[lbo-talk] Butler

[Eubulides]

Ted Winslow wrote:
> Chris Doss wrote:
> 
>> "Rational" does not mean "right," but "reasoned and
>> logically consistent." (You certainly aren't going to
>> find a solution to the virus-witch problem through
>> phenomenology, given that it is a highly sophisticated
>> form of introspection for which the existence of an
>> objective reality is meaningless in both Husserl's and
>> Heidegger's formulations.) Actually given the
>> assumptions of people who do believe in witches, the
>> witch theory is perfectly rational. They are almost
>> certainly wrong, but that is not the point.
> 
> This misses the point which was that the claim that there are no  
> rational foundations for belief implies that it's not possible to find  
> rational foundations for believing that HIV/AIDS is not caused by  
> witchcraft and, therefore, can't be prevented by murdering "witches,"  
> i.e. it implies that there are no rational foundations on which to  
> base the conclusion that the belief that it is and can be is mistaken.
> 
> There are also no rational foundations on which to base the conclusion  
> that it's irrational which, as you say, is different from the  
> conclusion that it's mistaken.
> 
> In fact, on this assumption no "knowledge" in the sense of rationally  
> grounded belief is possible.  So claims to "know," in this sense, that  
> other people exist and believe in witchcraft contradict the assumption.
> 
> It's not true, however, that consistency with assumptions makes a  
> conclusion "rational."  "Solipsism of the present moment" isn't a  
> "rational" conclusion.
> 
> Husserl's phenomenology isn't a "form of introspection for which the  
> existence of an objective reality is meaningless."  This misinterprets  
> and misrepresents the idea of "bracketing."
> 
> "Bracketing" is putting in question all interpretive frameworks,  This  
> includes the interpretive framework that makes "intelligible" the  
> conclusion that experience is so constituted that "bracketing" in this  
> sense is impossible.  Leaving this interpretive framework unquestioned  
> is failing to "bracket" it and so isn't "phenomenology" in the sense  
> of Husserl.
> 
> Putting it in question, "contesting" it, is very difficult, however,   
> It's very difficult to "resist its charms."
> 
> This difficulty is linked to the misidentification of "rationality"  
> with "remorseless logic"
> 
> It's also linked to the difficulty of putting in question the belief  
> that "all" “forms of  scientific consciousness" are “aspects of the  
> will to knowledge,” of a  “rancourous”, “malicious”, “murderous”  
> “instinct for knowledge.”
> 
> It's also linked to absurd belief in the "inner truth and greatness"  
> of National Socialism.
> 
> Ted

====================

Einstein was not bothered in the least that the most fundamental 
postulates of science were "free creations of the human mind"; the 
foundationalist/antifoundationalist issue never held him up. Nor did it 
seem to bother Watson and Crick. One could go on "naming names". There 
does not seem to be any need for perfect certitude, with all the 
problems of epistemic authoritarianism it carries in it's wake, to 
combat the superstitions of the current decade, centuries as many of 
them are...........

Ian