The meanings (plural) symbols (individually) come to possess are tied to their materiality, or material expression in linguistic forms, but - and this is the important moment for me - these meanings are bound up in cultural systems - they are bound up in networks of meanings. The reason I fought Charles' claims about human culture vs mere animal action is not so much because I think he's wrong but because my sense that culture, as he expressed it, was too simple... its definition too straightforwardly opposed to animal capacities
I guess there are two things important to me. First, the symbolic meaning of an act/object is never singular - even within a culture (whatever that means, since the spatiotemporal boundaries of cultural practices are never clearcut) - because all acts/objects are engaged in an array of - always contested - meaning systems... think of the rabbinical traditions or standpoint epistemologies if you'd like. Second, my sense of the human condition is not one where we can clearly say that this or that aspect of human cultural practice is absolutely not shared by animals (as if that were a coherent category), it is one where we are better off saying that it is the qualitatively different, mutually reinforcing and dialectical ways humanity can and sometimes does actively engage material, individual and social networkings other species enter into a few at a time and with far less frequency - and as a result -with far less depth and historicity.
I think Geertz is really useful but we need to remember that his writing in The Interpretation of Cultures occurs at the climax, and as the death-knell, of ethnocentric scientism/objectivism in cultural anthropology. His work then serves as one of the foundations for reflexive ethnographic writings which simultaneously introduce the author's thought process more transparently into ethnographic writing and decenter the author as a result. While this kind of public auto-deconstruction became all-but onanistic in its ironic playfulness at the height of post-modernism it also decentered the researcher, set the stage for reflexive ethnographies of advanced industrial social relations - including science - and contributed powerfully to the debate over feminist standpoint epistemology, situated knowledges and the democratization of scientific research - where research subjects actually gain some subjectivity.
Everything from science as a labor process (see Robert Young et al in the Science as Culture collective) to cultural anthropological studies of laboratory practices (see Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar or Karin Knorr Cetina) to sci/tech/med studies (see Langdon Winner, Donna Haraway, Rayna Rapp and/or Adele Clarke) all start to raise major epistemological questions about the status/activity/contribution of objects, natures, others/othering etc. to knowledge and culture. My sense is that Geertz' work is VERY useful but is also very situated in its late-60s production... it serves as a very readable introduction to more powerful and transformative recent material.
On Wed, Aug 12, 2009 at 12:04 PM, Jeffrey Fisher <jeff.jfisher at gmail.com>wrote:
> I see where you're going semiotically here, but this what Geertz is doing.
> The symbol is the object/act. The meaning it carries is the abstract
> concept, not an object. But he does think of these concepts/conceptions as
> meaningful primarily in terms of their being expressed materially, which is
> part of why any objects or acts can be symbols -- if they carry meaning.
> This underscores the centrality of ritual, and religious doctrine (for
> example) then is seen as important insofar as it matters for what people
> actually do (whether in ritual strictly speaking, or in simply acting more
> broadly). There is something William James about it, in that respect. But I
> think it's fair to say that Geertz is very much in the tradition of
> Durkheim
> and Weber.
> But Geertz is worth reading, imo, and I think the case is much more solid
> than with Badiou. Everyone talks about the balinese cockfight essay, and
> I'm
> not dissing it, but for me the ones that have always mattered are "thick
> description" and the essay on "religion as a cultural system," the latter
> of
> which I usually make students in religion classes read. Both are in _the
> interpretation of cultures_. The problem, as Alan already noted, is his
> emphasis on meaning. On the one hand, this is very compelling, and on the
> other, it means (as it were) that he misses things. Myself, I'm fine with
> that, because his approach to the question of religion, and of culture in
> general, is useful.
>
> and i'm presuming that if
> i've said anything wildly misleading, alan or someone will correct me.
>
>
>
> > > > > meaning. concepts. symbols are abstract
> > > representations of
> > > > > concepts, i think
> > > > > is what he says? and the important part for
> > > geertz is
> > > > > meaning.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
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