[lbo-talk] Arab Spring: The Libyan Remix

Wojtek S wsoko52 at gmail.com
Wed Aug 31 06:42:08 PDT 2011


Ravi: "Probably there aren’t any. But limiting this manipulation, if possible, helps, doesn’t it? "

[WS:] Obviously, but we also need to disentangle the concept of manipulation - it has very pejorative connotations that typically end all discussion. That is why the all-or-nothing dogmatists love it so much. I think a better concept is "utilization of elective affinities" - which means that different parties may collaborate to advance their common interests even though they may not share other interests. Each side "manipulates" the other side in such collaboration, although unequal power relations may limit how far the sides can go in that manipulation, or perhaps what will happen if the collaboration falls through.

A good example of such a relationship has been described by Janine Wedel in her book "Collision and Collusion," which provides an account of Western economic aid to Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the fall of Communism. She argued that Western aid agencies and Eastern recipients of that aid had different power and different interests, yet they collaborated to achieve common goals. Western aid agencies obviously "manipulated" Eastern organizations receiving that aid to achieve their own political objectives , but they were also "manipulated" by Eastern agencies to use Western funds to achieve their own domestic goals that had little to do with the donors' objectives. While the Western donors had the "power of the purse" over Eastern donors, they faced information asymmetry vis a vis Eastern recipients how to deploy their money locally to achieve their power. Consequently, Eastern recipients were often able to exploit that information asymmetry to their own advantage - speak the NGOspeak to obtain the funds and then divert them to their own goals.

This example illustrates a general rule that the relationship between Western powers and developing countries is never as straightforward as many dogmatists tend to portray it. Western powers may have superior economic or military resources, but these resources are not unlimited, so their efficient local deployment becomes critical. Here is when the local actors exercise their power coming from having superior local information, local connectedness and embneddedness, or perhaps higher risk tolerance than Western organizations. So the relationship between the West and developing countries is always based on utilization of elective affinities, even though developing country agents may be junior partners in those cooperations. This holds even for outright military takeovers - as the case if Iraq clearly demonstrates. And of course the British indirect colonial rule - used so effectively in India - is the prime classical example.

In case of Libya - different internal factions had certain elective affinities (deposing Qaddafi) which convince them to cooperate despite their differences. Asking for NATO support was just an extension of that cooperation - asking for help from powerful actors who share the same elective affinity. In that respect, the rebels "manipulated" NATO countries just as NATO countries "manipulated" the rebels, and different rebel groups "manipulated" each other. That is quite common in history - which is basically a realm of changing contingencies and shifting alliances based on these contingencies.

Some people seem to have problems with this picture of the world as contingent, uncertain, and predictable. Instead, they prefer a permanent logical order that gives them a sense of predictability and certitude. As I see it, a great deal of left talk about capitalism, imperialism, racism, etc,. falls into this category. I find this worldview just as unappealing as these folks find mine in which contingencies, shifting alliances and uncertainty are the norm.

Wojtek



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