[lbo-talk] Russia's high-risk game in Chechnya

uvj at vsnl.com uvj at vsnl.com
Sat Mar 10 15:47:52 PST 2007


The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/

Saturday, Mar 10, 2007

Opinion

Russia's high-risk game in Chechnya http://www.hindu.com/2007/03/10/stories/2007031003131200.htm

Vladimir Radyuhin

Former rebels today bear the main responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the region.

WITH THE appointment of former rebel Ramzan Kadyrov as President of Chechnya last week, Moscow's plan to pacify the rebellious region through "Chechenisation" of the conflict has entered its final phase. President Vladimir Putin conceived the plan when Moscow launched a second military campaign in October 1999 to crush Chechen separatism. After Russian forces seized all major rebel strongholds, he appointed former mufti Akhmad Kadyrov as the head of the pro-Russia administration in Chechnya in June 2000. Kadyrov, who fought on the rebel side in the first Chechen war from 1994 to 1996, was to persuade other rebels to come out of the woods. It was no simple task as rebel resistance remained strong and Russian troops continued to die on a daily basis in guerilla-style attacks. But Moscow pushed ahead with its peace plan. In March 2003 war-weary Chechens overwhelmingly voted in a referendum for a Kremlin-drafted Constitution for Chechnya, which restored its status as a Russian province. This enabled Moscow to take a further step and shift greater responsibility for governing the region to the Chechen administration. In October 2003, Akhmad Kadyrov was elected President of Chechnya. He was killed in a bomb attack at a stadium in the Chechen capital, Grozny, in May 2004.

His death dealt a major blow to the Kremlin's efforts to restore peace in the region, but Mr. Putin stuck to his "Chechenisation" plan. Four months after Kadyrov was killed Moscow held a new presidential election in Chechnya, which was won by Kremlin-backed Interior Minister Alu Alkhanov. Two months later Chechnya elected a Parliament, completing the establishment of a civilian structure of government.

However, Moscow was not yet prepared to hand over full control of the region from the Russian military to the Chechen administration. President Alkhanov, a career police officer who had fought on the Russian side since the first Chechen war, was not in the best position to prevail upon militants to lay down arms. This job was entrusted to Kadyrov's 27-year-old son and security chief, Ramzan, a former rebel like his father. The Kremlin started grooming Kadyrov junior to step into his father's shoes when he turned 30, the minimum age for becoming President under the Chechen Constitution. In the meantime Ramzan was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in charge of security under President Alkhanov, and last year took over as Prime Minister.

The Kremlin's betting on Kadyrov junior has paid off. He succeeded where the several thousand Russian forces deployed in Chechnya failed: in bringing peace to the embattled region. There have not been any major rebel attacks in the region since the Beslan school hostage drama in September 2004, in which nearly 350 people died, half of them children. Rebel attacks on Russian forces declined especially dramatically last year with most rebels crossing over and joining Chechnya's security forces, which have been beefed up from 5,000 to 15,000 armed men in the past couple of years.

Former rebels today bear the main responsibility for maintaining peace and security in Chechnya. An estimated 500 to 600 armed militants who are still holding out have been largely demoralised and rendered inactive as rebel leaders, including Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev, were liquidated one by one by Russian security services. Foreign funding of the Chechen resistance has dried up as Moscow forged links with conservative Arab regimes.

Four months after Kadyrov junior turned 30, Mr. Alkhanov tendered his resignation last month, clearing the way for Mr. Putin to nominate Ramzan for President. On March 2, the Chechen Parliament almost unanimously endorsed Ramzan as President.

What Mr. Putin did essentially was to buy the loyalty of former rebels. Tiny Chechnya with a population of 600,000 gets over $1 billion a year in federal subsidies, project financing, and private investment. Kadyrov junior is believed to be already the richest man in North Caucasus, and has set up a foundation named after his father, which helps rebuild Chechnya's two main cities - Grozny and Gudermes. The first priority for Chechnya, which has a 57 per cent unemployment rate, compared with 8 per cent across Russia, is to create jobs so that the young people are not tempted to take up arms to earn a living.

Grozny, which a few years ago did not have a single building left undamaged by shelling during the two wars, today stuns visitors with rows of smart, freshly painted blocks of flats, and the soaring minarets of a huge new mosque, the biggest in Russia.

Kadyrov senior was once quoted as telling a Russian reporter: "What fools we were to fight a war against Russia, when we can just take whatever we want from Russia and still live as we please."

Former rebels are indeed the true rulers of Chechnya. They sit in Parliament, run Ministries, and man security forces.

Critics say the Kremlin is playing a high-risk game by installing former rebels in power. "Chechenisation" has been transformed into "Ramzanisation." Kadyrov junior and his militia, known as "Kadyrovtsy," have been widely accused of systematic abductions, tortures, and murders of those who stand in their way. In one particularly outrageous episode, they gunned down the leader of a rival pro-Russia Chechen security force in central Moscow in broad daylight. "Kadyrovtsy" are also prime suspects in the murder last year of well-known Moscow journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, who exposed human rights abuses in Chechnya.

Sceptics warn of the dangers of placing all eggs in Kadyrov junior's basket. His installation has upset a system of checks and balances Moscow has always sought to maintain in Chechnya by appointing a Russian Prime Minister or having an absolutely loyal President like Mr. Alkhanov. Kadyrov junior is likely to push for more and more power and money, blackmailing Moscow with threats of renewed rebel fighting, and it is only a matter of time before he breaks loose of Kremlin control.

Moscow has also betrayed loyal Chechens who have stayed with it through the two wars, but are now being squeezed out from the government. Mr. Alkhanov complained in a recent interview that the Kremlin supports those who have "spilt floods of blood" in Chechnya and has turned its back on those who have worked for peace.

Supporters of the Kremlin tactics agree the risk is there, but argue that a peaceful if despotic Chechnya is a far better option than a warring Chechnya. It is also pointed out that Russia today is much stronger than it was 10 years ago, and will not allow a resurgence of separatism. Moscow has already launched various programmes to reintegrate Chechnya into Russia economically and culturally. Chechen students are enrolled into Russian universities and Russian engineers and other professionals are encouraged to go work in Chechnya.

Russia's long war in Afghanistan, which was the cradle of Al-Qaeda, taught Mr. Putin that no amount of military superiority can defeat Islamic insurgency. Chechen resistance, which NATO ranked as the most combat-worthy guerilla force in the world, had no military solution either. Guerilla warfare in Chechnya continued even after the Russian army overran the whole of the region in the course of the first and the second Chechen campaigns. Worse still, terror attacks spilled over to neighbouring regions, threatening to set on fire Russia's entire North Caucasus. Chechnya was emerging as a hotbed of Islamic extremism and an Al-Qaeda stronghold. Moscow struck a deal with the Kadyrovs and other former rebels, because, for all their barbarity, they were moderates compared to Al-Qaeda-linked jihadis such as Basayev and Khatab. Interestingly, Mr. Putin's experience of reincorporating Chechen radicals into Russia's fold has come in handy in his current efforts to persuade Iran and Hamas to abandon radicalism in favour of compromise and moderation.

Ever since the U.S. invaded Iraq four years ago, America has been urged to learn from Russia's negative experience in Chechnya, when harsh military response to growing rebel resistance generated a vicious circle of violence and drove more civilians into the ranks of insurgents. Today, voices are heard calling on the U.S. to learn from Russia's success in pacifying Chechnya.

The regime set up in Chechnya "may not be pretty, but Russia won - meaning that Chechnya has been seamlessly reincorporated into the Russian Federation," New York-based analyst Alexei Bayer wrote. "If it hopes to restore stability in Iraq, Washington will similarly need to incorporate Iraq into its economic system."

When Mr. Putin ran for President in 2000, one of his main campaign promises was to crush separatism and "restore constitutional order" in Chechnya. As things look today, he will be able to claim to have honoured this pledge when he steps down in a year's time.

Copyright © 2007, The Hindu.



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