>CB: Wrong. Carter did not respond to the Sandinista offensive which
>toppled the Somoza regime in Nicaragua
Depends on what you mean by respond:
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155/25979.html#author
In June 1993 the Foreign Minister under the late Panamanian President Torrejos told me of President Carter's briefest regional meeting. It took place less in May 1979 less than two months before Somoza was overthrown. Carter convened a meeting of foreign ministers of several Latin American countries who were opposed to Somoza's dictatorship. President Carter entered and immediately tabled a proposal to form an "Inter-American Peace Force", a military force of US and Latin American troops to invade Nicaragua to "end the conflict" and support a diverse coalition. The purpose, according to the former Panamanian minister present, was to prevent a Sandinista victory, preserving Somoza's National Guard and replace Somoza with a pro-US conservative civilian junta. Carter's proposal was rejected unanimously as unwarranted US intervention. Carter in a pique ended the meeting abruptly. Carter's attempt to throttle a popular revolution to preserve the Somocista state and US dominance clearly belied his pretensions of being a "human rights" President. His legacy of using "Human Rights" to project imperial military power became standard operating procedure for Reagon, Clinton and both Bush presidencies.
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/Nicaragua_KH.html
In 1978, with Somoza nearing collapse, Carter authorized covert CIA support for the press and labor unions in Nicaragua in an attempt to create a "moderate" alternative to the Sandinistas. Towards the same end, American diplomats were conferring with non-leftist Nicaraguan opponents of Somoza. Washington's idea of "moderate", according to a group of prominent Nicaraguans who walked out on the discussions, was the inclusion of Somoza's political party in the future government and "leaving practically intact the corrupt structure of the somocista apparatus", including the National Guard, albeit in some reorganized form. Indeed, at this same time, the head of the US Southern Command (Latin America), Lt. General Dennis McAuliffe, was telling Somoza that, although he had to abdicate, the United States had "no intention of permitting a settlement which would lead to the destruction of the National Guard". This was a notion remarkably insensitive to the deep loathing for the Guard felt by the great majority of the Nicaraguan people.
*****
After the Sandinistas took power, Carter authorized the CIA to provide financial and other support to their opponents. At the same time, Washington pressured the Sandinistas to include certain men in the new government. Although these tactics failed, the Carter administration did not refuse to give aid to Nicaragua. Ronald Reagan was later to point to this and ask: "Can anybody doubt the generosity and good faith of the American people?" What the president failed to explain was:
a) Almost all of the aid had gone to non-governmental agencies and to the private sector, including the American Institute for Free Labor Development, the long-time CIA front.
b) The primary and expressed motivation for the aid was to strengthen the hands of the so-called moderate opposition and undercut the influence of socialist countries in Nicaragua .
c) All military aid was withheld despite repeated pleas from the Nicaraguan government about its need and right to such help-the defeated National Guardsmen and other Supporters of Somoza had not, after all, disappeared; they had regrouped as the "contras" and maintained primacy in the leadership of this force from then on.