negating non-intervention

[Yoshie Furuhashi]

JC Helary wrote:

>plus, my memory may fail me but the obuchi cabinet (the previous one) already
>passed a 'new guideline' bill that is supposed to support actively projects
>related to the security treaty between the us and japan. the contents of the
>guidelines are unknown to me but i remember a special issue of a 'left'
>monthly in november 1999 focusing on the policies of the obuchi cabinet that
>included a harsh criticism of them (the guidelines). so i guess a research in
>the international pages of related magazines from 1999/4 to 11 should bring
>fruits.
>
>back to the main issue. the right to project means a change in the
>constitution (the japanese people renounce the threat or use of force as a
>means of settling international disputes. chap2 art9) although japan's self
>defense forces -as they are locally called- have been allowed to operate
>abroad as part of peace keaping operations thanks to a law passed in 92. the
>means to project well means that they don't have any (?) carriers and related,
>that also is from memory and i have nothing at hand to check it. In 1994 a
>comitee handed a report that suggested the acquisition of long distance
>support material to take part more efficiently to pko. i have no idea what the
>results were. any specialist of defense matters?

*****   NBR Publications: AccessAsia Review: Vol. 2, No. 1

The National Bureau of Asian Research

STATE OF THE FIELD REPORT:
RESEARCH ON JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

Michael J. Green  [Michael Green is Olin Fellow for Asian Security at 
the Council on Foreign Relations and Acting Director of the Edwin O. 
Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins 
University School of Advanced International Studies]

...Introduction

In recent years Japan has taken a series of steps to redefine its 
defense policies and its security relationship with the United States:

In 1992 the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) produced a report, 
_Japan's Role in the International Society_, which highlighted a 
consensus in the party that Japan should expand its participation in 
UN peacekeeping operations and demonstrate more assertive leadership 
on regional security issues;1

In 1994 Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa's special Advisory Committee 
on Defense Issues produced a report calling for a tripartite defense 
policy based on: (1) utilization of multilateral security forums; (2) 
enhanced indigenous defense capabilities; and (3) the U.S.-Japan 
security relationship;2

In 1995 the coalition government of socialist prime minister Tomiichi 
Murayama issued a revision of the 1976 National Defense Program 
Outline that shifted the scope of Japanese defense requirements from 
those capabilities necessary to "resist a small-scale limited 
invasion" to those necessary to respond to "situations in the area 
around Japan that have an effect on the security of Japan;"3

In 1996 President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto 
announced a new Joint Security Declaration that reaffirmed the 
continuing importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the maintenance 
of U.S. forces in Japan and outlined an agenda for expanded defense 
cooperation, including: defense planning, research and development, 
missile defense, and diplomacy toward China;4

In 1997 the U.S. and Japanese governments completed a revision of the 
1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, paving the way for new 
Japanese legislation and bilateral mechanisms designed to expand 
Japan's logistical and military role in the event of regional 
contingencies;5

Throughout this period, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the 
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) have steadily increased their policy role 
in Japan.  The process began with the dispatch of Maritime 
Self-Defense Force minesweepers to the Gulf in 1991 and Ground 
Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia for UN peacekeeping in 1992. 
Institutional enhancements have continued at home with the 
establishment of the Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters in 1997 
and a strategic planning unit in 1998.  The JDA and JSDF have also 
initiated active defense diplomacy (exchanges, training, multilateral 
forums) with other militaries in East Asia....

...The Defense Guidelines and the Japanese Constitution

Much of the debate over Japanese security policy in the past few 
years has focused on how rapidly the U.S.-Japan alliance should be 
restructured to prepare for the next big international crisis.  Most 
analysts agree with the need for reinvigoration of the alliance 
represented by the 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration and the 
1997 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, but opinion divides on 
whether that process should take place within Japan's current 
constitutional framework, or should be the vehicle for 
reinterpretation or even revision of the Japanese Constitution.

The Japanese government has interpreted Article Nine of the 
Constitution to mean that Japan has the right of both individual and 
collective self-defense, but has chosen not to exercise the right of 
collective defense.  The Cabinet Legal Affairs Bureau (_Hoseikyoku_) 
established in 1983 that Japanese forces may come to the aid of a 
U.S. ship resisting an attack on Japan, but may not come to the aid 
of the U.S. ship if it is engaged in offensive military operations 
not directly related to the defense of Japan.  This line between 
"collective" and "individual" self-defense has obvious implications 
for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation and Japan's larger definition of 
its security role.

When the Japanese government revised the National Defense Program 
Outline in 1995, moving the focus from defense against "small-scale 
limited invasion" to "situations in the area surrounding Japan that 
have a direct impact on the security of Japan," the barrier created 
by the self-imposed ban on collective defense came under intense 
scrutiny and debate.  After the United States and Japan agreed to 
review the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in 1996, conservatives 
in the LDP and the members of the opposition New Frontier Party 
pushed for the Japanese government to finally recognize the right of 
collective self-defense.  They had support from _Yomiuri Shimbun_, 
which had published a draft proposal for a new constitution that 
included explicit language on collective defense.29

However, the LDP leadership was concerned about maintaining its 
delicate coalition with the Social Democratic Party and about broader 
public and regional support for the new Guidelines.  The Clinton 
Administration was not about to press for constitutional 
reinterpretation or reform either.  Consequently, the two governments 
announced that the Guidelines review would occur within the framework 
of the Japanese Constitution and the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual 
Security and Cooperation.  When the new Guidelines for Defense 
Cooperation were completed in September of 1997, the Cabinet Legal 
Affairs Bureau determined that almost all of the new missions and 
areas of cooperation outlined were consistent with a somewhat more 
flexible interpretation of the right of "individual" self-defense. 
The only areas that remained ambiguous were the ability of Japanese 
minesweepers to operate with U.S. naval forces in offensive 
operations and the ability of Japan Air Defense Force facilities to 
refuel or rearm U.S. jet fighters about to strike enemy targets. 
However, the Cabinet Legal Affairs Bureau acknowledged in 
negotiations with the Defense Agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
that even these limitations were subject to reinterpretation 
depending on the context of the operations.  The most crucial 
operational support -- in logistics; access to bases, areas, and 
facilities; sealane patrol; and so forth -- fell within the bounds of 
"individual" self-defense.

Critics of this incremental approach to restructuring the alliance 
argue that it is insufficient in the context of the post-Cold War 
changes in Japanese politics and U.S.-Japan relations.  Mike 
Mochizuki argues that incrementalism impedes Japan's expanded 
contributions to the alliance, perpetuates ambiguity about the 
ultimate goal of Japan's defense capabilities and prevents a frank 
and open discussion of security issues in Japan, particularly at the 
parliamentary level.30  In short, the incremental approach preserves 
the asymmetries that put the alliance at risk in the first place. 
Torkel Patterson maintains that "the alternative to increased 
latitude on collective security and collective defense is a more 
expensive and autonomous Japanese defense establishment that is less 
interdependent and interoperable with U.S. forces."  Patterson, a 
veteran Pentagon official of the Gulf War era of U.S.-Japan friction, 
argues that Japan's legitimate national security interests extend as 
far as the Persian Gulf (in tandem with the United States) and that 
the post-war constraints on U.S.-Japan security cooperation are 
therefore anachronistic.31

Supporters of an incremental approach generally agree with the 
ultimate objectives of those advocating more drastic restructuring, 
but question the notion that bilateral asymmetries can or should be 
immediately corrected.  U.S. pressure on Japan to adopt the right of 
collective defense might provoke a new security debate in Japan, but 
it would also undermine the broad Japanese domestic political 
consensus that has allowed the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation 
review to occur, and it would increase tensions with China and the 
Republic of Korea.  In the end, the U.S.-Japan alliance would be left 
with a less stable regional environment and a re-polarization of the 
politics of defense in Japan.32  As Bruce Stokes and James J. Shinn 
note in a Council on Foreign Relations study of the options for the 
alliance, the alliance must be strengthened so that Japan is "planned 
in" U.S. strategy (i.e. included in U.S. contingency plans) for the 
Asia Pacific region, but:

the risks of a new Cold War rivalry in East Asia and of being trapped 
in a deadly self-fulfilling prophecy increase if a tighter alliance 
antagonizes Beijing.  This is the most compelling reason to move with 
caution and moderation in strengthening the security relationship 
with Japan.33

The key, as Ralph Cossa points out, is not correcting asymmetries, 
but "defining adequate support to the satisfaction of both nations, 
and in a manner not threatening to Japan's peace-loving neighbors."34 
Defining "adequate" Japanese support as Cossa urges, and "planning 
Japan in" as Stokes and Shinn argue, requires implementation of the 
Guidelines through enabling legislation in Japan-a process that must 
result from broad public support rather than from divisive debate....

[The full article is available at 
<http://www.nbr.org/publications/review/vol2no1/essay.html>.]   *****

Yoshie
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