On Sun, 29 Aug 2010, Joseph Catron cited:
> http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/opinion/29abunimah.html
It's news that they published him. I think it's worth posting the whole thing (attached below), because it bears on our lobby discussion -- it is essentially a comparative tale of two lobbies. The same comparison also functions here as a very nicely done piece of rhetoric. I'm very impressed with Abuminah's ability to tailor his style to his venue.
Michael
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http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/opinion/29abunimah.html
The New York Times
August 28, 2010
Hamas, the I.R.A. and Us
By ALI ABUNIMAH
Chicago
GEORGE J. MITCHELL, the United States Middle East envoy, tried to
counter low expectations for renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace
negotiations by harking back to his experience as a mediator in
Northern Ireland.
At an Aug. 20 news conference with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton, announcing the talks that will begin this week, Mr. Mitchell
reminded journalists that during difficult negotiations in Northern
Ireland, "We had about 700 days of failure and one day of success" --
the day in 1998 that the Belfast Agreement instituting power-sharing
between pro-British unionists and Irish nationalists was signed.
Mr. Mitchell's comparison is misleading at best. Success in the Irish
talks was the result not just of determination and time, but also a
very different United States approach to diplomacy.
The conflict in Northern Ireland had been intractable for decades.
Unionists backed by the British government saw any political compromise
with Irish nationalists as a danger, one that would lead to a united
Ireland in which a Catholic majority would dominate minority Protestant
unionists. The British government also refused to deal with the Irish
nationalist party Sinn Fein, despite its significant electoral mandate,
because of its close ties to the Irish Republican Army, which had
carried out violent acts in the United Kingdom.
A parallel can be seen with the American refusal to speak to the
Palestinian party Hamas, which decisively won elections in the West
Bank and Gaza in 2006. Asked what role Hamas would have in the renewed
talks, Mr. Mitchell answered with one word: "None." No serious analyst
believes that peace can be made between Palestinians and Israelis
without Hamas on board, any more than could have been the case in
Northern Ireland without Sinn Fein and the I.R.A.
The United States insists that Hamas meet strict preconditions before
it can take part in negotiations: recognize Israel, renounce violence
and abide by agreements previously signed between Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization, of which Hamas is not a member.
These demands are unworkable. Why should Hamas or any Palestinian
accept Israel's political demands, like recognition, when Israel
refuses to recognize basic Palestinian demands like the right of return
for refugees?
As for violence, Hamas has inflicted a fraction of the harm on Israeli
civilians that Israel inflicts on Palestinian civilians. If violence
disqualifies Hamas, surely much greater violence should disqualify the
Israelis?
It was only by breaking with one-sided demands that Mr. Mitchell was
able to help bring peace to Northern Ireland. In 1994, for instance,
Mr. Mitchell, then a Democratic senator from Maine, urged President
Bill Clinton -- against strenuous British objections -- to grant a
United States visa to Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader. Mr. Mitchell
later wrote that he believed the visa would enable Mr. Adams "to
persuade the I.R.A. to declare a cease-fire, and permit Sinn Fein to
enter into inclusive political negotiations." As mediator, Mr. Mitchell
insisted that a cease-fire apply to all parties equally, not just to
the I.R.A.
Both the Irish and Middle Eastern conflicts figure prominently in
American domestic politics -- yet both have played out in very
different ways. The United States allowed the Irish-American lobby to
help steer policy toward the weaker side: the Irish government in
Dublin and Sinn Fein and other nationalist parties in the north. At
times, the United States put intense pressure on the British
government, leveling the field so that negotiations could result in an
agreement with broad support. By contrast, the American government let
the Israel lobby shift the balance of United States support toward the
stronger of the two parties: Israel.
This disparity has not gone unnoticed by those with firsthand knowledge
of the Irish talks. In a 2009 letter to The Times of London, several
British and Irish negotiators, including John Hume, who shared the
Nobel Peace Prize for the Belfast Agreement, criticized the one-sided
demands imposed solely on Hamas. "Engaging Hamas," the negotiators
wrote, "does not amount to condoning terrorism or attacks on civilians.
In fact, it is a precondition for security and for brokering a workable
agreement."
The resumption of peace talks without any Israeli commitment to freeze
settlements is another significant victory for the Israel lobby and the
Israeli government. It allows Israel to pose as a willing peacemaker
while carrying on with business as usual.
As for Mr. Mitchell, since he was appointed Middle East envoy, he has
so far enjoyed almost 600 days of failure. As long as the United States
maintains the same hopeless approach, he can expect many more.
Ali Abunimah is the author of "One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the
Israeli-Palestinian Impasse."