--- On Mon, 3/23/09, dredmond at efn.org <dredmond at efn.org> wrote:
> Chris Doss wrote:
>
> > Well, there's also fractures and differences of
> opinion within the elites
> > themselves. I mean, serfdom wasn't abolished by a
> broad social movement.
> > It was abolished by Tsar Alexander after a long
> struggle between pro- and
> > antiserfdom factions within the Imperial elite.
>
> True. No single crisis moment created today's Russian
> developmental state:
> it evolved out of a complex constellation of factors
> (ruthless oligarchs,
> corrupt party elites, foreign neoliberals, falling energy
> prices,
> dissatisfied siloviki and scientific-managerial
> professionals, etc.).
>
> Probably every noteworthy historical change or transition
> was preceded by
> decades, if not centuries, of slow, accretive
> transformation.
>
[WS:] I guess it is a more general philosophical question of whether changes are linear i.e. resulting from progressing accumulation of small steps (like baldness, for example) or non-linear (or discrete) i.e. resulting from sudden, often catastrophic events. I understand that this question is debated in natural sciences as well (e.g. evolutionary biology) and it is far from being settled.
Philosophically, I disdain linear explanations - they tend to appeal to unimaginative bean-counters and apologists of the status quo (as linear trends make perfect rationalizations of the status quo). Non-linear trends, discrete progressions, catastrophic events, and big bangs are far more interesting intellectually. I do realize, however, that not only these two are not mutually exclusive, but usually (if not necessarily) interdependent.
Earthquakes provide a good analogy here. Tension builds up from small linear increments, but then there is a precipitating event that triggers a massive release of the built-up tension. Both are necessary to produce an earthquake - any single one acting alone will not do.
In case of social change - tensions build up almost constantly, especially in stratified societies, but whether those building up tensions result in a massive change of societal institutions depends on the elite's ability to maintain its hegemony and diffuse those tensions. More often than not, elites can maintain their hegemony and diffuse tensions, which produces sporadic unrest and relatively minor changes, but the core institutional system (especially its underlying property relations) remains pretty much intact.
The Mau Mau rebellion (Kenya, 1951) is a good case in point. Social tensions were created by the land grab by white settlers that started around WW1, and resulted in the increased exploitation of the native agricultural labor and displacement of a large number of the natives. As these tensions were brewing, the British administration initially ignored the local demands for land reform and political independence. This let to the eruption of hostilities in 1951, known as the Mau Mau uprising. However, the Brits easily defeated the insurgents militarily, taking advantage of their "indirect rule" i.e. using local elites as proxies for the colonial power. Security forces composed mainly of the native population did most of the fighting against the insurgents.
After defeating the insurgents militarily, the Brits instituted most of the initial demands for land reform (against white settler wishes) and political independence, which eventually led to electoral victory of Jomo Kenyatta (who sided with the Brits during the Mau Mau uprising) and eventual national independence of Kenya. Interestingly, the independence government (Kenyatta and his successor Daniel arap Moi) preserved and used the security apparatus created by the British colonial state to stave off challenges to its rule. Only after a neo-liberal rule, and foreign (mostly British) ownership of most of Kenya's industrial assets had been firmly established, the country returned to a formally democratic rule (2002 election.)
This case illustrates how the elite's ability to maintain its hegemony and diffuse social tensions resulted in the preservation of the core institutions (based mainly on property relations) with relatively minor changes of mostly political nature. A similar case can be made of South African development, where growing power of African labor following the country industrialization in the beginning of the 20th century. Black labor union and African National Congress support was instrumental in the victory of the Hertzog government in 1924, which proposed the extension of the voting rights to the non-white populations. This challenge was diffused by instituting the apartheid state by 1948, which unified whites (divided by class interests) against blacks and basically protected white ownership of land and industrial assets. Formal democracy was allowed only when potential challenges to those property relations (the "specter of communism") were defeated on a
global scale. Like in Kenya, the native elites of formally democratic South Africa aptly stepped into the institutional order created by the colonial powers.
Now contrast that with the developments in Russia or China, where socialist revolutions managed to succeed in the overhaul of the old institutional order. Both countries had similar to Africa class relations, a small land - and industry owning elite facing huge working class (agrarian and industrial) - and both experiencing periodical eruptions of social unrest created by the class conflict. However, the major difference is the strength of the elites to maintain its hegemony and institutional order. In East Africa, that strength was due, in a large part, to British "indirect rule" which resulted in British support in defeating challenges from below to the status quo. In Russia and China, the local elites were mortally weakened by foreign powers - German offensive that crushed the Russian forced in WW1, which was the main pillar of the pre-revolutionary institutional order; and Japanese occupation that wiped out the Chinese state and uprooted large
peasant masses (which Mao was able to harness to advance a revolution.)
In short, in East and South Africa elites were challenged but not crushed, while in Russia and China elites were crushed by outside forces. Consequently, Russia and China had socialist revolutions that effectively overhauled the institutional order, but Africa did not - despite strong class conflict and impressive mobilization of the subordinate classes.
Wojtek