During the cold war the FAZ had been fiercly anti-communist. But even the FAZ rather calls the PDS 'former communists', 'successor party' etc.
Johannes
Berlin's Power Games
Volker Zastrow
The grand coalition between the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the city-state of Berlin is at an end -- the Social Democrats have decided to finish it off. More surprising is that it lasted for so long: more than 10 years.
The preceding quarter-century had been characterized by sharp contrasts between the CDU and SPD. It was compulsion rather than natural attraction that brought them together: a strong CDU that nonetheless was dependent on a partner to be able to form a government; and a weak SPD, which could have governed without the CDU only by forming a coalition with both Alliance 90/The Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism, the successor party to East Germany's communists. As a matter of pure calculation, those three would always have been able to garner a majority. About 10 percent of the voters support the Greens, and about 20 percent are behind the two other parties; a little less for the PDS and a little more for the SPD.
But a coalition of the Social Democrats with East Germany's former communists, with their enduring stronghold in the once Russian-occupied half of the city, the "Capital of the German Democratic Republic," has thus far always been considered the mettle test. His brow lined with worry, Berlin Governing Mayor Eberhard Diepgen has repeatedly emphasized that point, claiming that this applies not only to the SPD, but to the entire city as well.
At least for the SPD, this is apparently no longer the case. Several months ago, Gregor Gysi, the former PDS parliamentary leader, said that just such an alliance would provide evidence that East and West in Germany are indeed growing together -- as if "the East" and the PDS were identical. Since then, Mr. Gysi has been spinning cunning yarns as Berlin's utmost flatterer; it often seems as if the city is greedily awaiting his ascent. This, incidentally, is not merely a result of his rhetorical skills; it is also a side effect of his party's isolation, which makes it seem that the party is more influential than is actually the case with its 17.7 percent of the vote.
But the SPD's compulsion to join in a grand coalition arose from the demand that the PDS must not govern in Berlin. As such, the situation may be viewed inversely: If it desires to avoid that compulsion, it must do away with the demand. This has been in the works for quite some time. The motivating force behind it is Klaus Wowereit, leader of the SPD group in the Berlin city parliament. As early as last year, he publicly sounded out Mr. Gysi as to how "attitude blockades" might be overcome. Mr. Wowereit has been working unwaveringly to bring down the coalition for months now, ever since the Landowsky affair provided him with the opportunity.
The SPD is now listening to him. The party will also likely make him its mayoral candidate. Has it already forgotten the fiasco of Walter Momper, who as the party's candidate in 1999 likewise was not burdened by any attitude blockades -- at least in theory?
Mr. Diepgen holds the responsibility for the way the CDU dealt with the current budget crisis that can charitably be described as casual, and less charitably as irresponsible. The CDU has the added bad luck that the Landowsky case, involving DM40,000 ($17,000) in illegal donations, seems to be linked to the Bankgesellschaft Berlin's huge deficit. Moreover, the public-sector bank scandal is not purely the fault of the CDU; indeed, its governing partner SPD must share the responsibility. And even in the face of the enormous sums, one must not forget that Berlin's financial problems are not purely homemade, but are also to some extent inherited and occasioned by German unification.
Nonetheless, a shadow lies over the CDU, and this is the opportunity sought by Mr. Wowereit. The grand coalition must be perceived by the Social Democrats as a burden. After all, only Mr. Diepgen has profited from the continuation of the party's cooperation. He has established himself in Berlin as the protector of the "little people." The "rejection of social coldness" and of the Social Democratic "demolition society," which Mr. Diepgen lost no time in expressing at his first press conference following the coalition's downfall, has its price; namely, garnering 40 percent of the vote for the CDU.
The others are all aware of this. Consequently, the first reactions by the SPD, PDS and Alliance 90_The Greens implied that none of them were serious about a budget consolidation.
In reality then, this is not about the budget. The first reactions by the SPD were thus also characterized by endeavors to establish a myth of having been stabbed in the back, implying that it was actually the CDU that allowed the coalition to fall apart. In truth, Mr. Diepgen fought for its survival to the end, with an obvious interest. No, it is rather the SPD that is building bridges to the PDS. This is consistent with the national trend. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has been involved since 1994, when he was still premier of Lower Saxony. The calculation is simple: The SPD gains freedom to maneuver with a PDS deemed coalition-worthy, and the CDU is thereby isolated.
But this calculation is not free of ideology. For quite some time, a number of Social Democrats have viewed the confrontation with the communists as a "war amongst brothers." Since the Cold War is receding ever further into history, it is becoming ever easier to match up relics of bygone days with the democratic capacity for differentiation. That message should be especially taken to heart by the western portion of Berlin. In contrast to Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania or Saxony-Anhalt, Berlin does indeed consist of East and West. Only in Berlin may the PDS be made "socially acceptable."