Unless one party destroys the other, they must communicate about the terms of denouement. My impression is that OBL mostly wants the U.S. out of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. He wasn't sufficiently exercised about Palestine to reject collaboration with the U.S. against the Russians. In all these things there are degrees of policy change. Unless OBL is deeply intransigent, agreements are conceivable. Suppose the U.S. blows up 85% of al-qaida's capacity, but the remaining 15% is prohibitively costly to root out, and this same 15% is not nearly as dangerous. Maybe an under-the-table truce is based on leaving the 15% alone in exchange for some low-grade concessions re: Saudi Arabia (i.e., a marginally more Islamic government; more women's heads can get chopped off).
I am impressed by DD's point (and earlier, Mark J) that there is some aftermath where some remnant of al-qaida and some remnant of the U.S. strike a deal. The bigger your remnant, the better your bargaining position. There is already talk of a scaled-down, pacified 'moderate' Taliban regime for Afghanistan, installed by the U.S. The failure to go to Baghdad in 1990 could be read as another example where the "Evil One" du jour was unaccountably permitted to remain in power. We all know that in U.S. foreign policy, "Evil" comes in different sizes. Some of them you can do business with.
mbs
But what would be negotiated exactly? ObL & Co. want the U.S. out of the Middle East. That basically means disengagement from a major outpost of Empire, and the cutting loose of one of Washington's most important sub-hegemons, Israel. As much as just about everyone on this list would like to see this result, it seems pretty fanciful to me that the U.S. would even begin to negotiate over demands like this. Am I missing something? Doug