I'm sorry, you are. You said this:
^^^^^ CB: Well, in Levi-Strauss's sense, structures _are_ metaphors. Levi-Strauss's signification is " a is to be as c is to d". or a:b::c:d.
So, in a mythical island society, male:female::seaside: islandside would be a structue of analogies that can be traced through lots of aspects of the whole culture.
See? You said that Levi-Strauss claims that structures ARE metaphors. That isn't true. Structures are more fundamental than metaphors. Without structures metaphors cannot take place.
This isn't pendanticism on my part either - its absolutely fundamental to structuralist theory. I'll give two concrete examples:
(1) The classic example given by Borges and quoted in Foucault's "Order of Things".
In "The Analytical Language of John Wilkins," Borges describes 'a certain Chinese Encyclopedia,' the Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge, in which it is written that animals are divided into:
1. those that belong to the Emperor,
2. embalmed ones,
3. those that are trained,
4. suckling pigs,
5. mermaids,
6. fabulous ones,
7. stray dogs,
8. those included in the present classification,
9. those that tremble as if they were mad,
10. innumerable ones,
11. those drawn with a very fine camel hair brush,
12. others,
13. those that have just broken a flower vase,
14. those that from a long way off look like flies.
Note that this is an explication of some of the structural classifications in China at the time. Since we do not inhabit this particular structure it seems bizarre. If someone who were operating within this structure made a metaphor we would simply not understand it. For example: "Haha, my friend, your wife is like a stray dog whereas mine is like a creature that from far away resembles a fly!".
(Excuse the sexism of this example, but I did it on purpose to allude to the basic law in every culture that metaphor and structure are tied to sexual difference).
(2) Another interesting example from a different register is that of psychosis. Lacan contends that in people suffering from psychosis have failed to integrate the structures of their particular culture properly. This results in their being unable to produce original metaphors (this is a major factor in Lacanian clinical diagnosis). Indeed, in the case of paranoid schizophrenia - like that of Tilly Matthews I discussed earlier in a different context - after the psychotic breakdown ensues the patient generally puts together an all new structure in order to organise his/her world. This is why these constructions appear to us so bizarre - because, like the Chinese encyclopedia article we do not live within these structures. Thus when the schizophrenic says: "Aha, I am feeling unwell today because the criminal gang operating the air loom have infused its workings with the gas from the anus of the horse - today they are lobster cracking me!!!", we do not understand at all what he is on about because we don't live within his structure.
So, you see the structure is NOT "the metaphorical identification" as such. It is the organising principle that allows certain metaphorical identifications to function and prevents others from functioning.
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> ^^^^^^
> CB: Once you get to two binary oppositions related, you have a
> structure and a metaphor.
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> ^^^^^^^^
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Again, no, this is incorrect. One cannot arbitrary create metaphors through
just any binary opposition. Watch:
"The moon that night shone like a curled toe"
Perhaps that's the start of a mediocre Surrealist poem, but if I spoke like that to everyone I encountered I'd be sure to find myself in a psyche-ward rather quickly. Structure are the rules that govern understanding, just like - to go back to where we started with this - the Law is the body of rules governing our definitions of right and wrong; or, to continue with your example, structuring what judgements are going to be passed in particular cases (euthanasia, gay marriage, but also murder and rape).