It's always a giggle to read posts from people offering opinions without the baggage of any research. Anyone with a library card can discover that there have been over two dozen books on populism written since 1980, and while there are differences of opinion, in the more recent research there is substantial trend toward agreement on the basic definition and themes of populism.
So for all of you who haven't read anything on populism since Daniel Bell or Lawrence Goodwyn:
>From the Encyclopedia of Millennial Movements (Forthcoming, 2000)
Populism
by Chip Berlet
Millennial movements in the United States have often involved some form of populist protest. Populism is a rhetorical style that seeks to mobilize "the people" as a social or political force. Populism can move to the left or right. It can be tolerant or intolerant. It can promote civil discourse and political participation or promote scapegoating, demagoguery, and conspiracism. Populism can oppose the status quo and challenge elites to promote change, or support the status quo to defend "the people" against a perceived threat by elites or subversive outsiders. Kazin argues that populism in the United States today is "a persistent yet mutable style of political rhetoric with roots deep in the nineteenth century" (1995: 5).
Roots of Populism in the United States
In the late 1800s an agrarian-based popular mass revolt swept much of the country, and helped launch the electoral Populist Party. The Populist movement of this period started out progressive, and even made some attempts to bridge racial divides between blacks and whites. Some populist groups, however, later turned toward conspiracism, adopting anti-Semitism, and making racist appeals. Kazin traces "two different but not exclusive strains of vision and protest" in the original U.S.
Populist movement: the revivalist "pietistic impulse issuing from the Protestant Reformation"; and the "secular faith of the Enlightenment, the belief that ordinary people could think and act rationally, more rationally, in fact, than their ancestral overlords." "Circuit-riding preachers and union-organizing artisans (even the Painite freethinkers among them) agreed that high-handed rule by the wealthy was both sinful and unrepublican. All believed in the nation's millennial promise, its role as the beacon of liberty in a benighted world" (10-11).
The Populist Party fought against giant monopolies and trusts that concentrated wealth in the hands of a few powerful families and corporations in a way that unbalanced the democratic process. They demanded many economic and political reforms that we enjoy today. At the same time populism drew themes from several historic currents with potentially negative consequences:
1) Producerism--the idea that the real Americans are hard-working people who create goods and wealth while fighting against parasites at the top and bottom of society who rob the public--sometimes promoting scapegoating and the blurring of issues of class and economic justice, and with a history of assuming proper citizenship is defined by White males; 2) Anti-elitism--a suspicion of politicians, powerful people, the wealthy, and high culture--sometimes leading to conspiracist allegations about control of the world by secret elites, especially the scapegoating of Jews as sinister and powerful manipulators of the economy or media; 3) Anti-intellectualism--a distrust of those pointy headed professors in their Ivory Towers--sometimes undercutting rational debate by discarding logic and factual evidence in favor of following the emotional appeals of demagogues; 4) Majoritarianism--the notion that the will of the majority of people has absolute primacy in matters of governance--sacrificing rights for minorities, especially people of color; 5) Moralism--evangelical-style campaigns rooted in Protestant revivalism--sometimes leading to authoritarian and theocratic attempts to impose orthodoxy, especially relating to gender; and 6) Americanism--a form of patriotic nationalism--often promoting ethnocentric, nativist, or xenophobic fears that immigrants bring alien ideas and customs that are toxic to our culture.
Varieties of Populism
Canovan defined two main branches of populism worldwide--agrarian and political--and mapped out seven disparate varieties. Agrarian populism includes commodity farmer movements with radical economic agendas such as the U.S. People 's Party of the late 1800s; subsistence peasant movements such as Eastern Europe 's Green Rising movement after World War I; and romanticized agrarian movements led by intellectuals such as the late-nineteenth-century Russian narodniki (literally "populist," a socialist movement of the time). Political populism includes populist democracy, calling for more political participation, such as the use of referenda; politicians' populism marked by vague appeals for "the people" to build a unified coalition; reactionary populism such as the white backlash harvested by George Wallace in the 1960s and 1970s; and populist dictatorship such as that established by Juan Peron in Argentina in 1945-1955.
Canovan notes that there are "a great many interconnections" among the seven forms of populism, and that many "actual phenomena--perhaps most--belong in more than one category." She adds that "given the contradictions" between some of the categories, "none ever could satisfy all the conditions at once" (1981: 289). Combinations can vary. Populism in the United States "combined farmers' radicalism and populist democracy" (293). Canovan argues that all forms of populism "involve some kind of exaltation of and appeal to 'the people,' and all are in one sense or another antielitist" (294).
Theories of Populism
There is much dispute in academia as to what populism is and how it works. Goodwyn described the original Populist movement as "the flowering of the largest democratic mass movement in American history" (1978 :vii). This and other romanticized views see populist movements as inherently progressive and democratizing. It is as overly optimistic as the negative view of populism by some academics is overly pessimistic. As Canovan observed "like its rivals, Goodwyn's interpretation has a political ax to grind" (51).
Classic theories
Centrist/extremist theory was the first major attempt to explain populism. It arrived with the 1955 publication of a collection of essays titled The New American Right edited by Daniel Bell. Eight years later the collection was expanded and republished under the title, The Radical Right. A number of books appeared that either elaborated on or paralleled the general themes of centrist/extremist theory first sketched in The New American Right.
Centrist/extremist theory (especially as outlined by Lipset, Raab, Bell, Forster, Epstein and to a lesser degree, Hofstadter) saw dissident movements of the left and right as composed of outsiders--politically marginal people who have no connection to the mainstream electoral system or nodes of government or corporate power. Social and economic stress snaps these psychologically-fragile people into a mode of irrational political hysteria, and as they embrace an increasingly paranoid style they make militant and unreasonable demands to defend their social and economic status. Because they are unstable, they can become dangerous and violent. Their extremism places them far outside the legitimate political process, which is located in the center where pluralists conduct civil democratic debates.
Centrist/extremist theory marginalizes populist dissidents as dangerous irrational extremists. Their grievances and demands need not be taken seriously. Law enforcement can break up any criminal conspiracies by subversive radicals who threaten the social order. The centrist/extremist model favors labels such as "radical right," "wing nuts," "lunatic fringe," or "religious political extremists."
Emerging "strategic" theories
Early questions about centrist/extremist theory were raised by Rogin (1967) and the authors in Schoenberger (1969), and now an increasing number of social scientists use different approaches. Smith notes that in the 1970s there was "a decisive pendulum-swing away from these 'classical' theories toward the view of social movements as rational, strategically calculating, politically instrumental phenomena" (1997: 3). At the same time, there was a rejection of the romanticized view of populism as inherently constructive. Dobratz and Shanks-Meile write that in studying populist social movements it is necessary to consider "socioeconomic conditions, changing political opportunities, resources, consciousness, labeling, framing, interpretations of reality, boundaries, and negotiation of the meaning of symbols" (1997: 32). Discussions of postclassical sociological theories of social movements in general can be found in Tarrow, Lofland, Klandermans, Buechler and Cylke, Morris and Mueller, Johnston and Klandermans, and Boggs. Authors such as Himmelstein, Diamond, Hardisty, and Berlet use variations of postclassical theories to study populism on the political right.
Using emerging theories of social movements, it is evident that most people who join populist movements are not acting out of some personal pathology, but out of anger and desperation. They are grasping at straws in an attempt to defend hearth and home against the furious winds of economic and social change seen as threatening their way of life. They may feel abandoned, or claim that no one in power seems to be listening. They come to believe that no one cares except others in the same predicament. Their anger and fear are frequently based on objective conditions and conflicts--power struggles involving race, gender, ethnicity, or religion; economic hardship; changes in social status; conflicts over cultural issues; and other societal transformations that cause anger, confusion, and anxiety.
Whether or not their grievances are legitimate (or even rational) they join with others to confront what they believe is the cause of their problems. Often, instead of challenging structures and institutions of power, they attack demonized scapegoats, often in the form of conspiracist allegations. Sometimes they resort to violence.
Contemporary Populism
Contemporary populism involves many varieties. Populist democracy is championed by progressives such as political activist Jesse Jackson, and columnists Jim Hightower and Molly Ivans. Politicians' populism marked the presidential campaigns of Ross Perot. Reactionary populism is the style of Pat Robertson who condemns liberals, feminists, and gay rights. Pat Buchanan and David Duke combine reactionary populism with hints of organic populist dictatorship.
Phillips compared the populist resurgence in the 1990s to previous examples in the 1890s and 1930s and found many of the same elements:
[Block quote] Economic anguish and populist resentment; mild-to-serious class rhetoric aimed at the rich and fashionable; exaltation of the ordinary American against abusive, affluent and educated elites; contempt for Washington; rising ethnic, racial and religious animosities; fear of immigrants and foreigners, and a desire to turn away from internationalism and concentrate on rebuilding America and American lives. (1992: 38-42). [End quote]
Most major populist movements in the 1980s and 1990s were on the political right, as opposed to the 1960s and early 1970s when most were on the political left, such as the civil rights movement and the movement to end the war in Vietnam. Examples of contemporary right-wing populist arguments can be found in Viguerie (1983), Carto (1982), and Reagan, (1996).
Betz noted that one common theme among the contemporary right-wing populist movements he studied was xenophobia and racist scapegoating of immigrants and asylum-seekers. Betz argues that generally the right-wing populists in Europe distanced themselves from open affiliation with the violent far right such as neo-Nazis, avoided obvious and overt racism, and presented themselves as willing to make "a fundamental transformation of the existing socioeconomic and sociopolitical system" while still remaining within reformism and claiming to represent "democratic alternatives to the prevailing system" (1994: 108). This is similar to the main themes of right-wing populism in the United States.
Two versions of right-wing populism emerge in both the United States and Europe: one centered around economic libertarianism coupled with a rejection of mainstream political parties (more attractive to the upper-middle class and to small entrepreneurs); the other based on xenophobia and ethnocentric nationalism (more attractive to the lower-middle class and to wage workers). These different constituencies unite behind candidates that attack the current regime since both constituencies identify an intrusive government as the cause of their grievances.
Repressive Populism, Conspiracism, and Producerism
Stock (1996) writes about the role of producerism and vigilantism in U.S. populist movements throughout U.S. history and exemplified by the contemporary Armed Militia movements. Producerism is a narrative that describes the "productive" citizen in the middle as being squeezed by parasitic forces from above and below.
Conspiratorial allegations about parasitic elites seen as manipulating society, lead to anger being directed upwards. The list of scapegoats seen as among the alleged elite parasites includes international bankers, Freemasons, Jews, globalists, liberal secular humanists, and government bureaucrats. The parasites below are stereotyped as lazy or sinful, draining the economic resources of the productive middle, or poisoning the culture with their sinful sexuality. Among those scapegoated as lazy are blacks and other people of color, immigrants, and welfare mothers. The sinful are abortionists, homosexuals, and feminists. A repressive force is directed downwards toward people seen through this stereotype and prejudice. In this context, conspiracy theories that often accompany producerism are a narrative form of scapegoating; and they overlap with some demonizing versions of Christian millennialist endtimes scenarios that watch for betrayal in high places and a population turning from God and drifting into laziness and sin.
The overall outcome of the producerist model of populism is a broad social and political movement sometimes called "Middle American Nationalism" or "The Radical Center" or "Middle American Radicals." Whatever the label, this is a form of repressive populism with a producerist narrative. As the size of the repressive populist sectors grow, politicians and activists within electoral reform movements try to recruit the populists toward participation within electoral political frameworks. As they seek votes, some politicians begin to use populist rhetoric and pander to the scapegoating. Anna Marie Smith, Ansell, Hardisty, Diamond, and Sklar note how in Britain and the United States, right-wing repressive populism diverts attention from inherent white supremacism by using coded language to reframe racism as a concern about specific issues, such as welfare, immigration, tax, or education policies. Non-Christian religions, women, gay men and lesbians, youth, students, reproductive rights activists, and environmentalists also are scapegoated. Sometimes producerism targets those persons who organize on behalf of impoverished and marginalized communities, especially progressive social change activists. Today there are four main sectors of the right where repressive forms of right wing populism with its producerist narrative are used to mobilize movements: the Christian Right, libertarianism, regressive patriots and Armed Militias; and Far Right insurgents and neo-Nazis.
Producerism played a key role in a shift from the main early mode of right-wing populist conspiracism which defended the status quo against a mob of
"outsiders," originally framed as a conspiracy of Freemasons or Jews or immigrants. The John Birch Society and the Liberty Lobby played a significant role in promoting producerism and helping it transform into populist antigovernment conspiracist themes during the 1960s and 1970s. Populism in the Christian Right centers on mobilizing godly people against secularized elites seen as controlling the government and media.
Because populist right-wing conspiracism so often rests on an antielite critique, it has been known to attract some on the political left. Biehl and Staudenmaier (1995) reveal how some Green Party activists in the 1990s had to struggle against conspiracism, including the anti-Semitic variant, among members and even a handful of leaders. Populist conspiracism also has found a home in certain black nationalist and Arab anti-imperialist groups.
Right-wing populism can act as both a precursor and a building block of fascism, with antielitist conspiracism and reactionary scapegoating as shared elements. Fritzsche (1990) showed that distressed middle-class populists in Weimar launched bitter attacks against both the government and big business. This populist surge was later exploited by the Nazis which parasitized the forms and themes of the populists and moved their constituencies far to the right through ideological appeals involving demagoguery, scapegoating, and conspiracism.
Conclusion
Populism needs to be seen as a style of organizing that transcends political boundaries. Fear of all forms of populism by some intellectuals is dismissive of the democratic capability of the majority of citizens. At the same time, the idea that populism is always good, and that "The People" are always right, ignores the history of such claims. Too often this attitude leads to infringement of minority rights by the majority. Populist conspiracism from anywhere on the political spectrum can lure mainstream politicians to adopt their scapegoating narratives in order to attract voters. Throughout U.S. history, repressive populist movements have used demonizing rhetoric that encouraged acts of discrimination and violence. A lynching is as much a form of populism as is a demonstration against racist police brutality. Like most tools, populism can be used for good or bad purposes.
Kazin suggests that "when a new breed of inclusive grassroots movements does arise, intellectuals should contribute their time, their money, and their passion for justice. They should work to stress the harmonious, hopeful, and pragmatic aspects of populist language and to disparage the meaner ones" (1995: 284). The formula for democracy is profoundly populist. It is the faith that over time, the majority of citizens, given enough accurate information, and the ability to participate in an open public debate, reach the right decisions to preserve liberty and defend freedom.
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