Julio,
though I may not agree with you entirely on Dabashi, I wanted to write that the below is one of the best written opinions/analysis I have read here on PEN-L. Combined with your recent posts on PEN-L you have added considerable intelligence to the discussion. I think you should bring your blog back to life as a general political/economical one, perhaps even as part of a blog collective if more of the smart posters on this list and PEN-L can be convinced to attempt it,
--ravi
On 13 Oct, 2007, at 0:11 AM, Julio Huato wrote:
>
> In a similar vein, others argue that Bush doesn't give a shit about
> gays and women in Iran. So the criticism of the Western left of
> Ahmedinajad's government's treatment of gays and women in Iran can
> have no consequence. It cannot strengthen imperialism or weaken Iran.
> Suggesting otherwise is calumnious.
>
> Taken as a whole, the arguments (implicit or explicit) in the
> formulations above encapsulate the precise way in which the U.S. left
> (or, more generally, the Western left) can ensure continuous strategic
> irrelevance and its remaining a marginal yet effective tool in the
> hands of the most reactionary and dangerous forces of our time.
>
> It's the sum of two wrongheaded beliefs: (1) we (the Western left) can
> alter the *terms* of the conflict facing the Iranians by merely
> reframing the discourse, by boldly escaping an artificially imposed
> discursive dichotomy, and (2) our actions have no influence on the
> *outcome* of the conflict. Strategic voluntarism paired with tactical
> fatalism.
>
> Well... it's exactly the opposite!
>
> We won't make any significant advance until we realize that the
> broader social, political forces in motion in our time, their
> fundamental interests, the clashes between them (which bring about the
> largest human consequences) cannot be altered directly, immediately by
> the sheer application of our political will (let alone by merely
> declaring our wishes).
>
> We need to take action upon accepting that the motion of these social
> forces, the main terrains on which these forces clash -- i.e. the
> *terms* of their conflict -- are determined by social conditions that
> -- historically speaking -- take a geological time to shift, acquire
> political articulation, etc. For all the immediate practical purposes
> relevant to the Western left, these forces are large gravitational
> attractors that warp the political space-time continuum in which we
> operate.
>
> That's why, regardless of our desires, we don't really have a large
> number of nuanced options from which to choose. In effect, the
> hardened realities of the conflict funnel our options, force them into
> a binary choice. We can make the choice with less or more awareness
> of the consequences, or by default. It's still a binary choice. In
> the abstract, there may be a sharp difference between "legitimate"
> criticisms of Iranian policies and pro-imperialist manifestos. Yet,
> in real life terms, intentions don't have to be matched by
> consequences.
>
> So, I am not impressed by Prof. Dabashi's piece. A roughly equal
> number of blows delivered to Bollinger and Ahmadinejad won't cut it
> for me. It's brave in that it risks his job by criticizing his boss.
> It's coward in that he attacks Ahmedinajad at a time when the country
> that man leads is being threatened by the biggest economic and
> military power in human history.
>
> Even if Dabashi doesn't intend it, his perorations against Ahmadinajad
> translate into moral grandstanding from the academic Mount Olympus of
> a prominent U.S. university. As influential as a Columbia professor
> may be (or may believe he is), the broader terms of the conflict won't
> bend. I mean, the terms of the conflict between Iran and U.S.
> imperialism -- because the terms of the conflict over the allocation
> of resources at Columbia University may end up affected.
>
> The sooner we understand that the terms of the larger conflicts are a
> given, the faster we will be in a position to make them truly pliable
> to our political efforts. The sooner we understand this, the sooner
> we'll be making a difference at this level. A difference we can make,
> because we (the Western left) -- as much as we cannot directly change
> hardened social conditions -- are not in a terrible position to
> influence the *outcome* of these larger conflicts. We are
> strategically weak, but we are not tactical nothings. That's because
> the specific outcomes of these conflicts are determined at the margin,
> where small, incremental influences can have decisive,
> disproportionate effects.
>
> Even if unable to change the terms of the conflict, our views and
> actions are consequential. With time, we can build up on that
> marginal power. But that requires our actions to be sustained, to
> adjust so that they best "win friends and influence people," to be
> consistent with the way in (and pace at) which society (ourselves
> included) evolves, etc. Then we will be in a position to change the
> terms of our relations with other nations.
>
>
>
>
> Just because the Bushies don't give a shit about gays and women in
> Iran or anywhere else doesn't mean that they cannot boomerang gays and
> women issues against the Iranians.
>
> These arguments remind me of the rationale used to justify the
> candidacy of Ralph Nader in 2000. Nader's campaign was supposed to
> help break the stronghold of the two-party system in U.S. politics.
> A grand (and certainly desirable) strategic goal. But then they
> argued that Nader couldn't hurt Gore, that only Gore could hurt
> himself. In other words, Nader was thought to be tactically
> ineffectual. Well, Nader's campaign was the exact opposite: a
> strategic zero and a tactical coup (in favor of Bush!).
>
> Of course the Republicans didn't give a shit about Nader's agenda in
> 2000. Yet that didn't stop Erik Prince (Amway's major stockholder,
> Blackwater USA's CEO, and top Republican funder) and other Republicans
> with a bit of strategic common sense from giving cash to Nader's
> campaign to weaken Gore just a little here and a little there.
>
> How much of a difference did Nader make in Florida? Maybe Greg Palast
> can tell. There was some Nader-Gore vote pairing, but perhaps not
> enough. Gore had to spend resources facing Nader's needling on the
> left flank, resources that could have been used differently. Etc.
> What's undeniable is that in highly contested conflicts, weakening one
> side at the margin, just nibbling a bit one of its flanks can make all
> the difference in tilting the outcome. (Ex ante, a rv can have n
> possible outcomes. Ex post, only one is realized and observed.)
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