I agree that much of what Petras says is overblown. He uses references to Zionism in a manner that would gain accolades among the mullahs. He overstresses the role of the US.However this piece is surely lacking. No references as to why the polls referred are to be trusted. Not a single mention of the power of leaders such as Rafsanjani who is a great power behind the scenes and of course rich anc corrupt and just as violent as any of the other leaaders when he feels it is necessary.
I would not be surprised if Ahmadinejad is dumped if things do not get quieter quickly. But I would not be surprised either if there is an all out civil war since powerful groups support both sides and there are divisions within groups such as the Revolutionary Guard. I don't know what the situation is in the armed forces.
Cheers, ken hanly
Blog: http://kenthink7.blogspot.com/index.html Blog: http://kencan7.blogspot.com/index.html
--- On Sun, 6/21/09, Michael McIntyre <morbidsymptoms at gmail.com> wrote:
> From: Michael McIntyre <morbidsymptoms at gmail.com>
> Subject: [lbo-talk] On Iran
> To: lbo-talk at lbo-talk.org
> Date: Sunday, June 21, 2009, 9:46 AM
> My new colleague, Kaveh Ehsani,
> recently wrote this takedown of James
> Petras' nonsense about Iran in Global Research.
> Chossudovsky is refusing to
> publish it, so Kaveh will be rewriting it for publication
> elsewhere, but I
> have his permission to circulate it in its original
> format.
>
> MM
>
>
> > Date: Saturday, June 20, 2009, 4:09 PM
> > Dear Professor Chossudovsky
> > I just read James Petras' appalling article about
> 'the
> > stolen election 'hoax' in Iran'.
> >
> > http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14018
> >
> > For a well known and respected scholar of the left to
> write
> > such an uninformed and outrageous piece, at this
> critical
> > time, when unarmed and peaceful protesters are being
> > arrested, tortured, and openly gunned down by what can
> only
> > be called fascist forces of repression in Iran is, to
> put it
> > simply, shocking!
> > Petras is not alone in taking this ignorant position.
> Many
> > others on the American left, equally contently
> misinformed,
> > have taken similar positions in support of a mounting
> rise
> > of fascist repression. I can appreciate the good
> hearted,
> > politically correct, sentiment behind this misguided
> > article. Petras is worried about a possible
> strengthening of
> > imperial US tendencies if the Iranian regime is
> demonized.
> > All good and well. Many of us have opposed and
> continue to
> > oppose US imperial policies. But Petras, like many
> other
> > sincere members of the US left, is reading Iranian
> political
> > developments entirely through the more familiar lens
> of
> > anti-imperialist critiques of US foreign policy,
> and/or
> > knowledge of the class and regional fragmentations of
> some
> > Latin American states. Iran is specific, not only for
> its
> > regional or religious identity, but for its
> particular
> > postrevolutionary political development and culture.
> The
> > strength of a thoughtful and principled
> > left has always resided in the ability to
> distinguish
> > between proto-fascistic populism and genuine
> democratic
> > movements, rather than simplistically supporting what
> the
> > opposition opposes. Perhaps a re-reading of 'the 18th
> > Brumaire' would have prevented this gaff!
> > I also cannot help but think that
> Petras,
> > a scholar of Latin America, but certainly not Iran,
> should
> > have done some minimal background research about
> electoral
> > patterns in Iran, or at least consulted with someone
> who
> > knows a bit more about the topic, or can read the
> language
> > and provide access to the enormous amount of online
> > information in Persian, before venturing an opinion.
> Among
> > other US sources the journal I co-edit, Middle East
> Report
> > (Merip) has written numerous pieces in English on the
> > subject over the past few years.
> > The simple facts are these:
> >
> > 1] Legally, election observers have to be present
> when
> > ballots are counted, and sealed. They sign the result
> sheet,
> > and are given a copy. This is the law, respected for
> the
> > past 30 years. This time they were expelled from the
> room
> > BEFORE the counting, and were not given copies of the
> > results.
> >
> > 2] 57m. ballots were printed (40 m people voted), but
> in
> > major polling stations ballots ran out at 10 am,
> leading to
> > voters being unable to vote for up to 8 hours. Extra
> ballots
> > were used to pre-stuff and pre-seal boxes, which is
> why
> > Ahmadinejad's vote tally never changed during the
> counting.
> > Officially Rezaei is supposed to have received 600
> thousand
> > votes. He asked those who voted for him to email him
> their
> > national card numbers. He has received 900 thousand
> emails!
> > In his case alone the obvious fraud makes a 50%
> difference.
> > What if we were to apply the same ball park figure to
> > Mousavi who officially received 13m. votes?
> >
> > 3] Mr. Petras should STUDY 30 years' pattern of ethnic
> and
> > provincial voting before he ventures to express an
> opinion
> > about a place so far from Latin America! Those
> patterns are
> > clear. Go to www.merip.org as just one source, and
> read
> > about the past elections and voting patterns.
> > I have worked for the past 20 years in Khuzestan's
> rural
> > and provincial areas. Other observers who do regular
> > research in rural Iran have already written about what
> has
> > taken place in peripheral areas (Eric Hooglund, for
> example
> > who has worked in rural Fars). Reliable reports from
> across
> > the country confirm the same point: Ahmadinejad lost
> > heavily, including in rural and provincial areas,
> which is
> > why we are facing a coup d'etat.
> > Ahmadinejad does have popular support. No one denies
> that.
> > But local elections 2 years ago displayed the extent
> of his
> > popularity. This time around, reliable polls in
> working
> > class satellite towns around Tehran, like Eslamshahr,
> > Sardasht, Varamin, etc. where his support was supposed
> to be
> > strong, indicated that Moussavi had 55% popular
> support,
> > Karoubi and Rezaei had a 10% total support, and
> Ahmadinejad
> > 35%. These polls, as well as the unprecedented
> illegal
> > behavior of the Interior Ministry after the elections
> are
> > the bases of the popular outrage and the claims of
> > widespread election rigging. As to the numbers, the
> > conservative mayor of Tehran has estimated the number
> of
> > protesters over the last few days at around 3m! These
> are
> > NOT only middle class people. Look at the pictures, if
> you
> > cannot follow the flood of material coming online.
> >
> > In these elections a third of the historically
> passive
> > electorate decided to cast their votes this time
> around, not
> > to affirm Ahmadinejad's administration, but because in
> the
> > last week of the election they witnessed 2 things:
> > 1. The strength and organization of Mousavi's
> campaign
> > which led them believe his campaign can accomplish
> the
> > changes he is promising, and
> > 2. in the televised debate they witnessed first-hand
> the
> > reality of the divisions that are splitting Iran's
> ruling
> > elite. The population realized the elections are not a
> show,
> > and the division among these candidates are real.
> Within
> > this division the voters sought to express their
> desire for
> > reform through peaceful means.
> > 3. They were profoundly shocked and outraged by the
> brazen
> > lies and the vicious tone of Ahmadinejad. The man
> looked at
> > the camera and lied about inflation figures which his
> own
> > Central Bank had published. People may not know about
> > statistics, but they can tell how much the price of
> basic
> > needs has inflated!
> > People in Iran are not fighting to establish a
> neo-liberal
> > order, or a client state of the West. Iranians have
> endured
> > 3 decades of revolution, war, and isolation, not to go
> back
> > to what they rejected under the monarchy, but to
> establish
> > an independent polity, which is democratic and
> respects
> > social justice and the public culture of the
> population.
> > Today they are risking everything to establish a state
> of
> > law, which is the next stepping stone toward
> accomplishing
> > that goal. They deserve the support of the
> international
> > forces and figures who claim to share the ideals of
> social
> > justice and democratic politics.
> > Petras claims Ahmadinejad has strong support in 'the
> oil
> > provinces', and that he is opposing neo-liberal
> > privatization policies that Mousavi supports! I wonder
> if
> > your journal has an editorial, fact finding policy at
> all?
> > For Ahamdinejad's position on privatization please see
> my
> > piece in the recent issue of Merip (
> http://merip.org/mer/mer250/mer250.html).
> Suffice it so
> > say that Ahmadinejad's model of privatization is close
> to
> > what took place in Yeltsin's Russia, distributing
> near
> > worthless vouchers to the poor, concentrating wealth
> in the
> > hands of a new oligarchy of military-security allies
> who
> > enjoy preferential access to banking capital. If this
> coup
> > succeeds we will witness the rise of Iranian
> equivalents of
> > Gazprom and Neftogaz, semi privatized econmic empires
> run by
> > Ahmadinejad's allies.
> > Mousavi's economic policy, on
> the other hand,
> > has been shaped by a number of vocal critiques of
> > privatization, and by economists who had clustered in
> the
> > Institute of Religion and Economics. The core of
> their
> > arguments about the economy is based on good
> governance,
> > institution building, and maintaining sate enterprises
> for
> > their employment generating role, while channeling
> surplus
> > oil revenues to expand an independent private sector:
> A
> > social democratic policy.
> >
> > Over the past century, at great cost, Iranians have
> made
> > several attempts to build an accountable polity. In
> all
> > these attempts they have been frustrated and
> eventually
> > betrayed by a combination of domestic reactionaries
> and 'the
> > West'. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 was
> eventually
> > crushed by the Great Game of Russian and British
> > imperialisms. The Oil Nationalization movement was
> > overthrown by the 1953 British and American coup
> d'etat. The
> > democratic aspirations of the 1979 revolution were
> > extinguished under the double blow of the repressive
> forces
> > that today support Ahmadinejad ( a point emphatically
> made
> > by Mousavi in his televised debate with Ahmadinejad),
> and a
> > bloody war with Iraq instigated and supported by the
> US and
> > European powers. The 1997 reformist movement was
> shunned by
> > the West and eventually defeated by Khamanei's
> intransigence
> > and sabotage. When Khatami was calling for dialogue
> abroad
> > and rule of law at home, Bill Clinton pushed
> > for dual containment and George Bush called Iran
> an Axis
> > of Evil. These betrayals by the international
> community have
> > harmed the development of democratic politics in
> Iran.
> > Let me be clear: Iranians are not looking to anyone
> but
> > themselves to build a democratic polity. This is NOT
> an
> > American inspired and financed velvet revolution. They
> are
> > not facing the vicious violence of
> Khamenei-Ahmadinejad
> > forces to build a neo liberal client state. They are
> trying
> > to build a state of law, where the real differences
> of
> > opinion that exists in this society are recognized
> and
> > respected, and that politics is shaped by mutually
> respected
> > rules, not demagoguery and violence.
> > If successful, this movement will revolutionize the
> > politics of Iran, and the region.
> > The least Iranians can expect from the progressive
> > international forces, if they are not going to show
> > solidarity and comprehension, at least do not stab us
> in the
> > back, yet again!
> >
> > I hope you will pass this along to James Petras.
> Ideally I
> > would like to ask you to print this as a response to
> the
> > Petras piece, but of course that is up to you.
> However,
> > given the gravity of Petras' piece this debate should
> be
> > made public, and I will seek to have it published
> elsewhere
> > if you decide against posting it.
> > Thank you for your time
> >
> > Sincerely
> >
> > Kaveh Ehsani
> > Assistant Professor of INternational Studies,
> > DePaul University, Chicago
> >
> > Editorial Board Member, Middle East Report (Washington
> DC)
> > Goftogu (Tehran)
> >
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