit those the
United States embraces. Dividing Palestine geographically is no more a
recipe for success than dividing Palestinians politically.
We should not be fooled by Abbas's rhetoric. Sooner or later he will be
forced to pursue new power-sharing arrangements between Hamas and Fatah
and restore unity among Palestinians. As the United States and others
seek to empower him, they should push for a comprehensive
Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire in Gaza and the West Bank, which will
require dealing -- indirectly at least -- with elements of Hamas. They
should resist the temptation to isolate Gaza and should tend to its
population's needs. And should a national unity government be
established, this time they should welcome the outcome and take steps
to shore it up. Only then will efforts to broker credible political
negotiations between Abbas and his Israeli counterpart on a two-state
solution have a chance to succeed.
The diplomatic equivalent of the medical precept is do no harm. Since
Hamas's electoral victory, U.S. policy has helped strengthen radical
forces, debilitate Palestinian institutions, undermine faith in
democracy, weaken Abbas and set back the peace process. Why ask for
more of the same?
Robert Malley is director of the Middle East program at the
International Crisis Group. Aaron David Miller is a public policy
scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and author of the forthcoming
"America and the Much Too Promised Land."
© 2007 The Washington Post Company