Joel
On Aug 29, 2010, at 1:22 PM, Michael Pollak wrote:
>
> On Sun, 29 Aug 2010, Joseph Catron cited:
>
>> http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/opinion/29abunimah.html
>
> It's news that they published him. I think it's worth posting the whole thing (attached below), because it bears on our lobby discussion -- it is essentially a comparative tale of two lobbies. The same comparison also functions here as a very nicely done piece of rhetoric. I'm very impressed with Abuminah's ability to tailor his style to his venue.
>
> Michael
>
> =======
>
> http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/opinion/29abunimah.html
>
> The New York Times
> August 28, 2010
>
> Hamas, the I.R.A. and Us
>
> By ALI ABUNIMAH
>
> Chicago
>
> GEORGE J. MITCHELL, the United States Middle East envoy, tried to
> counter low expectations for renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace
> negotiations by harking back to his experience as a mediator in
> Northern Ireland.
>
> At an Aug. 20 news conference with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
> Clinton, announcing the talks that will begin this week, Mr. Mitchell
> reminded journalists that during difficult negotiations in Northern
> Ireland, "We had about 700 days of failure and one day of success" --
> the day in 1998 that the Belfast Agreement instituting power-sharing
> between pro-British unionists and Irish nationalists was signed.
>
> Mr. Mitchell's comparison is misleading at best. Success in the Irish
> talks was the result not just of determination and time, but also a
> very different United States approach to diplomacy.
>
> The conflict in Northern Ireland had been intractable for decades.
> Unionists backed by the British government saw any political compromise
> with Irish nationalists as a danger, one that would lead to a united
> Ireland in which a Catholic majority would dominate minority Protestant
> unionists. The British government also refused to deal with the Irish
> nationalist party Sinn Fein, despite its significant electoral mandate,
> because of its close ties to the Irish Republican Army, which had
> carried out violent acts in the United Kingdom.
>
> A parallel can be seen with the American refusal to speak to the
> Palestinian party Hamas, which decisively won elections in the West
> Bank and Gaza in 2006. Asked what role Hamas would have in the renewed
> talks, Mr. Mitchell answered with one word: "None." No serious analyst
> believes that peace can be made between Palestinians and Israelis
> without Hamas on board, any more than could have been the case in
> Northern Ireland without Sinn Fein and the I.R.A.
>
> The United States insists that Hamas meet strict preconditions before
> it can take part in negotiations: recognize Israel, renounce violence
> and abide by agreements previously signed between Israel and the
> Palestine Liberation Organization, of which Hamas is not a member.
> These demands are unworkable. Why should Hamas or any Palestinian
> accept Israel's political demands, like recognition, when Israel
> refuses to recognize basic Palestinian demands like the right of return
> for refugees?
>
> As for violence, Hamas has inflicted a fraction of the harm on Israeli
> civilians that Israel inflicts on Palestinian civilians. If violence
> disqualifies Hamas, surely much greater violence should disqualify the
> Israelis?
>
> It was only by breaking with one-sided demands that Mr. Mitchell was
> able to help bring peace to Northern Ireland. In 1994, for instance,
> Mr. Mitchell, then a Democratic senator from Maine, urged President
> Bill Clinton -- against strenuous British objections -- to grant a
> United States visa to Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader. Mr. Mitchell
> later wrote that he believed the visa would enable Mr. Adams "to
> persuade the I.R.A. to declare a cease-fire, and permit Sinn Fein to
> enter into inclusive political negotiations." As mediator, Mr. Mitchell
> insisted that a cease-fire apply to all parties equally, not just to
> the I.R.A.
>
> Both the Irish and Middle Eastern conflicts figure prominently in
> American domestic politics -- yet both have played out in very
> different ways. The United States allowed the Irish-American lobby to
> help steer policy toward the weaker side: the Irish government in
> Dublin and Sinn Fein and other nationalist parties in the north. At
> times, the United States put intense pressure on the British
> government, leveling the field so that negotiations could result in an
> agreement with broad support. By contrast, the American government let
> the Israel lobby shift the balance of United States support toward the
> stronger of the two parties: Israel.
>
> This disparity has not gone unnoticed by those with firsthand knowledge
> of the Irish talks. In a 2009 letter to The Times of London, several
> British and Irish negotiators, including John Hume, who shared the
> Nobel Peace Prize for the Belfast Agreement, criticized the one-sided
> demands imposed solely on Hamas. "Engaging Hamas," the negotiators
> wrote, "does not amount to condoning terrorism or attacks on civilians.
> In fact, it is a precondition for security and for brokering a workable
> agreement."
>
> The resumption of peace talks without any Israeli commitment to freeze
> settlements is another significant victory for the Israel lobby and the
> Israeli government. It allows Israel to pose as a willing peacemaker
> while carrying on with business as usual.
>
> As for Mr. Mitchell, since he was appointed Middle East envoy, he has
> so far enjoyed almost 600 days of failure. As long as the United States
> maintains the same hopeless approach, he can expect many more.
>
> Ali Abunimah is the author of "One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the
> Israeli-Palestinian Impasse."
>
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