> The Israel Lobby currently plays an important role in US politics, not an independent or decisive one - its money, influence in Congress, and pro-Israel US public opinion notwithstanding. Its influence is strictly contingent on the view of US military and political leaders that Israel is a strategic asset. But the rise of radical Islam has been altering the relationship of forces in the Middle East and beyond, and shaking the perception that US interests are inseparable from those of Israel as unchallenged regional hegemon. Does anyone seriously doubt that the influence of the Israel Lobby - based essentially on a convergence of Israeli power and US interest, rather than on Jewish American money and connections - would not decline sharply if Israel came to be viewed as a strategic liability rather than an asset, a view which now enjoys greater currency within the US defence and foreign policy establishment than at any time since 1956?
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To me there's something wrong with this formulation. You seem to be saying that on one side there's the Israel Lobby; on the other side there's "US military and political leaders"; and the influence of the former depends on the fact that the latter largely agree with it. The US leaders seem to be all of one mind - their view is that "Israel is a strategic asset"; but current events are "shaking that perception"; and the Lobby would surely lose its influence "if Israel came to be viewed as a strategic liability rather than an asset." Their views may change, but they all move in unison.
As I see it, the Lobby *itself* is made up in large part of US military and political leaders. Surely Dennis Ross, formerly of WINEP, who currently runs US Mideast policy, is in some sense part of the Lobby. And conversely, opponents of the Lobby - like Chas Freeman and Brent Scowcroft and the CENTCOM officials described in the excerpt you quote - are among the pillars of the US military and political leadership. In the Lobby-skeptical view, the Lobby itself never seems to have an opinion of its own about whether Israel is a strategic asset; only the serious "real" leaders who "really" make the decisions have an opinion on this. But it seems to me that the denizens of the Lobby are just as often the ones who make the decisions and they believe Israel *is* a strategic asset, while their opponents disagree.
So given that the pillars of the US foreign-policy establishment are themselves divided over whether Israel is a strategic asset (and always have been), why do the pillars who are *in* the Lobby always seem to get to make policy, while the pillars who *oppose* the Lobby always seem to lose the policy battles? Couldn't it be because the pillars in the Lobby have more political influence in America than the pillars outside the Lobby?
SA