[lbo-talk] Malley & Miller: 'West Bank First': Why It Won't Work

Michael Pollak mpollak at panix.com
Sun Jun 24 08:40:17 PDT 2007


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/18/AR2007061801365.html

Tuesday, June 19, 2007; A17

Washington Post

'West Bank First': It Won't Work

By Robert Malley and Aaron David Miller

Having embraced one illusion -- that it could help isolate and defeat

Hamas -- the Bush administration is dangerously close to embracing

another: Gaza is dead, long live the West Bank. This approach appears

compelling. Flood the West Bank with money, boost Fatah security forces

and create a meaningful negotiating process. The Palestinian people,

drawn to a recovering West Bank and repelled by the nightmare of an

impoverished Gaza, will rally around the more pragmatic of the

Palestinians.

The theory is a few years late and several steps removed from reality.

If the United States wanted to help President Mahmoud Abbas, the time

to do so was in 2005, when he won office in a landslide, emerged as the

Palestinians' uncontested leader and was in a position to sell

difficult compromises to his people. Today, Abbas is challenged by far

more Palestinians and is far less capable of securing a consensus on

any important decision.

But the more fundamental problem with this theory is its lack of

grounding. It is premised on the notion that Fatah controls the West

Bank. Yet the West Bank is not Gaza in reverse. Unlike in Gaza,

Israel's West Bank presence is overwhelming and, unlike Hamas, Fatah

has ceased to exist as an ideologically or organizationally coherent

movement. Behind the brand name lie a multitude of offshoots, fiefdoms

and personal interests. Most attacks against Israel since the elections

were launched by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the unruly

Fatah-affiliated militias, notwithstanding Abbas's repeated calls for

them to stop. Given this, why would Israel agree to measurably loosen

security restrictions?

"West Bank first" also relies on the notion that Abbas -- or any other

Palestinian leader -- can afford to concentrate on the West Bank at

Gaza's expense. There is raw anger among Palestinians. But once the

dust settles, Abbas will want to be viewed as president of all

Palestinians, not of a geographic or political segment of them. For him

to accept funds that can be spent only on the West Bank, or

international dealings that exclude Gaza, would critically undercut his

position as a symbol of the Palestinian nation.

Finally, the theory assumes that Hamas has little influence in the West

Bank. Fatah may have more guns, but Hamas retains considerable

political support. More important, it takes only a few militants to

conduct attacks against Israel and few such attacks to provoke an

Israeli military reaction. If Hamas is convinced that there is an

effort to strangle its rule, it is likely to resume violence against

Israel -- either directly or through one of many militant groups, Fatah

offshoots included. There will be no shortage of militants angry at

Fatah leaders' dealings with Israel or hungry for cash. If such

violence occurs, hope for progress in the West Bank will come crashing

down.

Since Hamas's election in early 2006, the United States and its allies

have behaved as though isolating the Islamist movement could undo its

victory and that supporting Fatah politically and militarily would

hasten that outcome. The wreckage of that policy is clear. Yet, having

witnessed the consequences of those myths, they are hastening to adopt

others. Efforts to deepen the split between Hamas and Fatah or between

Gaza and the West Bank will compound the disaster, for there can be no

security, let alone a peace process, without minimal Palestinian unity

and consensus.

The United States and others should support Abbas and encourage

progress in the West Bank, but smartly. Sticks for Gaza coupled with

carrots for the West Bank will divide Palestinians, radicalize Gazans,

provoke violence by those who are left out and discredit those the

United States embraces. Dividing Palestine geographically is no more a

recipe for success than dividing Palestinians politically.

We should not be fooled by Abbas's rhetoric. Sooner or later he will be

forced to pursue new power-sharing arrangements between Hamas and Fatah

and restore unity among Palestinians. As the United States and others

seek to empower him, they should push for a comprehensive

Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire in Gaza and the West Bank, which will

require dealing -- indirectly at least -- with elements of Hamas. They

should resist the temptation to isolate Gaza and should tend to its

population's needs. And should a national unity government be

established, this time they should welcome the outcome and take steps

to shore it up. Only then will efforts to broker credible political

negotiations between Abbas and his Israeli counterpart on a two-state

solution have a chance to succeed.

The diplomatic equivalent of the medical precept is do no harm. Since

Hamas's electoral victory, U.S. policy has helped strengthen radical

forces, debilitate Palestinian institutions, undermine faith in

democracy, weaken Abbas and set back the peace process. Why ask for

more of the same?

Robert Malley is director of the Middle East program at the

International Crisis Group. Aaron David Miller is a public policy

scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and author of the forthcoming

"America and the Much Too Promised Land."

© 2007 The Washington Post Company



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