On Tue, 23 Mar 2004 uvj at vsnl.com wrote:
> Compare the US policies towards Iraq and Pakistan. Iraq was subjected to
> UN weapons inspection and economic sanctions for years and then invaded
> for concealing WMDs.
>
> On the other hand, Pakistan was allowed to acquire nukes in the 80s
> (when it was a frontline state against the Soviet occupation of
> Afghanistan) and proliferate without any hindrance for 16 years !
Ahem, Ulhas :o) Which country was the first to acquire a nuke on the Indian subcontinent? Much heavier sanctions were placed on Pakistan than on India -- in large part because there wasn't much the US could withhold from a country that wasn't an ally and didn't get much in the way of US aid or weapons and had a pretty self-sufficent economy. The story of Pakistan was that those old style sanctions were toothless. The only real sanction under the old system was the enormous cost and effort, which only a country which felt real fear of destruction -- or was enormous -- would bear.
Iraq on the other hand was prevented from getting WMDs by the Gulf War and the supersanctions that came after it -- but that war came about for entirely different reasons -- and, from the viewpoint of proliferation, entirely chance reasons. If it hadn't been for that war -- and for the Israelis bombing Osirak -- Iraq might well have acquired a bomb. And when it came to leniency on WMDs during the 80s, we were much more lenient towards Iraq than Pakistan.
I'm not disputing any of your implicit value judgments. I just think we have to keep the historical record straight for future reference. This wasn't a matter of differing policies. This was a matter of policy failure, the limits of policy, and gratutitous accident.
Similarly, as for Pakistani proliferation to other countries, that was not a matter of policy, that was a matter of extreme policy failure. The US was deadset against precisely those countries getting anything connected with nuclear weapons exactly during the period they got some. The US state and intelligence departments didn't cut Pakistan any slack on that front for its help with the Mujadeheen (which was over during the period of proliferation, which was the 90s). They just abjectly failed. And/or they didn't have the tools to succeed -- they couldn't force middlemen to comply.
(Although it must said, the jury's still out on how much anybody got. Libya's the only one we've been able to check out for sure, and so far it looks like she got a billion dollars worth of squat. North Korea, whatever they got, it could only at most have been a second string backup to what they already had. And Iran we don't know yet. But it certainly would be ironic if Pakistan, the most anti-Shia state in the world, supplied their neighbor Iran with the essentials they needed to make a bomb. I find it hard to believe that would be something the Pakistani government or military or intelligence or jihadist sympathizers were for. It gives credence to the rogue venality argument. And I suspect when all the smoke is cleared we'll find out they got what Libya got: a lot of stuff with crucial parts missing.)
Michael