Part two, continued.
------------------------------------
Primakov has three priorities for Baghdad which will benefit
Russia: (1) the resumption of sales of oil, which will allow Iraq
to repay its $7 billion debt for Soviet weapons purchased in the
1980s;14 (2) the fulfillment of Saddam Hussein's pledge to order
4,000 battle tanks from the ailing Russian military-industrial
complex, which could save the crumbling Russian arms industry; and
(3) the lifting of U.N. sanctions so that such powerful Russian
oil companies as Lukoil can begin implementing their agreements
with Iraq to develop multibillion-dollar oil and gas projects,
such as the Western Kurna oil field.
Primakov is taking steps to improve Russia's position in Iraq and
throughout the Middle East so that, once again, Russia is seen as
a friend of the Arab cause. If both Iran and Iraq break out of
containment, America's allies in the Middle East including Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel will be threatened. Another war in the
Middle East would result in large causalities and drive up oil
prices, undoubtedly benefiting both Iran and Russia. To placate
the Arab regimes, Primakov has called for the multilateralization
of mediation efforts in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and he is
demanding the participation of Russia and the European Union. In a
recent interview, he stated that "The process of political
settlement has come to a point in time when the monopolization of
peacemaking efforts by any single side does not create favorable
conditions for progress."15
Primakov is using arms sales and intelligence support to
authoritarian and anti-Western regimes as a means to regain
Russian influence in the Middle East-the same policies he pursued
as the USSR's top Middle Eastern expert in the 1970s and 1980s. On
his watch, the Russia Foreign Intelligence Service started
training Iranian intelligence operatives who are engaged in
terrorism around the world.16 Moscow forgave 50 percent of Libya's
$4 billion debt for weapons purchases in the 1970s and 1980s.17
Primakov is thought to be behind a huge pending sale of arms to
Damascus in which bankrupt Syria, which already owes Russia $10
billion, will receive modern weapons worth an additional $2
billion to $3 billion.18 This is an expensive price tag for
Primakov's old Middle Eastern policy that left the former USSR
with a multibillion-dollar bad debt from its former client states.
In another destabilizing move, Russia agreed to supply Cyprus with
its state-of-the-art anti-aircraft/anti-ballistic missile system,
the S-300, which Turkey already has threatened to destroy. This
step is aimed at exacerbating the conflict between the two NATO
allies, Greece and Turkey, on the eve of NATO expansion. Moreover,
terms of the contract for the supply of this modern system remain
murky, and it is not clear whether it will allow Cyprus to
transfer the S-300 system to Iran, Iraq, or Libya.
Another Discovery: CIS Integration. Since his days as Russia's
chief spymaster, Primakov has promoted the integration of the
Commonwealth of Independent States under the aegis of Russia.19 In
a widely publicized report, he claimed that his experts at the
espionage agency discovered an "objective tendency" for
integration of the CIS into Russia.20 He also has warned the West
not to become involved in the development of Eurasia's mineral
resources and not to assist or strengthen the New Independent
States on their road to democracy and market economy. Similar to
the concept of multipolarity, these "centripetal processes" serve
only to promote Russian neo-imperialist aspirations in what Moscow
sees as its "near abroad."
Under Primakov, Russia also is playing a key role in all regional
conflicts in Eurasia. From Moldova to Abkhazia and from
Nagorno-Karabkh to Tajikistan, Moscow was involved in supporting
pro-Russian factions and exacerbating ethnic conflicts that have
destabilized the New Independent States. Now it is attempting to
dictate the terms of peace to the warring parties.21 While it is
conceivable that Primakov has decided to improve relations with
Russia's neighbors in order to challenge the United States
elsewhere, it is also likely that he is coming to grips with
limitations on Russia's power and capabilities due to its economic
and political decline.
The treaty of unification with Belarus was a victory for Russia's
neo-imperialist faction. Primakov was instrumental in negotiating
this arrangement and now wholeheartedly supports and promotes
it.22 He views union with Belarus as a geopolitical response to
NATO expansion, which would bring Russian troops to the Polish
border and extend Russia's presence on the borders of Ukraine and
Lithuania. Provisions of the union treaty unite Russia with the
most politically oppressive and economically retrograde
neo-Stalinist regime in Europe-a step seen by Russian hard-liners
as the first step to reunification of the old Soviet Union.23
However, repressive actions by Belarussian President Aleksandr
Lukashenka, such as the arrest of Russian television crews and
members of Belarusssian opposition groups and the closing of
newspapers, as well as concerns in Moscow regarding the costs of
reunification have slowed the unification process.24
In January 1997, Primakov threatened Estonia with economic
sanctions.25 While Russia and Estonia completed the draft of a
peace treaty, Primakov stalled the signing of the agreement.
Meanwhile, the Russian foreign ministry took a harsh position
toward Latvia, apparently in an attempt to forestall a bid on the
part of the Baltic states to join NATO.26 The Russian Duma is
stalling ratification of a peace treaty with Lithuania. Only
recently did Russia change its tune and attempt to improve
relations with the Baltic states, primarily to prevent them from
joining NATO.
"MULTIDIRECTIONAL" FOREIGN POLICY:
A PRESCRIPTION FOR OVERREACH?
The Primakov doctrine is designed primarily to dilute America's
strength and influence while increasing Russia's influence and
position in the Middle East and Eurasia. To achieve this goal,
Russia is also attempting to capitalize on China's quest to become
a regional superpower and force reunification with Taiwan.
Moreover, Moscow is working to improve ties with Tokyo. For
example, Primakov seems to have succeeded in convincing the
government of Japan to moderate substantially its claims to the
Northern Territories (the South Kurile islands occupied by Russia
in World War II).27 Moscow would like to improve relations with
Tokyo in order to neutralize the Japanese-American military
alliance.
Primakov has shown himself to be a master at exploiting
anti-American feeling. He is playing on the traditional
anti-American sentiments of the Iranian Shiite establishment, the
Arab nationalists, and even the French foreign policy elite. On
recent visits to Japan and Latin America, Primakov promised
Russia's support for their efforts to secure permanent seats on
the U.N. Security Council.28 The United States and Great Britain
most probably would oppose such a moveæthereby making Moscow look
good by comparison.
CONCLUSION
Russia is looking to establish its position in the post-Cold War
world and, under the leadership of veteran Cold Warrior Evgenii
Primakov, is not likely to position itself with the West and the
United States. Russia is too weak to sustain a credible coalition
to challenge the United States, but its irresponsible attempts to
counter the United States undoubtedly will lead to increased
tensions in the Middle East and elsewhere. Therefore, Primakov's
attempts to have Russia challenge the United States for influence
are dangerous. In the end, they will prove to be counterproductive
and will contribute little to Russia's integration into the global
economy.
Primakov's path for Russia is one of nurturing geopolitical
tensions, imperial grudges, and as-yet-unfulfilled great power
ambitions.29 By playing into the hands of unreconciled communists
and nationalists in Moscow, dictators in Baghdad, and mullahs in
Tehran, Primakov is hoping to strengthen his own political
position in Moscow and the Middle Eastern capitals. In the
process, he is hampering Russia's integration with the West,
endangering both the flow of technology transfers and foreign
investment into his country30 and the access by Russian enterprise
to U.S. capital markets-a situation that undoubtedly will be
blamed on "American opposition" to the flow of Western capital to
Russia.
By building an anti-American coalition, cultivating Middle Eastern
dictators, and modernizing China's military power, the Primakov
doctrine endangers U.S.-Russia relations as well as world peace
and stability. It will place Russia increasingly in a zero-sum
game with the United States and the West while encouraging Russia
to champion the pariah states of the world. This is an
irresponsible game that serves no country's best interests, not
even Russia's. Washington's foreign policy decision makers should
take note of his efforts and proceed with caution when faced with
Evgenii Primakov's neo-Soviet foreign policy.
Endnotes
1 The author thanks Professor Stephen J. Blank, Professor Robert
O. Freedman, J. Michael Waller, Professor Uri Ra'anan, Herbert
Romerstein, and a number of colleagues for reviewing and assisting
with this article.
2 For a thorough discussion of Russia's growing role in the Middle
East, see Stephen J. Blank, "Russia's Return to the Mideast
Policy," Orbis, Fall 1996, p. 516.
3 Scott Parish, "Primakov in Tehran," OMRI Daily Digest, December
30, 1996.
4 Qian Qichen, "Primakov Holds Talks," Xinhua, November 10, 1997,
FBIS-CHI-97-314.
5 Yevgenia Albatz, "KGB-MSB-MBVD: Substantive Changes?" Moscow
News, January 13, 1992, which cites former KGB General Oleg
Kalugin. Also from personal interview at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, Boston, Massachusetts, 1990, with source who
requested anonymity.
6 Alexander Rahr, A Biographical Directory of 100 Leading Soviet
Officials (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 144-145.
7 J. Michael Waller and Victor Yasmann, "Russia's Great Criminal
Revolution: The Role of the Security Services," Journal of
Contemporary Criminal Justice, January 1995, at
http://www.afpc.org/issues/crimrev4.htm; J. Michael Waller, "Who
Is Making Foreign Policy," Perspective, Vol. V, No. 3
(January-February 1995), at
http://web.bu.edu/ISCIP/content/vol_5/Waller.html, confirmed by
interviews with Duma members who requested anonymity, Moscow, July
1996.
8 Primakov and SVRR worked to undermine Kozyrev and his
"pro-Western" foreign policy. See J. Michael Waller, "Primakov's
Imperial Line," Perspective, Vol. VII, No. 3 (January-February
1997), p. 2, at http://web.bu.edu/ISCIP/content/vol_7/Waller.html.
9 Savik Shuster, "Face to Face, Conversation with Alexei Arbatov,"
Radio Liberty transcript, November 16, 1997.
10 Conversations with Heritage staff during visits in 1997.
11 Tomas Kolesnichenko, "Our Foreign Policy Cannot Be the Policy
of a Second-Rate State-Primakov on NATO Relations, Multipolar
World," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 17, 1996, pp. 1-7,
FBIS-SOV-96-243. See also Aleksandr Nechayev and Victor Khrekov,
"Text of Primakov Interview on Reform," ITAR-TASS, January 8,
1997, FBIS-SOVI-97-006.
12 Ariel Cohen and James Phillips, "Russia's Dangerous Game in
Iran," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 503, November
13, 1997.
13. "Russia Push for Iraq Opposed at UN," Associated Press,
November 25, 1997.
14 Josef Joffe, "Moscow Is Mediating on Its Own Account,"
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, November 20, 1997, p. 4, FBIS-WEU-97-324.
15 Aleksandr Zhudro and Georgiy Shelenkov, "Primakov Against
`Monopolization' of Mideast Peace Process," ITAR-TASS World
Service, October 31, 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-304.
16 J. Michael Waller, "Primakov's Imperial Line."
17 Ibid.
18 According to U.S. government sources, Russia is seeking Saudi
financing for this transaction. From personal interview, December
1997, in Washington, D.C.
19 Ariel Cohen, "Revisiting Russia's Turbulent Rim: Caucasus,
Central Asia and Moldova," in Russia: A Return to Imperialism, ed.
Uri Ra'anan and Kate Martin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995),
p. 87.
20 Rossiya-SNG: Nuzhdayetsia li v korrektriovke pozitisia Zapada
(Moscow: Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki Rossiyskoi Federatsii, 1994).
21 For the context and implications of Russia's CIS policy, see
Ariel Cohen, "A New Paradigm of U.S.-Russia Relations: Facing the
Post-Cold War Reality," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1105,
March 6, 1997, and "U.S. Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia:
Building a New `Silk Road' to Economic Prosperity," Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 1132, July 24, 1997.
22 Nechayev and Khrekov, "Text of Primakov Interview on Reform."
23 Ariel Cohen, "Russia's Union with Belarus: Expensive and
Troubling," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 476,
April 21, 1997.
24 Russian economic reformers, including First Deputy Prime
Ministers Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, indicated to Boris
Yeltsin that the unification with Belarus would drastically dilute
presidential power and cost the Russian treasury over $10 billion.
25 "Primakov Assesses Ties with Baltic States," Interfax, January
13, 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-009.
26 "Latvian Foreign Minister Assesses Meeting with Primakov,"
Radio Riga Network, September 29, 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-272.
27 Shigeki Hakamada, "Proposal for Building New Japanese-Russian
Relations," Tokyo Forsight, August 1997, pp. 6-9, FBIS-EAS-97-296.
28 Ibid. See also "Russia Backs Latin American Wish for UNSC
Membership," ITAR-TASS, November 21, 1997, as quoted in
FBIS-SOV-97-325.
29 Kolesnichenko, "Our Foreign Policy Cannot Be the Policy of a
Second-Rate State."
30 "Senator D'Amato Serves Notice on Those Who Aid and Abet U.S.
Adversaries: No Fund-Raising on American Markets," Center for
Security Policy Perspective No. 97-C 161, October 30, 1997.