On 2010-03-10, at 12:41 PM, farmelantj at juno.com wrote:
> I think that if the cold war had
> not ended, the western powers would
> have been much more reluctant to
> see an ANC government in South Africa,
> and they would have put less pressure
> on the apartheid regime to negotiate
> with the ANC. On the other hand,
> the ANC would still have had Soviet
> backing, and so to that extent might
> have had greater leverage in negotiations
> concerning future South African economic
> policy.
=====================
The international context is not unimportant, but I think the domestic relationship of forces is what is decisive in these cases. There comes a point in every long and stalemated conflict, from strikes to an armed struggles, when the parties become exhausted and try to cut a deal. As often as not, the pressure on popular organizations to do so comes equally from below as from above. If it were a simple case of "betrayal" by the leadership, the dissenting factions which invariably arise to challenge peace overtures would carry the masses with them every time.
The decisions of the ANC, Al Fatah, and the IRA to dissolve their military wings and negotiate with their respective enemies are the most prominent recent examples of liberation struggles which fell well short of achieving their programmatic goals. In fact, such concessions as were made or promised by the Afrikaners, Israelis, and British-backed Unionists were conditional on guarantees that their security, property, and privileges would remain largely intact. Given such commitments, it is not surprising that further progress, especially as concerns the social conditions of the masses, has been limited or non-existent. And though reprehensible, neither is it especially surprising that many of their leaders, early idealists grown cynical by defeat and weary from years of sacrifice, should have capitulated to the temptations of office offered to them as part of a settlement by the other side with this intended consequence very much in mind.