Most theory, though, is written without marshalling empirical evidence. There are several different kinds of theory in sociology for example. There is what is sometimes called metatheory: theory about theories, as well as theories regarding how we know (epistemology) and theories regarding what is is that we know (ontological). We also do normative theory: theorizing about what _should_ be as opposed to what is.
When I wrote an empirical paper that attempted to flesh out Habermas's theories, one of the things that was most often said about it was that it was among the very few attempts of such with Habermas's theories. I was only aware of one slim volume that investigated what I'd examined: Habermas's theories regarding legitimation crises and new social movements. But lots of people write satisfying and quite interesting work fleshing out and criticizing Habermas's theories. I see no need for anyone to draw on empirical evidence in any direct way to have a contribution to make to our understanding of the world.
We call another kind of theory substantive theory which tends to be theory about social life itself: organizational theory, political theory, theory of families, theories of the workplace. These theories can go both ways. They can be theories about the various theories in the field. They can be speculative. They can be normative. Sometimes, they are theories that derive from empirical research conducted by others. Sometimes, they are theories that are meant to be pushed forward and then others pick them up and test them. Other times, the other him or herself does the empirical work and then fleshes out the theory. The latter is rare, I think, because it is rather difficult to be accomplished at both.
Wall St. is an example of substantive theory about theory that occasionally draws on empirical studies done by others.
It seems to me that in academia, part of what they do is specialize. Philosophers hardly ever write about empirical research. Iris Marion Young was the only contemporary philosopher I'd ever read who occasionally dived into empirical work - and that was partly because she was involved in a very specialized arm of philosophy that was all about bringing substantive empirical work to bear on the philosophical project. I can't recall the name of the organization she belonged to in the late 70s, IIRC, but you don't hear much about it these days -- at least I don't. It doesn't seem to have gone far. In part, this probably has much to do with the lack of interest -- and a agreat deal comes from the way academic specialization works.
Judith Butler is a theorist who doesn't really use empirical evidence. She gestures as one anthropological study in Gender Trouble, and I don't recall a lick of empirical work brought into the Psychic Life of Power.
Walter Benn Michaels and other literary critics have hardly ever delve into empirical investigations. And when they do, they are typically ill-equipped to assess them: they have no training in how to understand social scientific work. They do not study how ethnographies are conducted, they are unaware of how to assess qualitative research, and especially ill-equipped to understand quantitative research. They certainly don't engage in literature reviews but mostly cherry pick through research they feel exemplifies their case -- which is hardly go od substantive theory derived from a body of empirical evidence. They write theory about theory -- epistemology. Or theory about how texts mean, but I don't really ever read actual research on how people interpret texts -- though some lit theorists do that.
Ambagen and his colleagues at UC appear to be philosophers, cultural critics and or literary critics who's disciplines and interests are just another way of knowing about the world that doesn't have to cowtow to the empiricists demands in order to offer a contribution to our undestanding of the world.
shag
http://cleandraws.com Wear Clean Draws ('coz there's 5 million ways to kill a CEO)