I'm sure that there are many Americans of Russian-Slav decedent who would like to take a crack at helping Russia. You might not be able to get high toned academics with big credentials---even though they do exist---is that what Russian American relations need anyway. How about some plain, honest people who are literate and numerate and could be understood by the Russians. You might end up with some sort of stuffed cabbage "flea" market socialism and a free and independent labor movement, would that be so bad.
Your email pal,
Tom L.
Brad De Long wrote:
> >
> >Also, why would they have basically, kicked Russia in the teeth,
> >effectively laying the foundation for a new cold war, just because Yeltsen
> >and the free-market reformers started losing power?
> >
> >Didn't the US sort of back the reformers into an ideological corner and
> >contribute to their downfall?
> >
> >Did the adm. want to destabilize Russia maybe?
> >
> >pms
>
> I very much hope that the administration didn't want to destabilize Russia.
> Back in 1993, at least, the line among the people whom I hung out with was
> that the United Stase had an enormous security--never mind the
> humanitarian--interest in making Russia's transition as successful as
> possible: no one wanted to see a Weimar Russia.
>
> Of course trying to make Russia's transition as successful as possible
> would have required Marshall Plan-scale aid--on the order of $70 billion a
> year. I tended to think that such aid should be focused on making sure that
> democratization worked, and that as far as economic reorganization was
> concerned that the Russians should try a bunch of different things and then
> keep doing the ones that seemed to work. Others thought differently: some
> seemed to think that halting hyperinflation and achieving macroeconomic
> stabilization was the one thing that had to be done first; others seemed to
> think that if you privatized industry you would create a
> politically-powerful class with a strong interest in rapid economic
> development--create a progressive bourgeoisie, as it were.
>
> But the policy of attempting to avoid a Weimar Russia would seem to require
> not just a lot more aid, but also treating Russia as a great power--no
> sudden moves, genuine consultation on security issues, and so forth. I
> understand how the politics of the deficit wiped out any chances of
> Marshall Plan Mark II. I don't understand our policy of not treating Russia
> like the great military power it was and in all probability will be again.
>
> But then I have never understood much of the thinking of those who have
> dominated the formation of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Truman
> administration. Acheson, Marshall and company I understand. Dulles,
> McNamara, Bundy, Kissinger, et cetera I do not...
>
> Brad DeLong