[lbo-talk] Dilip Hiro: Iran stats and recent history

Michael Pollak mpollak at panix.com
Mon Jun 29 17:29:27 PDT 2009


[Reasons many people think reformist sentiments are held by majority in Iran -- even if they might not triumph militarily]

Tom Dispatch

posted 2009-06-28 17:28:15

Tomgram: Dilip Hiro, The Weeks of Living Dangerously

<snip>

Khamanei has won the immediate battle, but the conflict between

hard-liners and reformists is far from over. Taking a long-term

view, Khamanei and his hard line cohorts face a superhuman task

of countering an inexorably rising trend. Quite simply, the

demographic make-up of Iran favors their reformist adversaries.

A glance at the republic's history bears this out.

Two Decades of Revolution

Between 1979, the year of the Islamic revolution, and 1999,

Iran's population doubled to 65 million, two-thirds of them under

25 years of age. Those young Iranians had no direct experience or

memory of the pre-Islamic regime of the Shah -- its inequities

and injustices, and its subservient relationship with Washington.

Therefore, their commitment to the Islamic regime was less than

total. Moreover, the post-revolutionary educational system had

proven inadequate when it came to socializing them the way the

republic's religious leaders wanted.

During those two decades, Iran's student body increased almost

threefold, to 19 million. The overall literacy rate jumped from

58% to 82%, with the figure for females -- 28% in 1979 --

tripling. There was a remarkable upsurge in the enrollment of

women in universities. Nationally, their share of university

student bodies shot up to 60%. At prestigious Tehran University,

they were a majority in all faculties, including science and law.

The total of university graduates, which stood at 430,000 in

1979, grew nine-fold in those years. As elsewhere in the world,

university students and graduates would become a vital engine for

change.

Much to the disappointment of the mullahs, a study of university

students in the late 1990s showed that whereas 83% of them

watched television, only 5% watched religious programs. Of the

58% who read extracurricular books, barely 6% showed interest in

religious literature.

In his book, A Study of Student Political Behavior in Today's

Iran, Professor Majid Muhammadi divided university students into

three categories: those born into largely Islamic working or

traditional middle-class households (traders and craftsmen);

those born to secular, or nominally Islamic, modern middle class

parents (teachers and doctors); and those raised in an

environment that mixed traditional Islam and secularism.

While the first category was loyal to the regime, and the second

kept a low profile, shunning politics, it was the students in the

last, and largest, category who felt deeply conflicted. While

linked to Islam through tradition, they were attracted to modern,

Westernized culture politically and socially. In attempting to

resolve the conflict, most of them became politically active, and

were transformed into a force for social and political change.

By and large, university students were interested in watching

foreign television programs, finding the national channels

unimaginative and propagandistic. A poorly enforced ban on

satellite dishes meant they could easily get access to the BBC,

CNN, and the Voice of America. In the post-1999 decade, the

arrival of the Internet, e-mail, blogging, YouTube, Facebook, and

most recently Twitter, opened up opportunities previously not

available to their older peers.

[BloodEarth.gif] Irrespective of their social backgrounds, what

indisputably impinges on the daily lives of university students

and other young Iranians are the restrictions the regime tries to

impose on their social and personal freedoms, including going to

mixed-sex parties, holding hands with someone other than a

marriage partner, drinking alcoholic beverages, listening to

modern Western music, watching foreign television channels via

satellite, and having extramarital sex. While reformists

recognize that restricting such activities is having the singular

effect of alienating the young from the Islamic Republic, their

conservative opponents consider these restrictions essential to

uphold Islamic morality and culture.

Not surprisingly, politically conscious university students have

been striving to enlarge the arena of personal freedoms as a

means of countering social repression and administrative

corruption, and making the Islamic system more transparent and

accountable.

Politics in Command

It was against this background that, in 1997, a presidential

election was conducted. Muhammad Khatami, a reformist outsider,

unblemished by corruption, proceeded to trounce his rival, Ali

Akbar Nateq Nouri -- the erstwhile Speaker of parliament favored

by the religious establishment and perceived to be corrupt -- by

a margin of almost three to one. In the next election, Khatami

trumped his nearest rival by a five-to-one margin.

Notwithstanding periodic setbacks due to a dispersion of power

among the office of president, the parliament, and the judiciary,

Khatami created an environment in which the area of social,

cultural, and political freedoms expanded.

Initially, for instance, the authorities were very strict about

enforcing the wearing of the hijab (a head-covering scarf) and

banning the use of make-up for women, nor did they allow young

men and women to sit in the same classrooms in colleges and

universities. By the time of Khatami's reelection in 2005,

however, the authorities were tolerating young women who flouted

the strict Islamic dress code of covering themselves fully,

except for face and hands. They even allowed an occasional rock

concert and they were giving more leeway to non-governmental

organizations.

During the first year of Khatami's presidency, the country

experienced an explosion of new publications. Following a

landslide victory by the reformists in the first round of

parliamentary elections in February 2000, a newly bullish

pro-reform press even began publishing stories of corruption in

the pre-Khatami period. These proved immensely popular.

Khatami's supporters viewed this as a sign of the growing

maturity of the Islamic system and the evolution of democratic

governance. Before the second round of the elections could take

place in May, however, a conservative-minded parliament reacted

speedily. Encouraged by Khamanei, it stiffened the Press Law in

April, leading to the closure of dozens of publications by the

judiciary.

In the 2005 presidential contest, leading reformists were barred

from the race by the Guardian Council. Deprived of real choice,

most reformist voters boycotted the election. This enabled the

hard-line mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad -- a Khamanei favorite --

to trounce Rafsanjani, an affluent, pragmatic conservative

blemished by a reputation for corruption.

During Ahmadinejad's presidency, university classes were

re-segregated by gender. The law banning satellite dishes was

enforced vigorously. The morality police resorted to patrolling

the streets to ensure that women wore proper Islamic dress and

unmarried couples refrained from holding hands. This was but a

part of Ahmadinejad's drive to return society to the early years

of the Islamic revolution.

Little wonder then that, in the run-up to the 2009 presidential

election, young voters rallied behind Mir Hussein Mousavi, whose

academic wife, the artist Zahra Rahnavard, spoke of the hijab

becoming optional for women. Mousavi promised to disband the

morality police and appoint women to important government jobs.

The Nature of the Iranian Revolution

In trying to recreate the environment of the early days of the

Iranian revolution in the absence of the conditions that brought

about the collapse of the old order of the Shah, the country's

hard line leaders are defying both human nature and history.

They are ignoring the fact that most people tend to strive only

to the extent that is necessary to survive, procreate, and lead a

comfortable life. More important, human beings simply cannot

continue functioning at a heightened level for decades on end.

Revolutions are born out of periods of acute crisis and

extraordinary fervor combined with high idealism. With time, red

hot zeal cools, and so does a revolution. Idealism gives way to

pragmatism -- and, of course, corruption.

No less than the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah

Ruhollah Khomeini, bowed to inescapable reality when he accepted

a United Nations-brokered ceasefire with Iraq in 1988, after

endlessly exhorting Iranians to fight on for 20 years -- until

victory.

Such softening is common to all revolutions.

Yet in the regional context, what happened in Iran in the late

1970s had been unique. Every previous post-World War II dramatic

regime change in the Middle East had come about thanks to

overnight military coups. The overthrow of the seemingly

unassailable Shah of Iran in February 1979, on the other hand,

was the culmination of a relentless two-year-long revolutionary

movement.

Globally, too, the Iranian revolution stood apart. All the

revolutions of the last century, starting with the Mexican

revolution of 1910, were secular and focused on changing property

and class relations. Not the one in Iran.

Its leader, Khomeini, made adroit use of Shiite history and

Iranian nationalism to attract ever-increasing support. He

managed to unite the disparate anti-Shah forces, both religious

and secular -- including Marxists of various shades -- by his

most radical demand: the deposition of Muhammad Reza Shah

Pahlavi. Although his revolutionary movement included

secularists, only the religious segment was capable, via the

mosque, of providing a national organizational network down to

the village level.

Both as an institution and a place of congregation, the mosque

proved critical. Since the state could not suppress the mosque in

a country that was 98% Muslim, it offered a sanctuary to the

revolutionary movement. That was why Khomeini instructed the

clergy to base the Revolutionary Komitehs (Committees)

coordinating the anti-Shah movement in those mosques.

It was in this way that the unprecedented upheaval, claiming an

estimated 10,000 to 40,000 lives (largely unarmed Iranians killed

by military gunfire), turned into the successful "Islamic

revolution." It became a preamble to the founding of the Islamic

Republic of Iran. That term "republic" -- not "state" or

"emirate" (as in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the

Taliban) -- in the official title was, and remains, highly

significant. Thirty years on, the partisans of Mousavi are now

arguing that the recent electoral fraud undermines the founding

principle of the post-Shah regime: that power lies with the

public.

Overthrowing an established order is a hard, bloody affair, but

making a revolution stick is even more demanding. In the case of

Iran, the revolutionary regime became a target of aggression when

Iraq's Saddam Hussein launched his invasion in September 1980.

The subsequent eight-year war helped merge Iranian nationalism

into the post-Shah regime, and stabilized it.

Following Khomeini's death in 1989, the transition to his

successor Khamanei as the Supreme Leader, assisted by the

popularly elected president Rafsanjani, was smooth. Initially,

Khamanei took his cues from Rafsanjani, a wily politician. As he

consolidated his hold over the military, the Revolutionary Guard

Corps, and its auxiliary, the Basij militia, however, he began

operating independently and drifted away from Rafsanjani.

Now, both hard-liners and reformists are competing to show their

loyalty to Shiite Islam. Its founder, Imam Hussein, the Great

Martyr, leading a band of 72 retainers, died in 680 AD while

battling a force of 4,000 to stake his rightful claim to the

caliphate usurped by his rival. The moral of this episode, which

lies at the heart of Shiite Islam, is that the true believer must

not shirk from challenging the established order if it has become

unjust and oppressive.

Competing Loyalties to Shiite Islam

In today's Shiite Iran, the partisans of Mousavi have adopted

green, the color of Islam, as their brand. They shout "Allah-u

Akbar" (God is Great) and "We want [Imam] Hussein" in the streets

and from the rooftops, while their leader invokes the Quran to

demand justice. They are not demanding regime change, only an

overdue change in the regime.

For his part, Supreme Leader Khamanei sees the hand of God in the

overwhelming victory of Ahmadinejad. The riot police and Basij

militia regard him as their spiritual guide and consider any

challenge to his word or deed as a challenge to Islam. Ignoring

massive evidence to the contrary, Khamanei has ruled out an

electoral fraud on the grounds that such a possibility is

inconceivable in Iran's Islamic system.

While locked in a struggle, both sides claim to be pursuing the

ideal of a just Islamic state. Each remains aware of the value of

martyrdom.

The Iranian security forces' beatings, baton charges, and tear

gassing of unarmed, peaceful protestors, as well as mass arrests,

are deplorable. It is worth noting that most of the firing of

live ammunition by the security personnel seems to have been in

the air. That explains why the fatalities in the massive and

repeated street protests in Tehran have remained relatively low,

totaling 15, according to official sources, which also claim that

eight Basij militiamen have been killed. Media reports generally

have cited 17 deaths of protestors so far, though rumors of

higher death tolls abound.

What matters most to the government, as well as its opponents, is

the number of people killed, or "martyred."

The speed with which the authorities have tried to hijack the

killing of 26-year-old Neda Aghan Soltan in Tehran by a bullet

almost certainly fired by a uniformed member of the security

forces is illustrative. They have declared her to be a Basiji

martyr, allegedly killed by pro-Mousavi protestors, who, in

response, rushed to circulate worldwide the shocking image of her

dying in the street.

Given its Shiite underpinning, the government remains conscious

that resorting to excessive violence could turn opponents into

that most dangerous of symbols: martyrs.

Until the June 12th election -- despite evidence of modest

tinkering with the first round of the 2005 presidential vote --

post-Shah Iran seemed to indicate that Islam and democracy could

work in harmony. The upheaval since then has demonstrated that

when strains between the two concepts develop, it is democracy

that gets short shrift.

That is bad news for Muslims -- and non-Muslims -- worldwide.

Dilip Hiro is the author of five books on Iran, the latest being

The Iranian Labyrinth: Journeys Through Theocratic Iran and its

Furies (Nation Books), as well as most recently Blood of the

Earth: The Battle for the World's Vanishing Oil Resources. His

upcoming book After Empire: The Rise of a Multipolar World will

be published by Nation Books later this year.

Copyright 2009 Dilip Hiro



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