Now this obviously does not follow. It's not even true that Mill always thought in such an elitist vein (see his comments on socialism in his Political Economy), and there is no reason to think that Rawls follows Milll at his worst. In fact there is reason to think otherwise, since in hos one relatively extended discussion of transitions, he specifically points to the abolitionists and to the civil rights movement, that is, to struggle from below, and he also expressly and quite inconsistently justifies the use of coercion against slavers and segregationists. OK, then.
But my real point about Rawls' historicism did not involve his lack of a transition theory, but his insistence that justice depends on historical circumstances and the kind of justice one can aspire to depends on the level of productivity, or, as we say here, the development of the productive forces. If that ain't historical materialism, I will eat my hat, brim and all.
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> Institutions are transformed through the exercise of collective human
> agency (_we_ make history, though not under the circumstances of our own
> making), but the conception of history and historical change in the liberal
> tradition is not the same as historical materialism (and on this point you
> must agree with me, in fact). For instance, J. S. Mill argues in . . .