Here are the chapters: 1. Hermeneutische und analytische Philosophie. Zwei komplementaere Spielarten der linguistischen Wende. 2. Rationalitaet und Verstaendigung. Sprechakttheoretische Erlaeuterungen zum Begriff der kommunikativen Rationalitaet. 3. Von Kant zu Hegel. Zu Robert Randoms Sprachpragmatik. 4. Wege der Detranszendentalisierung. Von Kant zu Hegel und zurck. 5. Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Zu Richard Rortys pragmatischer Wende. 6. Richtigkeit versus Wahrheit. Zum Sinn der Sollgeltung moralischer Urteile und Normen. 7. Noch einmal: Zum Verhaeltnis von Theorie und Praxis.
The translations so far can be found here: (2) "Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality" (in Cooke, ed. 1998). (5) "Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn" (in Cooke, ed. 1998). (4) "From Kant to Hegel and Back again - The Move Towards Detranscendentalization" in European Journal of Philosophy 7, 2, 129-157 (1999). (3) "From Kant to Hegel: On Robert Brandom's Pragmatic Philosophy of Language" European Journal of Philosophy 8, 3, 322-355 (2000). (1) Hermeneutics and practical philosophy in O'Heer, ed. German Philosophy After Kant.
To go back a bit, Habermas's programme of formal pragmatics provides the basis for a mostmetaphysical conception of communicative rationality that is supposed to permit context-transcendent social criticism while acknowledging the historicity of knowledge and the situatedness of reason in particular socio-cultural forms of life. In my posts I had emphasized his use of Kohlberg and Piaget - Habermas has since distanced himself from these developmental perspectives (this, in particular, was Miles concern), and now appeals to a socio-cultural concept of learning, which continues to be guided by a normative diea of inherently open-ended learning processes that transform the epistemic standards of a prevailing socio-cultural context.He broadly distinguishes between three kinds of learning: technical, personal, ansd socio-cultural - the last of these being the most important. Habermas does suppose a 'weak' naturalism in his work, one mixed with a pargmatist approach (his most recent attention has focused on Rorty and Brandom). In principle, Habremas argues, it is possible to provide a theory of evolution which supports the idea that human beings posses the organic equipment for communicative relations - but is not reducible to neurological and biogenetic explanations (this addresses Carrol's concern). Postmetaphysical thinking, for Habermas, is not a prior, which would require a strong metaphysical justification, and therefore be rather defeatist. Habermas does support a weak metaphysical justification, in the sense that truth is fallible, and thereby capable of correction through exploration and further analysis. The real issue here is whether or not communicative relations are, in fact, context-transcending in pragmatic terms. In other words, do human actors possess the capacity to alter and modify their claims such that actual gains in socio-cultural development can be made, in a non-trivial sense (ie. vs. contextualism). Maeve Cooke has argued that this is at the centre of Habermas's thought, but points out that there may in fact be a kind of 'metaphysical residue' that carries over into philosophical reflections on the conditions necessary for human existence (Cooke, Socio-cultural Learning as a 'Transcendental Fact'" (International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 9, 1, 63-83). What is intriguing about Cooke's analysis is that she argues, rather coherently, that this metaphysical residue might best be understood as an 'enabling fantasy' - we suppose understanding is possible, as well as transcendence, which actually brings about authentic progress in human relations through a furthering of the reflexivity of subjective positions orienting themselves toward understanding truth and norms...
Just in case there is, at least, one or two still interested, ken