Japan, US, gang up on China & Sniffing Conspiracy

pms laflame at mindspring.com
Mon Dec 7 16:49:18 PST 1998

>Try the Asia Intelligence Update
>Global Intelligence Update
>Red Alert
>December 8, 1998
>Japan Welcomes Chinese Dissident
>Kyodo News International cited "informed sources" on December 3
>as saying that Chinese dissident Zhao Zhen Kai will visit Japan
>for the first time as early as December 10. Zhao, a poet who
>currently resides in the United States, left China after
>demanding the release of dissident Wei Jiangshen following the
>1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Zhao reportedly sought to visit
>Japan this past fall, but when he attempted to renew his Chinese
>passport in August, the Chinese government instead confiscated
>it. According to Kyodo, Zhao will now visit Japan using
>identification and other documents issued by the U.S.
>Japan's decision to welcome a visit by Zhao comes in the wake of
>the contentious visit to Japan of Chinese President Jiang Zemin.
>During that visit, despite the fact that it evolved into the
>central issue of the summit, Tokyo refused either to provide a
>satisfactory apology for Japan's actions in World War II or to
>agree to further distance itself from Taiwan. Accepting Zhao,
>even if only to deliver a lecture on Chinese poets, will be a
>further slap in Beijing's face. And that slap is being
>facilitated by the United States.
>The U.S. is currently locked in a diplomatic row with China over
>a sweeping crackdown on pro-democracy activists launched
>throughout China last week. Beijing has rounded up more than a
>dozen advocates of the outlawed China Democracy Party, including
>prominent dissidents Xu Wenli and Qin Yongmin. Beijing also
>brought new charges against dissident Wang Youcai, already under
>house arrest for his role in founding the party. Wang was
>reportedly charged with "inciting the overthrow of the
>government," while Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao
>announced that Qin and Xu were "suspected of involvement in
>activities endangering state security." While the dissidents have
>faced government harassment since they launched a campaign in
>June of this year to establish and register the China Democracy
>Party, this is the first time that such serious charges have been
>brought against them. Wang, Xu, and Qin could face life in prison
>if convicted.
>On December 3, China's state prosecutor accepted the case against
>Wang. The speed with which the case is being processed has led
>Chinese opposition groups abroad to surmise that Beijing has
>already decided to imprison Wang. They also argue that the
>crackdown was long planned, but was only launched following the
>last of a series of high-level diplomatic exchanges until March
>of next year. The China Democracy Party is not the only target of
>Beijing's crackdown. On December 4, China began the closed-door
>trial of Lin Hai, a businessman who allegedly provided lists of
>Chinese e-mail addresses to overseas dissident magazines. Lin has
>been charged with inciting the overthrow of the state.
>At a press briefing on December 2, White House spokesman Joe
>Lockhart said the U.S. "deplores" the arrests of the dissidents
>and had communicated that view to China through the U.S. embassy
>in Beijing. U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin called
>the arrests "a serious step in the wrong direction." Zhu
>responded in a news conference on December 3 that the arrests
>were "a matter of China's internal affairs," and that Beijing was
>"opposed to any country, including the United States, interfering
>in China's internal affairs." He insisted that China was a one-
>party state with the support of the Chinese people, and would not
>tolerate the formation of opposition parties.
>Now the U.S. has made the next move in the diplomatic dispute,
>facilitating Zhao's visit to Japan. Furthermore, the U.S. is
>already negotiating with Taiwan over the island's desire to
>purchase new weaponry, including four Aegis destroyers. And
>Washington and Tokyo are both suggesting that Taiwan may be
>brought into a theater missile defense system. With Japan
>apparently joining the dissident dispute, major avenues of
>potential economic aid for China are now closing. The U.S. and
>Japan are apparently ready to knock China down a notch,
>especially if China wants financial aid. As we do not expect
>China to back down at this time, we wonder where Beijing will
>choose instead to lash out. Taiwan is one option, and North Korea
>is another.
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Henry, Enzo, anyone got a clue what's going on. Could there have been a decision to do some capital destruction at the expense of the Chinese?

>Global Intelligence Update
>Red Alert
>December 7, 1998
>Weekend Revelation of CIA Leaks to Hughes Electronics Baffling and Explosive
>On Saturday morning, December 5, both the New York Times and the
>Washington Post ran stories claiming that officials of Hughes
>Electronics had been warned by agents of the U.S. Central
>Intelligence Agency that they would be called to testify before
>Congress on the sale of satellite technology to China. This
>report is explosive because, if true, these agents would be
>guilty of a massive security breach. Since the story appeared
>simultaneously in both the Times and the Post, this was a
>deliberate decision on somebody's part to plant explosives
>beneath someone in the CIA. Now, although we only know what we
>read in the newspapers, it is more than enough to make us wonder
>what in the world is going on.
>The unofficial official explanation from the Agency was bizarre.
>It acknowledged that CIA officials had informed Hughes people
>that they were going to be summoned by the Senate Select
>Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) to testify on technology
>transfers to China. Moreover, it was acknowledged that the leak
>had been approved by the Agency. They did not claim that this
>was some unauthorized accident by a junior employee. The
>official counter-leaks went on to assert that, whoever approved
>it, it was not CIA Director George Tenet. The Associated Press
>cited an anonymous CIA official as asserting, "This was not the
>kind of thing that reached Tenet's desk." So the party line is
>that CIA employees did warn Hughes officials, that they were
>authorized to do so by someone with enough clout to authorize
>such a thing, but that the authorization didn't come from the top
>because DCI had no knowledge of the SSCI proceeding.
>That's a little hard to believe. The DCI, we would think,
>normally likes to stay on top of anything having to do with the
>Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Given that this is an
>already highly sensitive matter that has directly affected the
>President himself, it is more than a little hard to believe that
>Tenet doesn't keep himself informed of every detail. But let's
>assume that he did not authorize the leak. Let's also accept
>that the people who did the leaking were authorized to do so.
>Who did the authorizing?
>Hughes is a major contractor for the intelligence community.
>Hundreds or even thousands of intelligence employees for all
>sorts of agencies have daily contact with Hughes employees. But
>few of these are senior enough to authorize a leak of this sort.
>And, more important, none of these GS-12s have access to
>sensitive SSCI papers. We would expect that anything involving
>the SSCI, the President, campaign contributions, and possible
>criminality is handled at stratospheric levels in the Agency. If
>not Tenet, then who in the CIA has access to SSCI-sensitized
>information? Who has the ability to authorize lower level
>officials with daily contact with Hughes to pass on information?
>Who can access Agency's command and control mechanism to pass on
>such an authorization? Who has that much clout AND a reason to
>issue such a risky authorization?
>We give up too.
>So let's try to approach this from a different direction. What
>would be the reason for the leak? The obvious answer is to warn
>Hughes that it is coming. Well, when you think about it, that's
>a pretty feeble reason. Hughes officials were not about to be
>kidnapped off the street to testify. A nice letter would be sent
>on Senate stationary and a date, several days or weeks away would
>be arranged. The Hughes people would have plenty of time to
>prepare their testimony. Why risk all of this just to give the
>Hughes people some extra time to prepare? Besides, the Hughes
>folks had to know that all sorts of investigations were going on.
>They read the papers.
>According to the Post story, there is an innocent explanation
>being leaked by the CIA. This explanation revolves around a CIA
>analyst called Ronald Pandolfi, who testified to the SSCI in the
>Fall of 1998 that Hughes had been "too aggressive" in marketing
>technology to China. Pandolfi's testimony originated in a study
>he did in 1995. Back then, Hughes executives had complained to
>CIA officials about Pandolfi's research. The office that deals
>with Hughes reprimanded Pandolfi. After Pandolfi's testimony
>this year, this office informed Hughes of Pandolfi's views. It
>also offered Hughes that it would give the SSCI a list of Hughes
>officials that could refute Pandolfi's views. So, it was only in
>this sense that Hughes was told that they would be called to
>testify. Only in this sense??!!
>What this unofficial explanation implies is that it was not the
>fact that they were going to be called before the SSCI that was
>being conveyed to Hughes, but rather that the issue before the
>SSCI was Pandolfi's report from 1995. What they were being told
>by the CIA was that the Pandolfi report was in the SSCI's hands.
>Moreover, since Pandolfi had interviewed Hughes officials in
>writing that report, they had a pretty good idea of what
>questions he had asked and what answers he had gotten. They knew
>the internal thinking at SSCI. Passing this on to Hughes was a
>major security breach. It told Hughes a great deal about what
>the SSCI knew and when they knew it. The CIA official who
>authorized the leak to Hughes had no authority to do so, because
>the CIA didn't own the information. It belonged to SSCI and the
>U.S. Senate.
>Why go to all the trouble? What is the issue here? Forget all
>of the comings and goings and conspiracies for a moment and let's
>concentrate on why someone at the CIA in an extremely senior
>position would want to take this kind of risk at all. What could
>Hughes have been doing that would be so sensitive to the CIA or
>to someone at the CIA to take such a risk? So far as we can see,
>there are four possible tracks for explaining this:
>Track 1 -- The Old Boys Network Explanation: Hughes and the CIA
>have been working together for generations. Complex systems of
>personal and institutional connections have developed until the
>lines distinguishing the two organizations have begun to blur. A
>contract worker from Hughes who has been working at an
>intelligence facility for twenty years may be getting a check
>from Hughes, but his identity is with his facility. Moreover,
>the CIA is supposed to control its contractors. When Pandolfi
>reported that Hughes had gone over the line in China, this was a
>direct attack on the CIA people responsible for monitoring
>Hughes. The CIA people went to bat for Hughes, Hughes went to
>bat for the CIA. This whole thing is nothing more than the
>standard conflation of contractors with Federal agencies that has
>been going on since the founding. Clean it up and move on.
>Track 2 -- The Criminal Conspiracy Explanation: The Hughes
>transfer of technology to China was a deliberate security breach
>by Hughes (and perhaps other companies like Loral) for the simple
>purpose of making money. Certain officials of the CIA were aware
>that the technology transfer was taking place but either failed
>to report it or were personally part of the conspiracy.
>Pandolfi's discovery threatened to expose corruption at the CIA,
>so every attempt was made to discredit him and keep his report
>from the SSCI. When it got to the SSCI, Hughes was told so that
>they could start the shredders running and transfer vulnerable
>employees to Chad. Staff at SSCI got wind of it and went to the
>newspapers. This would explain the claim that Tenet didn't know
>about any of this but that it was an authorized leak. Under this
>theory (for which we haven't a shred of evidence), whoever did
>the authorizing may have some interesting Swiss bank accounts as
>Track 3 -- The Political Conspiracy Explanation: The President
>has been charged, among other things, with permitting the
>transfer of sensitive technologies to China in exchange for
>political contributions for the 1996 elections. Pandolfi's work
>was done in 1995, when the fundraising was roaring along. The
>SSCI is studying the technology transfer issue at the same time
>that the House Impeachment committee is doing something (though
>we can't quite figure out what). Henry Hyde just announced that
>the impeachment committee will not be considering campaign
>finance issues. Someone at SSCI, aware that there may be some
>smoking guns in the SSCI's extremely classified archives, is
>taking advantage of this breach to frantically wave his arms in
>an attempt to get Henry Hyde's shell-shocked attention. So, this
>assumes that there was a criminal conspiracy by the President to
>take campaign money in exchange for permitting technology
>transfers to China. It also assumes that there is now a
>political conspiracy by the President's enemies on the SSCI to
>make this public before the impeachment committee signs off on
>their recommendation.
>Track 4 -- There was in fact a major technology transfer program
>to China, but it was a Trojan horse. In other words, while major
>technology was transferred to China, the technology was either
>carefully flawed or embedded with some sort of monitoring system
>that would permit U.S. intelligence to monitor its use and
>neutralize its capabilities. Hughes and other companies were
>participating in a complex, covert operation that had to appear
>to be a security failure on the part of the United States in
>order to achieve its ends. The CIA, having recruited Hughes for
>a covert operation, must help Hughes cover its tracks. This
>conspiracy is so sensitive that the CIA never mentioned it to the
>SSCI and it is now leaning on Hughes to keep the secret. In this
>scenario, Hughes and the CIA are patriotic heroes and the SSCI is
>blundering around, lousing everything up. (By the way, we have
>no evidence whatever for this track. In addition we are not
>revealing anything to the Chinese with this speculation because
>the Chinese are a lot smarter than STRATFOR and much more
>paranoid. We have nothing to teach them about being suspicious).
>Let's throw another one in. Remember right after the Wye
>Agreement, the Israelis announced that Jonathan Pollard, the
>Israeli spy, would be released as part of the agreement?
>Remember that he wasn't released? Remember that it leaked a few
>days later that George Tenet had threatened to resign if Pollard
>was released? Well, the only one who would have wanted to leak
>that story was Tenet, because it made him look really good at the
>agency. It also made Clinton look like a wimp. Clinton couldn't
>fire him at the time, because he couldn't afford to look like he
>was caving in to the Israelis. Clinton must have been extremely
>annoyed with Tenet for the threat and the leak. If this affair
>proves as damaging as it appears to be, Tenet's career is over,
>regardless of what he knew. Maybe this is just the White House
>taking care of a bit of unfinished business.
>So, we have cronyism, criminal conspiracy, political conspiracy,
>covert conspiracy and inside-the-beltway conspiracy to choose
>from. We genuinely don't know which is the real story. But we
>don't think it is trivial. This affair could be a wedge into a
>very important and complex part of American history. Someone is
>issuing an extremely public invitation to investigate a critical
>issue with grave implications. It is almost as if someone is
>painting a map. The revelation of this single, relatively minor
>security breach could wind up explaining a great deal about the
>recent past. There may be simple and innocent explanations.
>There may be complex and dark explanations. But, for what little
>they are worth, our instincts tell us that this is the place
>where explanations begin.

Has any one heard mention of this story by the impeachment posse, Reno, or anyone else in Babylon?


Back out into this balmy night. Smooches, Paula

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