What I am arguing for is the opposite. Typically many EP theorists conclude
> that (a) our behaviours are a result of selection but (b) those selection
> forces are outdated. The combination of (a) and (b) is justifies the
> conclusion that human beings act oh so irrationally, feeding both the light
> humour industry and the more treacherous notion that rationality = narrow
> self-interest (cf: Amartya Sen). This conclusion is possibly true of certain
> human behaviours, but I am much more sympathetic to the E.O.Wilson PoV (as I
> see it) that morality/moralism is not one of them. In other words, moral
> desires *and* actions are not non-instrumental at all. They are, arguably,
> the foundation and glue that make human survival sustainable.
Well. Humans couldn't survive without some rules. That much is true. We might be operating on different meanings of the word "instrumental." In this context my use of the word refers only to things done or existing to fulfill the conscious will of some entity. Evolutionary processes, whether biological or, in many instances, social, don't fulfill that requirement. There are contexts in which it's sensible to say that "the purpose of the heart is to pump blood through the body," but right here I'm being literal. Hearts have no purpose, strictly speaking. Pacemakers do.
One reaon I'm skeptical of innatist etiological accounts of morality is that the only universalities that people can cite are tautologies like "don't murder" or "don't steal." At best we can say that all societies have some mechanism that disincentivizes at least some instances of killing and at least some instances of taking. But that's just a minimal requirement for a society to exist. And when such as situation arises in which one group of people possess social sanction to kill whomever or take whatever they want, well, guess what they do.
Of course you can say that we evolved such that we are capable of being morally programmed, reasoning, whatever. We're animals, so that's just by definition true of any feature we possess. (We evolved such that we can post on the internet, write the Divine Comedy, eat pasta, whatever.) But it doesn't mean that it's innate or that even the possibility of it is an adaptation.
>
>
> I think and hope that in providing examples that list proximate benefits
> you are not suggesting that benefits do not exist if we cannot immediately
> perceive them.
So, i.e., "benefits" of some sort may or may not exist, but if we can't see them, they surely aren't our *conscious, directed* object of action.
>
>
> One more thing: I don't think the last point (historical materialism =>
> morality = material interests of the ruling class) need absolutely
> contradict moralism. Human affairs, IMHO, are a delicate business, and as
> some of the fine distinctions (petit bourgeoisie, lumpen proletariat, etc,
> etc) in HM theories themselves seem to demonstrate, a sufficiently
> sophisticated framework has to describe and account for such. What I mean is
> that the seemingly legitimate claim that morality doubles the material
> interest of the ruling class can very well be seen as a caution rather than
> as a foundational critique (compare: "{technology,education} doubles the
> advantages of the ruling class").
>
Well, sure. That's the whole point of saying that etiology is a separate question. And of course it's obviously true that moral conceptions differ greatly within any given society, running along and through the various social groups that comprise it.
Making moral judgements of morality itself is kind of weird. If you've completely stepped outside the whale's belly it's just nonsense. But you can ask what your moral sentiments demand of you in terms of influencing others' moral sentiments or, indeed, your own.