> English translations of Aristotle are hilarious. Like, there is no
> concept of "essence" in Aristotle. There is the "to ti en einai,"
> the "what it was going to be," which is rather different -- and if
> you note it is a temporal concept that implies change (the to ti en
> einai being revealed after the process of change), which is rather
> the opposite of an essence.
This is the Hegel/Marx idea of "essence", so it's only "the opposite of an essence" if you insist on giving "essence" a meaning opposite to theirs.
"That man is free by Nature is quite correct in one sense; viz., that he is so according to the Idea of Humanity; but we imply thereby that he is such only in virtue of his destiny – that he has an undeveloped power to become such; for the 'Nature' of an object is exactly synonymous with its 'Idea.' But the view in question imports more than this. When man is spoken of as 'free by Nature,' the mode of his existence as well as his destiny is implied." <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/history4.htm>
"The state of Nature is, therefore, predominantly that of injustice and violence, of untamed natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and feelings. Limitation is certainty produced by Society and the State, but it is a limitation of the mere brute emotions and rude instincts; as also, in a more advanced stage of culture, of the premeditated self- will of caprice and passion. This kind of constraint is part of the instrumentality by which only, the consciousness of Freedom and the desire for its attainment, in its true – that is Rational and Ideal form – can be obtained. To the Ideal of Freedom, Law and Morality are indispensably requisite: and they are in and for themselves, universal existences, objects and aims; which are discovered only by the activity of thought, separating itself from the merely sensuous, and developing itself, in opposition thereto; and which must on the other hand, be introduced into and incorporated with the originally sensuous will, and that contrarily to its natural inclination." <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/history4.htm>
"Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man [menschliche Wesen = ‘human nature’]. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence is hence obliged:
"1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment regarded by itself, and to presuppose an abstract — isolated — human individual.
"2. The essence therefore can by him only be regarded as ‘species’, as an inner ‘dumb’ generality which unites many individuals only in a natural way." <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/>
This is also true of identifying "foundational" reasoning with axiomatic deductive reasoning, i.e. with "syllogistic reasoning and arguing from first principles".
For reasons pointed to by, among others, Hegel, Marx, Whitehead, Keynes and Husserl, this is a mistake, a mistake productive of the conclusion that so long as the reasoning is "consistent" it's "rational". (To see Whitehead's argument dismissing "deductive logic as a major instrument for metaphysical discussion" go here <http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/pkt/2000m03/msg00238.htm
>).
So it's a mistake productive of a conclusion as absurd as the conclusion that there are no "foundations" on which to base a rational judgement that Glen Beck's tears and anger, let alone the enjoyment of torture and lynching, are examples of feeling "wrongly".
It's another "extraordinary example of how,starting with a mistake, a remorseless logician can end up in Bedlam".
Ted