I note his point that the failure of the backyard steel part of the GLF did not do such serious economic damage despite what has been made out.
Concerning the mass line, much must depend on which ideas of the masses are taken by the leadership, concentrated and then taken back to them.
(I wonder if focus groups are the modern opportunist and passive equivalent.)
I suggest the main outline of the political campaigns of the CPC was determined by marxist theory in transferring from the new democratic (national) revolution to the socialist revolution. However the timing of particular campaigns may have been affected by the mass line.
I would suggest the mass line worked for the CPC in tandem with the investigation visit.
The leap to the communes may however have been a bridge too far.
This is a fundamental dilemma in marxist-leninist marxism. The official marxist position before 1917 was that it was necessary to go through a period of capitalism before going to socialism. Marx is on record as having expressed sypathy with and interest in Russian peasant communist tendencies. Lenin persuaded the CC of the Bosheviks to move rapidly ahead to the socialist revolution, and that with discpline the Bolsheviks could establish a revolutionary regime.
However Lenin's last theoretical article "On Cooperation" suggests a mixed economy for a generation.
During the cultural revolution, there was a theoretical campaign at the end to restrict bourgeois right, but the leftists lost the battle over incentives. Essentially the CPC I understand regards the attempts by Mao to build socialism from the mid 50's and the Cultural Revolution as having run too far ahead over the objective conditions of production.
The communes, with their egalitarian structure, and their failure to manage labour time economically and efficiently, except by ideological exhortation, were out of touch with the level of econonic development,
Chris Burford
____________________________________________________________________
[Henry Liu]
>I owe the list a serious summation of Mao's role in the Great Leap
>Forward.
>
>In order to change Chinese feudal society towards Communist social
>order, which is understood by Communists as a necessary goal of human
development,
>Mao developed specific methods out of Leninist concepts which rendered
special
>characteristics to Chinese Communism, its strengths and shortcomings. These
>methods, above all the system of organized mass movements, stress the
change of
>social consciousness, i.e. the creation of new men for a new society, as
the basis
>for changing reality, i.e. the mode of production. The concept of the mass
>politics, relevant in Chinese political thought from ancient time, plays a
role as
>important as that of the elite cadre corps within the Party.
>The mass movement as an instrument of political communication from above
to below
>is peculiar to Chinese Communist organization. This phenomenon is of utmost
>importance in understanding the nature and dynamics of the governmental
structure
>of the Communists Party of China (CPC). The theoretical foundation of mass
>movement as a means of mediation between the will of the leaders and the
people
>presupposes that nothing is impossible for the masses, quantitatively
understood
>as a collective subject, if their power is concentrated by a Party of correct
>thought and action. This concept comes out of Mao's romantic faith in the
great
>strength the masses are capable of developing in the interest of their own
>well-being. So the "will of the masses" has to be articulated by
>the masses and within the masses. This the CPC calls the "mass line".
>Mao's mass line theory requires that the leadership elite be close to
>the people, that it is continuously informed about the people's will and
>that it transforms this will into concrete actions by the masses.
>>From the masses - back to the masses! This means: take the scattered and
>unorganized ideas of the masses and, through study, turn them into focused
and
>systemic programs, then go back to the masses and propagate and explain these
>ideals until the masses embrace them as their own.
>Thus mass movements are initiated at the highest level, announced to
>Party cadres at central and regional work conferences, subject to cadre
criticism
>and modified, after which starts the first phase of mass movement. Mass
>organizations are held to provoke the "people's will", through readers'
letters to
>newspapers and rallies at which these letters are read and debated. The
results
>are then officially discussed by the staff of leading organs of the state
and the
>Party, after which the systematized "people's will" is clarified into acts
of law
>or resolutions, and then the mass movement spreads to the whole nation.
>Until the Cultural Revolution, the history of Chinese politics is a
>history of mass movements.
>Mass movements successfully implemented Land Reform 1950-53; Marriage Reform
>1950-52; Collectivization 1953 - the General Line of Socialist Transformation
>(from national bourgeois democratic revolution to proletarian socialist
>revolution); Nationalization 1955 (from private ownership of industrial
means of
>production into state ownership). The method against opposition was thought
>reform through "brain washing" (without the derogatory connotation), which
is a
>principle of preferring to change the consciousness of political opponents
instead
>of physically liquidating them.
>The Hundred Flower Movement, 1957 was launched on February by Mao with his
famous
>4-hour speech; "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the
People" before
>1,800 leading cadres. In it, Mao distinguished "contradiction between the
enemy
>and ourselves"
>from "contradiction among the people" which should not be resolved by a
>dictatorship, i.e. physical force, but by open discussion with criticism and
>counter criticism.
>Up until 1957, the mass movement policies of Mao achieved spectacular
success.
>Land reform was completed, the struggle for women's emancipation was
progressing
>well, and collectivization and
>nationalization was leading the nation into socialism. Health services
>were a model of socialist construction in both cities and the
>countryside. The Party's revolutionary leadership was accepted
>enthusiastically by society.
>By 1958, agriculture production almost doubled from 1949 (108 million tons
to 185
>million tons), coal production quadrupled to 123 million tons, steel
production
>grew from 0.1 million tons to 5.3 million tons.
>The only problem came from bourgeois intellectual rebellion.
>On May 25, 1957 Mao expressed his anxiety at a session of the Standing
Committee
>of the Politburo, and gave his approval to those who warned against too much
>bourgeois liberty.
>That afternoon, Mao said at a Conference of Communists Youth League cadres
that
>"all words and deeds which deviate from socialism are basically wrong".
>At the opening session of the Peoples Congress on June 26, Zhou Enlai
initiated
>the "counter criticism" against the critics.
>Mao's call for open criticism was serious and genuine, but the
>discussion he had conceived of as a safety-valve reached a degree of
>intensity he had not anticipated. Mao over-estimated the stability of
>the political climate.
>Against this background, the CPC stood at the crossroad of choosing the
Soviet
>model of development or an independent path.
>Economy development was based on three elements:
>1) Build up heavy industry at the expense of agriculture.
>2) The establishment of an extensive system of individual incentives by
mean of
>which productive forces could be developed from a conviction that the
superiority
>of socialist modes of production would be vindicated by visible rise in
living
>standards,
>3) The acceleration of the socialist transformation of society in order
>to create the precondition required by the CPC for establishing a
>socialist order.
>Two paths were opened to the CPC leadership in 1958:
>1) a phase of consolidation
>2) pushing forward toward permanent revolution.
>Mao was forced by geopolitical conditions (withdrawal of Soviet aid and US
>embargo) to overcome the lack of capital through mobilization of China's vast
>labor reservoir. The strategy was to connect political campaigns to
production
>campaigns.
>Under pressure from orthodox Leninists within the Party apparatus, with the
>failure of the "Hundred Flower Movement", Mao concluded it was impossible to
>create a socialist consciousness through a gradual
>improvement of material living conditions; that consciousness and
>reality had to be changed concurrently and in conjunction through
>gigantic new efforts at mobilization.
>This led to the Anti-Rightist Campaign 1957-58 followed by "Three Red
Banner" in
>Spring 1958 initiating simultaneous development of industry and agriculture
>through the use of both modern and traditional methods of production under
the
>"General Line of Building Socialism". It was to be implemented through a
labor
>intensive development policy by a "Great Leap Forward" and by establishing a
>comprehensive collectivization by establishing "People's Communes".
>The GLP was not as senseless as some suggest. It called for the new
>system of "Two Decentralizations, Three Centralizations, One
>Responsibility." By this it was meant the decentralized use of labor and
local
>investment, central control over political decisions, planning and
administration
>of national investment capital and one responsibility meant every basic
unit to
>account for itself to its supervising unit.
>The GLP was successful in many areas. The one area that failed
>attracted the most attention. It was the area of backyard steel furnace
>production. The technological requirement of steel making, unlike
>hydro-electricity, did not lend itself to labor intensive mass
>movements. Yet steel was the symbol of industrialization and a heroic
attempt had
>to be made to overcome the lack of capital. The attempt failed
conspicuously, but
>its damage to the economy was overrated.
>The real test however, was in the People's Commune. Favorable weather
conditions
>produced high yields in 1958 in the experimental communes.
>This led to a rush nationwide to follow suit, even though almost
>everywhere the fundamental preconditions for successful operation were
absent.
>Most did not have adequate administrative offices, nurseries, canteens, old
>peoples homes, hospitals, etc.
>In other places, the local leadership took the transition to communism
>at face value and severed all connection with supervising organs in the
name of
>the withering away of the state. Disorder grew into chaos within months.
>During the Wuhan Party Plenum, December 1958, Marshal Peng Dehuai
criticized the
>over-extended commune program which led to the Plenum initiating a
readjustment of
>the "Three Red Banner" policy.
>Conccurrently the Central Committee approved "the wish of Comrade Mao
Zedong not
>to stand again as a candidate for the Chairmanship of the PRC after the
end of his
>term in office".
>Liu Shaoqi was elected as head of state by the second People's Congress on
April
>27, 1959 and became heir apparent after Mao in the Party.
>In the fateful Lushan conference July 2-August 16 1959, Marshal Peng
shifted his
>criticism from policy to the person of the leader. On July 23, Mao in an
emphatic
>speech, rejected the reproach of his critics and declared that the "Great
Leap
>Forward" and the People's Commune had brought about more advantages than
>disadvantages. Mao threatened an open split:
>"If we deserve to perish I shall go away, I shall go to the countryside
>and lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If you of the PLA will
not
>follow me, the I shall find a Red Army. But I believe that the PLA will
follow
>me."
>On August 16, 1959, Peng and his followers were condemned as an "anti Party
>clique" by a resolution passed by the Eighth Plenum.
>On September 17, Peng was dismissed as Defense Minister.
>In late 1959, several natural disasters and bad weather condition were
>reported in the press. Floods and drought brought about the "three
>bitter years" of 1959-1962. After 1962, the economy recovered, but the
politic
>was shifting toward a struggle against revisionism which brought on the
Cultural
>Revolution four years later.
>
>While Mao was the leader of the CPC, leadership was and still is based on
mass
>support. The Chairmanship of the CPC before 1979 was similar to the
position of
>Pope in the Catholic Church, powerful in moral authority but highly
circumscribed
>in operational power.
>The GLF was the product of mass movement, not that of a single person.
>Mao's leadership was toward the organization of the Party and it policy
>formulation procedures, not the dictation of particular programs.
>To describe Mao as a dictator merely reflects an ignorance of the CPC power
>structure. The failures of the GLF and the People's Commune were caused
more by
>implementation flaws rather than conceptual error. Bad luck and US
embargo had
>also something to do with it.
>These programs resulted in much suffering, but the claim that 30 million
people
>were murdered by Mao with evil intent does not deserve a courteous response.
>
>Henry C.K. Liu
>
>
>
>