[WS:] Ditto. I would not have said it better myself. But still, I cannot see how "horse trading" with the Israeli Lobby (IL) can explain the US foreign policy in the Middle East, including the war on Iraq. By M&W's own admission, the IL is not the strongest lobby inside the Beltway - so we must look into other factors for an explanation.
My own position is that it is the peculiarity of the US political system. Specifically, domestic policy is extremely gridlocked by "checks and balances" imposed on different branches of government, the patronage dispensation in exchange for contributions modus operandi of the political party system, and the intense lobbying of conflicting interest groups. By contrast, foreign policy does not face such constraints, and the executive branch and to a lesser degree the legislative branch have greater discretion which courses to pursue without having to spend much of their political capital.
So, ceteri paribus, a lobby pushing for a foreign policy course has a much greater chance of success than a lobby pushing for a domestic policy course. This explains, in a large part, the power of the IL inasmuch as the US foreign policy is concerned. The case of the Cuban lobby further proves this point. It is much weaker than the Israeli lobby, yet it successfully pushes for a US policy toward Cuba that not only alienates the US from much of Latin America, but it is against US economic interests as well. This demonstrates that the power of a lobby per se is not a deciding factor in the success or failure of its pressure.
Wojtek