>Not to sound like George Friedman, but my pet fear, I have to admit, is
>not intervention so much as heightened military tensions with China. If
>Rice has an idea in her head, it's that: contain China. China also
>happens to be the one country in the world that could actually threaten us
>with missiles that could actually be stopped.
***** Since 1994, the Clinton administration's "China Policy" has gradually revealed clear political orientation, namely engagement and enlargement, more simply referred to as a policy of engagement.<15> The fundamental premise is that the Beijing regime is daily becoming a more powerful and less stable non status-quo country. Given the present Asia-Pacific security environment and structural situation built upon hegemonic stability and collective self-defense, the United States has the best chance of bringing China into regional and international society as a country satisfied with the status quo if it can broaden the range of exchange with China and provide sufficient incentives.
The term "engagement" has already become something of a magic word in U.S.-China bilateral relations, setting the direction and content of current relations between the two countries as they develop. In American policy pronouncements and security research regarding East Asia and China, phrases related to engagement are often almost too numerous to count: conditioned engagement, constructive engagement, comprehensive engagement, pragmatic engagement, and so on. Based on the Clinton administration's engagement and enlargement policy, the United States and China have opened a so-called "strategic dialogue," systematizing mutual official visits by the two heads of state, members of the American Congress, and other high-level officials, while strengthening military dialogue and transparency on issues of economics, trade, culture, and security. Though the policy of engagement has been the official language in describing the U.S.-China relationship, it is impossible for the U.S. and China to bury their considerable strategic differences and build a relationship of "strategic partners."<16> Therefore, Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush criticized the current policy of constructive engagement and used the term "strategic competitors" to describe the current U.S.-China relationship. However, even the new term still implies certain elements of engagement between the two countries, as David Shambaugh points out that "[t]he current state of strategic relations between the U.S. and China is, in fact, mixed - with elements of cooperation and competition. There remains an opportunity for the United States and its allies and security partners to work to establish a strategic relationship that enhances the elements of cooperation with China."<17>
One of the recent examples of U.S.-China military engagement bears noting here. Following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by American warplanes, China halted all exchanges and engagement of a military nature with the United States. This moratorium held until the two countries completed an agreement regarding China's accession to the World Trade Organization in November 1999; only then did Beijing agree to carry out joint military exercises in the waters off Hong Kong. These exercises have shown that even though military exchange and engagement between the United States and China is still limited to initial mutual confidence-building measures, the two countries have so far been able to make the exercises practical and not simply a matter of formality. <http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/Yang-1000.htm> *****
>Protecting Taiwan, which
>has warmed the cockles of the right since before the cold war, is the only
>part of that war still left. They'd love to put a sea-based missile shield
>around it, i.e., around China.
***** As far as the executive branch of the American government is concerned, Taiwan's strategic importance now is no longer what it was at the beginning of the Cold War, and U.S. economic interests in Taiwan are now subsumed by those of the so-called Greater China economic circle. Congress and American domestic public opinion, however, regard Taiwan's democratization as a concrete realization of American values. Add to this the diplomatic efforts expended by Taiwan toward the United States, and it becomes clear that any ruling political party in the United States will have to focus on maintaining the importance of Taiwan's security and stable cross-straits relations. This is why U.S. presidential candidates across the board almost unanimously promise to strengthen relations with Taiwan and guarantee its security during any given presidential election. Yet making Taiwan's security a high priority does not necessarily mean sending troops to the island's defense. Thus most newly elected American presidents quickly abandon their strong campaign rhetoric, and settle for emphasizing a formulaic policy of peaceful resolution to the cross-straits problem.
As a result, in the current U.S.-led Asia-Pacific security environment, "peace" and "self-defense" are two basic principles of cross-straits relations and Taiwan security. Key to the idea of "peace" is peace of the status quo. Thus "peaceful resolution" is nothing more than a policy expectation; maintaining the peace and security of the status quo, though, is still important. As Andrew Nathan argues, that "the United States has no vested interest in the outcome of the Taiwan issue so long as the resolution is arrived at peacefully."<11> <http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/Yang-1000.htm> *****
>And as the last couple of years have
>shown, anti-China feelings can easily warm the popular heart as well.
Yes, but not as easily as ideologues hope. Most Americans probably yawned when they heard the news of the "Chinese nuclear spy"; they didn't give a damn about the PNTR question either.
Popular sentiments may change if a coming recession ends in a hard landing, however.
Yoshie