Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Venezuela, Central Europe (which is, of course, clamoring to join the EU and EMU), and FRANCE????
Of course the relationship between state and economy is the story of the 20th century. It's the story right here in America - although it's not going well at the moment. The American GSEs created the entire securitization market - tens of trillions of dollars. But that's not the question.
The question is the BRIC countries and why we should believe that their "development state" is creating a new pole in the global order.
The Chinese state-industrial complex is absolutely dependent on exports for the growth rate that has made it even a short pole in China itself so that the society orbits around something other than the government. But of course it is still controlled by the Chinese government which can create a nightmare of obstruction on a whim.
The Putin state-industrial complex is now being formed by Putin's acquisition of the big industries and he just announced he was selling off the smaller ones. So, I don't see it there.
Brazil was absent from your analysis and likewise Indian capitalist powers like Tata and Infosys, which I think you have to take into account here.
Look, to the extent that your thesis is that we are going to see more and more "Nation State Incorporated" kind of structures, I agree, in fact I'm way ahead of you. But to the extent that you're telling me that commodities and exports money in the BRIC are creating the new socialism, I'm not buying it yet for two reasons, both of which you seem intent on not addressing:
First, these structures have failed, as yet, to internationalize.
Second, I think it's clear that the nascient BRIC structures are EXTREMELY vulnerable to the unwinding of the financial and commodities bubbles.
China is forming a keiretsu/chaebol economy. That is definitely - no question about it - a slam on the anarcho-capitalist theory of development. No question. Economies develop through cooperation, not competition. That's just true. But is that a post-capitalist argument?
Singapore is post-capitalist?
Ummm - no.
On a related note, we exchanged on another thread thusly:
On Sat, Aug 30, 2008 at 10:43 AM, <dredmond at efn.org> wrote:
> On Thu, August 28, 2008 2:02 pm, boddi satva wrote:
>
>> If South America is going to link with Russia, why are they dollarizing?
>
> They're not. 40% of world reserves are in non-dollars.
That's 35%, actually, DOWN from about 43% in 1997.
And we are talking about Latin America where dollar reserves have absolutely soared.
Panama is officially dollarized, of course and in 2000 it was Ecuador and in 2001 El Salvador. Dollar reserves - both official and private - have rocketed upwards, creating the situation where Bolivia is all-but dollarized, ditto Uruguay and Nicaragua.
Argentines and Peruvians seem to hold a majority or near-majority of their funds in dollars and Costa Rica is not far off.
What these countries have not done is turn to the real - as your thesis suggests they might have - or turn to the euro in big way. And we would have to assume they would do any of those things before they would ruble-ize.
>
>> Assuming Russia actually does want to remain European, here's my
>> question for you: wouldn't Russia do well to join the EMU?
>
> Absolutely not, because their economies aren't synchronized. Nor should
> Poland or the Baltics, for that matter. Russia should set its own monetary
> policy for now, grow its industrial base and get rich.
What makes you think that NOT being in the EMU would make Russia richer than being in the EMU? I think most evidence would suggest otherwise.
On Sat, Aug 30, 2008 at 10:58 AM, <dredmond at efn.org> wrote:
> On Thu, August 28, 2008 1:54 pm, boddi satva wrote:
>
>> What are these "development states" you speak of comprised of? Don't
>> tell me what models there aren't, just tell me what institutions you're
>> talking about - formal, semi-formal, cultural, whatever.
>
> State intervention in the economy, as well as socialized networks of
> accumulation focused on long-term development, not short-term greed.
>
> In addition to the sovereign wealth funds, there are also Korea's chaebol,
> Japan's keiretsu, China's state-industrial complex and township-village
> enterprises, Taiwan's business-state alliances, Singapore's EDB and
> Temasek, France's dirigisme, Central Europe's industrial networks and
> welfare states, the EU structural funds, Venezuela's social programs,
> Russia's investment funds and state champions - it's a long and growing
> list.
>
> The geopolitical story of 2000-2008 has been the spread of the
> developmental state from its heartlands in East Asia and the EU to
> Eurasia, Latin America and Southeast Asia.
>
> -- DRR
>
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