Didn't MF analyze "power"? Isn't this power an abstract category? What I'm saying is that I think the concept, when looked at closely, is hard to definitively distinguish from the common sense notion of "culture" (though the choice of words certainly and maybe fruitfully influences the angle of vision one takes). For example, if you're examining, say, how madness or homosexuality was defined by doctors or lawyers in a certain place and time and how these definitions embedded themselves in discourse - how is that not a history of medical culture or legal culture? I know this appears to be an attempt to put MF's thinking into "common sense" terms but I don't think that fact alone automatically undermines my point.
> Yes, you are thinking about this 'in completely wrong way.' I don't
> think that 'no autonomous reasoning subject' is a particularly
> devastating revelation. Our ability to engage with the world is
> always socially determined(not partially, but completely), although
> this determination is by no means total or unilateral. Our 'decisions' always exist in these social forces. This includes the
> analytical skills that we use when we 'reason.'
I'm not sure how you square this...
> Our ability to engage with the world is
> always socially determined(not partially, but completely),
...with this...
> although
> this determination is by no means total or unilateral.
...in the same sentence. How can our ability to engage with the world be "completely" socially determined, yet at the same time this determination can be "by no means total"? I understand the difficulty with this point, since it's a variation on an old philosophical conundrum that is hard to answer definitively. I'm content with the observation that the extent to which our ability to engage with the world is socially determined is "by no means total."
Seth